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ABSTRACT  
 
Compulsory education, in particular history and religious education, is often used by 
states as a critical tool of nation building, as states attempt to socialize and shape the 
attitudes and beliefs of citizens in line with their strategic aims.  As a state that defines 
itself as "Jewish and democratic" and that has instituted special compulsory education 
curricula for students on the basis of ethnicity and religion, the state of Israel is no 
exception. The Syrian Golan despite being under occupation by Israel for the last forty-
five years has been written about only sparingly compared to the overwhelming amount 
of research that has been performed on the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The Druze 
residents of the Occupied Syrian Golan are subject to a separate compulsory education 
curriculum designed and implemented by the state of Israel that attempts to shape their 
identity in religious terms that reflect Israel's strategic aims at the expense of accurately 
depicting the history and heritage of the Syrian Golan and its residents. It attempts to 
obscure their identity as Syrian Arabs entirely, focusing instead on a narrative of 
historical similarity and alliance of Druze and Jews and their common persecution by 
Muslims. And most importantly, it is the same curriculum that Israel has created for its 
own citizens, highlighting a fundamental problem in Israel’s denial that it occupies the 
Syrian Golan. The problem in the Syrian Golan is not simply that the residents receive a 
separate education on the basis of religious and ethnic difference. It is not simply that the 
residents are left without the option of choosing an alternative education for their children 
that respects their origins. It is that the abuse of the principle of non-annexation has 
fundamental consequences for the human dignity of the affected residents, and negative 
implications on the international legal system upon which the principle is based. This 
study undertakes to analyze the problem of education in the occupied Golan in relation to 
norms of IHRL and IHL and to propose reconciliation between these conflicting norms to 
the extent that it is possible. It will focus primarily on Israel’s obligations under the 
ICESCR, CRC, CADE, and key international humanitarian agreements including the 
Fourth Geneva Convention and the Hague Regulations in the context of belligerent 
occupation. And finally, it will briefly analyze the problematic legal consequences of 
Israel’s conduct in relation to the residents of the Syrian Golan, and the international 
legal system.   
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PREFACE 
 
Throughout this manuscript, identity will be discussed often, and as such it is appropriate 
to define how these identity-related terms are used and why they were chosen. 
 
Druze 
 
The origins of the name Druze are disputed. Many historians claim that it originated from 
a figure known as the first Druze apostate, al-Darazi who was an early convert who 
outsiders perceived to be the founder of the new religious movement.  His so-called 
followers therefore became Druzes (Duruz), although today the word “Darazi” is still 
used as a modern epithet, implying that the person is a heretic.1  The term is said to have 
gained prominence because of its use by those who attempted to defame the community, 
although its usage has become acceptable over time to describe adherents to the religion.  
Authentic Druze manuscripts however do not use the term “Druze” or “Druzes” and such 
terms are still rejected by some members of the community.  The Druze prefer to refer to 
themselves as “Unitarians,” or Muwwahhidun in Arabic, and sometimes as People of 
Tawhid or Ahl al-Tawhid. 
 
Due to the term’s prominence and common usage among the Druze with which the 
author is acquainted, the term Druze will be used throughout this article, and is not 
intended to mean any disrespect to the adherents of the faith. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 SAMY SWAYD, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE DRUZES xxii (2006). 
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“We don’t need no education.  
We don’t need no thought control.  
No dark sarcasm in the classroom.  
Teacher, leave those kids alone. 
Hey, teachers! Leave those kids alone.” 
-Pink Floyd 
 
 
 
“Careful the tale you tell… 
That is the spell. 
Children will listen.” 
-Stephen Sondheim 
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Introduction 
Compulsory education, in particular history and religious education, is often used by 
states as a critical tool of nation building, as states attempt to socialize and shape the 
attitudes and beliefs of citizens in line with their strategic aims.  As a state that defines 
itself as "Jewish and democratic"2 and that has instituted special compulsory education 
curricula for students on the basis of ethnicity and religion, the state of Israel is no 
exception. As will be shown, the Syrian residents of the Occupied Syrian Golan3 who 
have lived under Israeli occupation since 1967 and annexation since 1981 are subject to a 
separate compulsory education curriculum designed and implemented by the state of 
Israel that attempts to shape their identity in religious terms that reflect Israel's strategic 
aims.4  This has raised concerns that it does so at the expense of accurately depicting the 
history and heritage of the Syrian Golan and its residents, who define themselves almost 
without exception as Syrian, Arab and Druze.5  The curriculum, in contrast with the 
                                                
2 The Declaration declares the establishment of a “Jewish state in the land of Eretz-Israel [Land of Israel in 
Hebrew] to be known as the State of Israel” and does not explicitly mention democratic governance.  See 
Declaration of Establishment of the State of Israel, 5708-1948, 1 LSI 3-5 (1948) (Isr.), available [in 
English, Hebrew and Arabic] at 
www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Declaration+of+Establishment+of+St
ate+of+Israel.htm (also known as “The Declaration of Independence”). The democratic character of the 
state was legislated in A Basic Law provides that anyone negating “the existence of the State of Israel as a 
Jewish and democratic state” will not have the right to take part in elections to the Knesset. Basic Law: The 
Knesset (Amendment No. 35), 2002, S.H. 158 (Isr.). See generally Nathan Lerner, Religious Liberty in the 
State of Israel, 21 EMORY INT’L L. R. 239-276 (2007) (discussing the meaning of Israel being a Jewish and 
democratic state). See also Orit Ichilov, Gavriel Salomon & Dan Inbar, Citizenship Education in Israel – a 
Jewish-Democratic State, in ISRAELI INSTITUTIONS AT THE CROSSROADS 29, 29 (Raphael Cohen-Almagor 
ed., 2005) (discussing the Jewish, democratic character of the state in relation to civic education).  
3 Occupied Syrian Golan, Syrian Golan, and Syrian Golan Heights will be used interchangeably hereinafter. 
4 See generally Kais M. Firro, Reshaping Druze Particularism in Israel, 30 J. PALESTINE STUD. 40-53 
(2001). 
5 Based upon fieldwork conducted by the author throughout the summer of 2008.  Some residents described 
themselves as Israeli and had accepted Israeli citizenship, but the overwhelming majority described 
themselves as Syrian, Arab and Druze.  One Christian family lived in the occupied village of Majdal 
Shams, but all others defined themselves as members of the Druze religious sect.  See also Tayseer Mara’i 
and Usama R. Halabi, Life Under Occupation in the Golan Heights, 22 J. PALESTINE STUD. 78-93 (1992). It 
should also be noted that some Druze commentators in Israel, particularly prominent Israeli Druze (not 
from the Golan), have debated the notion that the Druze are Arab. See SALMAN FALAH, THE DRUZE IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST 1 (1992) (“It is interesting to note that the question of origin did not trouble the Druzes in the 
past; but with the spread of Arab nationalism, claims were made that the Druzes were of pure Arabic 
descent, a view opposed by many Druzes in Israel today, including public figures, who maintain that the 
Druzes are not Arabs. The Israeli authorities recognize them as a separate people, and their identity cards 
list them as belonging to the Druze nationality.”).  
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Palestinian Arab6 curriculum in Israel, which has been charged with simultaneously 
racializing and demonizing Arabs,7 has raised concerns that it attempts to obscure their 
identity as Syrian Arabs, focusing instead on a narrative of historical similarity and 
alliance of Druze and Jews, and their common historical persecution by Muslims.   
Separate education on the basis of religious and ethnic difference is a complex subject 
educationally speaking, and raises questions about its compatibility with Israel's human 
rights obligations including the right to non-discrimination and the right to education as 
defined under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination in Education, and other relevant treaties to which Israel is party.  In 
particular, educational curricula that is factually inaccurate and said to marginalize the 
identity and history of the residents it describes seems to rise to the level of a violation of 
the ICESCR, the CRC, and the CADE, among other international human rights treaties to 
which Israel is party.  Israel is also bound by the laws of belligerent occupation, since the 
Syrian Golan enjoys protected status under IHL, sometimes referred to as the 
International Law of Armed Conflict.  Educational institutions are protected places under 
the law of belligerent occupation, and IHL regards protecting children and maintaining 
continuity with the heritage, religion, language, and national identity of their parents with 
special concern.  The curriculum and educational institutions in the Syrian Golan will 
therefore be analyzed against the backdrop of Israel’s humanitarian obligations as an 
Occupant, and against state practice in this area. 
                                                
6 The term “Palestinian Arab” has been chosen based upon the preferences of the Palestinian Arabs 
interviewed by Human Rights Watch researcher Zama Coursen-Neff in her 2004 study on discrimination 
against Palestinian Arab children in Israeli schools. Official government sources in Israel usually refer to 
Palestinian Arabs as “Israeli Arabs,” however this term has become highly politicized and was rejected by 
most of those interviewed.  For explanation see Zama Coursen-Neff, Discrimination against Palestinian 
Arab children in the Israeli Educational System, 36 INT’L. L. AND POL. 749 (2004). 
7 See generally Ismael Abu-Saad, Present Absentees: The Arab School Curriculum in Israel as a Tool for 
De-educating Indigenous Palestinians, 7.1 HLS (2008) [hereinafter Present Absentees]; see also Ismael 
Abu-Saad, Separate and Unequal: the Role of the State Educational System in Maintaining the 
Subordination of Israel’s Palestinian Arab Citizens, 10 SOC IDENTITIES 1 (2004) [hereinafter Separate and 
Unequal]; see also ISRAEL: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PALESTINIAN ARAB CHILDREN IN ISRAEL’S SCHOOLS 
(Human Rights Watch, Children’s Rights Division) (2002) [hereinafter HRW Report on Discrimination in 
Israel’s Schools]; see also Janan Abdu, Official School Curricula: Tool in Israel’s Hand to Obliterate 
Palestinian Identity in the 1948 Areas, available (in English) [hereinafter: Official School Curricula] at 
http://www.jai-pal.org/pie/education%20in%20areas%20of%2048%20_English_.pdf (original in Arabic). 
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The Syrian Golan, despite being under occupation by Israel for the last forty-five 
years, has been written about only sparingly compared to the overwhelming amount of 
research that has been performed on the Occupied Palestinian Territories.  This paper 
aims to contribute to the increasing body of international legal analyses of disputed 
territories and to raise visibility for neglected issues within the Syrian Golan by outlining 
the violation of these important legal standards through the use of preliminary field work 
from the Syrian Golan, including the analysis of supplementary educational tools 
designed by the residents themselves.  It also raises questions about the limitations of the 
IHRL and IHL approaches to evaluating education systems in occupied territories, 
especially in relation to balancing the quality of educational content with the specific 
exigencies of a minority population under prolonged belligerent occupation. 
Special attention will be paid to Israel’s concerns related to security, since these are at 
the heart of any discussion of its actions in relation to the territories it occupies, and in 
relation to the Arab minority in the state and the territories under Israel’s control.  
Identity is a highly politicized topic in Israel, and one that carries significance in relation 
to its international and domestic security.  Of note will also be the limitations and 
problems with the security approach to maintaining and creating identity speaces within 
education, particularly as they concern an occupied population and Israel’s obligations 
under IHL and IHRL. 
It should be noted that the education system in the Occupied Syrian Golan is but one 
component of the larger picture of what one resident of Majdal Shams, a professor of 
post-colonial Middle East history, terms “ethnic engineering” that Israel has propagated 
in the Occupied Syrian Golan, separating Jew from Druze, re-imagining the Golan 
community and land through a complex web of social and economic policies, and 
creating a new reality that has fundamentally altered the geographic, social and economic 
landscape of the territory.8  This research note will show that these actions, specifically in 
the educational system, are contrary to international human rights law and have had 
lasting negative effects on the Syrian residents subject to Israel’s effective control and 
occupation.   
                                                
8 Interview with Dr. Munir Fakhereldin, in Majdal Shams (Aug. 2008). 
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The paper is organized as follows: first, a brief history of the Druze in Israel and the 
history of the Occupied Syrian Golan since its occupation by Israel in 1967 and Israel’s 
annexation of the territory in 1981, followed by an exploration of the competing 
interactions of state aims vis a vis employing education as a tool of nation-building 
within the modern nation state with an occupant’s obligations related to education under 
the laws of war.  It then provides an overview of the educational curricula in the 
Occupied Syrian Golan, taking note of the significance of nationalist rhetoric in the 
curriculum and what is known about Israel’s objectives in its creation and 
implementation.   Finally, it briefly analyzes the curriculum with respect to Israel’s 
obligations under International Humanitarian and International Human Rights Law, 
related specifically to the right to education as outlined by the treaties to which Israel is 
party and the relevant authoritative interpretations of those treaties.  It analyzes the right 
to education under these two legal contexts and analyzes Israel’s obligations, taking into 
account both Israel’s position on the applicability of the two bodies of law and the 
changing international legal norms of occupation.  It concludes that some of the 
curricular content and the administration of the schools is inappropriate and harmful to 
the children subject to the curriculum in the Occupied Syrian Golan, thus violating 
Israel’s obligations under International Human Rights Law and International 
Humanitarian Law.   
 
History of the Syrian Golan 
Several characteristics of the Occupied Syrian Golan should be noted prior to discussing 
the education system.  Chief among them is the physical makeup of the area, a 
characteristic that has played a large role in both Israel and Syria’s claims to sovereignty 
over the territory.  The villages of the Occupied Syrian Golan are cramped into the top 
corner of the fertile, volcanic plateau, which rises up to 2,224 meters above sea level.9  
The OSG boasts rich soil situated at varying altitudes, rendering it capable of growing a 
                                                
9 The highest point of the Occupied Syrian Golan is Mount Hermon (Jabal Al-Shaykh). See DR. RAY 
MURPHY & DECLAN GANNON, CHANGING THE LANDSCAPE: ISRAEL’S GROSS VIOLATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE OCCUPIED SYRIAN GOLAN (Al-Marsad Arab Centre for Human Rights in the 
Occupied Golan) (2008). For an extensive discussion of the topography of the Golan, see ELISHA EFRAT, 
THE GOLAN HEIGHTS: OCCUPATION, ANNEXATION, NEGOTIATION 16-28 (Shoshana Michael-Zucker trans., 
ABC Publisher) (2009). 
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diverse array of crops including mangoes, bananas, avocados, grapes, cherries, and the 
apples for which the Syrian Golan is recently famous.  Further, it contains water from the 
headwaters of the Jordan River and at its border lies Lake Tiberias, which currently 
provides up to one third of Israel’s total fresh water.10  Since the displacement of the 
Syrian residents that had previously lived throughout the Syrian Golan and the 
destruction of their villages and farms, the five remaining villages in the Syrian Golan are 
in relative isolation from other developed areas with the exception of several Israeli 
settlements, built in contravention of international law, including the closest settlement to 
Majdal Shams, Neve Ativ.  Public transportation is scarce,11 and the closest town in Israel 
proper to the Syrian Golan villages, Kiryat Shemona, is about thirty minutes away by car.  
Access to Syria and Lebanon are prohibited,12 and the area around the Druze villages is 
replete with landmines, fenced off only by barbed wire and danger signs. Roads in the 
area reportedly primarily serve security and military functions, and the function of 
serving the Israeli settlements.13 
Prior to its capture by Israel, the region that is now the Syrian Golan had a long 
history of settlement by a diverse array of peoples from the Middle East region including 
Jews, Muslim Arabs, Byzantine Christians, Bedouin, Circassians, Turkmen, and others. 
The region is mentioned in the Bible as Golan, named after the town Golan, by Greeks 
and Romans as “Gaulanitis,” and by Arabs as “Jaulan” meaning ‘wandering’ or 
‘migration’ due to its agricultural history.14  In modern times, Israeli archeologists have 
researched the history of Jewish settlement of what is in present day the Syrian Golan, 
dating back more than three thousand years, and have mapped out sites of synagogues 
and even reconstructed one in the illegal Israeli settlement of Katzrin.15  Non-Druze Arab 
                                                
10 Murphy, supra note 9, at 15. Water is also cited as a priority for both Israel and Syria in claming 
sovereignty over the territory. 
11 This is in stark contrast with the variety of public transport options accessible from the largest illegal 
settlement in the Golan, Katzrin (alternately spelled Qazrin). 
12 There are a few exceptions to this rule. The exceptions are governed by special agreements between 
Israel and Syria, mediated by the UN Peacekeeping Forces [hereinafter: UNDOF], in which authorized 
individuals or crops can travel across the border under special circumstances. 
13 Efrat, supra note 9, at 38. 
14 Efrat, supra note 9 at 28-32. These claims are often pointed out by those wishing to establish an 
historical, Biblical connection of Israel with the Syrian Golan. Those who are pro-Syrian who wish to 
establish a firmer connection to the Syrian Golan often refer to the residents of the Syrian Golan as the 
“native inhabitants” or “indigenous residents.” 
15 Efrat, supra note 9 at 29-31. 
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settlement began in the early seventh century C.E., and from the 13th to 16th centuries was 
part of the Damascus district. During Ottoman rule in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the 
inhabitants of the Syrian Golan were primarily nomadic Bedouin.16  Afterward, Muslim 
Circassians banished from the Ottoman empire, Turkmen, and Arab farmers who had 
migrated from parts of the present-day Palestinian territories in the West Bank settled the 
land.17 Settlement of the Syrian Golan by Druze Arabs was said to have begun in the late 
17th century when fighting between Muslim and Druze Arabs forced the Druze Arabs to 
emigrate from the Galilee to the area that is now the Syrian Golan.  They were later 
joined by Druze Arabs from present-day Lebanon and the Galilee, who joined their 
settlements around what is now the village of Majdal Shams.18 
Control over the Syrian Golan in modern times has largely been subject to the will of 
colonial powers.  Zionist interest in the area and other parts of Syria were asserted early 
as the late 19th century when land southeast of the Syrian Golan was purchased and 
temporarily settled by Jewish families.19  The only official border agreement that 
explicitly mentions the Syrian Golan territory during World War I was the Sykes-Picot 
agreement regarding what was to become of the Ottoman Empire’s land, concluded 
between France, England, Italy and Russia.  The 1916 agreement divided the territory 
that is now Israel and the Syrian Golan into four parts, with the Syrian Golan making up 
part of the northernmost part, to be controlled by France.20  Although the Sykes-Picot 
agreement fell through after Russia and Italy pulled out, Britain retained control of all of 
the territory and decided to respect France’s claims to the territory and ceded control of 
Syria to France.21 Britain and France took twelve years to demarcate the actual borders of 
the Syrian Golan and the decision on the borders was ultimately up to them.22  As noted 
however, 
…prior to the demarcation of new national borders and the establishment of British 
and French mandates over Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and Iraq, the 
                                                
16 Efrat, supra note 9 at 30. 
17 Id. at 32. 
18 Id. at 33. 
19 Id. at 39-40. 
20 Id. at 40. 
21 Id.  
22 Id. at 45. 
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Golan was part of the area that Zionists hoped to colonize and control23… In 1919, 
the Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann rejected the Sykes-Picot agreement, the 
British-French arrangement to divide the Arab east among them, on the grounds 
that the Golan Heights came under French control as part of their mandate over 
Syria.24 
 
 In 1920, the Zionists ultimately withdrew their demand for the Syrian Golan in 
exchange for gaining territory in the Galilee.25  This later became the basis for some 
Israelis’ claim that the Syrian Golan was “ripped away from the Land of Israel.”26 The 
French controlled Syria, including the Syrian Golan, until Syria gained its independence 
in 1946 – in part due to the anti-colonial, resistance efforts of many in the Syrian Golan 
villages in which many inhabitants of the territory lost their lives and entire Syrian Golan 
villages were wiped out.27  Between 1949 and 1967, the border between Israel and Syria 
was governed under an armistice regime according to ceasefire agreement signed in July 
1949, although both Israel and Syria violated the agreement throughout its tenure, 
escalating tensions that led up to the 1967 war.28  As part of this agreement, the UN 
created a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in parts of the territory that did not correspond to 
the international boundary between what the agreement calls Syria and Palestine, which 
would be negotiated pending territorial settlement between the parties, but importantly, 
                                                
23 S. FAKHR EL-DIN, TWENTY YEARS OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE SYRIAN GOLAN HEIGHTS (1993), as 
cited in Efrat, supra note 9 at 42. 
24 Efrat, supra note 9 at 43. 
25 Id. at 44-45. 
26 Id. at 45. (“[V]ery few of the claims raised during the discussions were based on reasons rooted in the 
past.  In fact, only the representatives of the Zionist movement made historically-based claims but these 
were not the official reasons. The Golan’s Jewish history was not presented during the negotiations and it 
was not claimed that the Golan was part of the patriarchal inheritance.  Although, the British and French 
dealt extensively with historical claims regarding other border sectors, they did not consider historical 
factors when dealing with the Golan.”). See also G. BIGER, THE POLITICAL DELIMITATION OF THE GOLAN 
HEIGHTS DURING THE MANDATE PERIOD 1918-1948 (1993), as cited in Efrat, supra note 9 at 45, 
(discussing the officially demarcated lines of the Golan border, “…the final border of the Golan Heights is 
an artificial line along its entire length; it is not based on conspicuous landscape features… it seems that the 
territory itself was of no particular importance to the parties and it may be that they were not even familiar 
with it.  It was the lines themselves that were important to the parties, the railroad tracks, the drainage 
canal, the irrigation channel, etc. and the adjacent land needed to secure them.  The need for these lines 
effectively determined borders in the Golan Heights unlike other areas of the Land of Israel with 
negotiations focused on demands for territory and not for lines.”) 
27 Efrat, supra note 9 at 47-48. 
28 Id. at 49. 
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over which no country was sovereign.29 Nevertheless, in direct violation of the terms of 
the armistice agreement, Israel maintained that it had sovereign claim to the territory and 
ceased attending required meetings with the UN body governing the armistice agreement, 
the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAC).30 Both parties took actions 
intended to increase their claim over the territories within the demilitarized zone, with 
Israel amassing control over two thirds of the demilitarized area, and Syria one third.31  
Over the course of the 17-year armistice agreement, the UN Secretary General remarked 
that Syria and Israel had submitted no less than 66,000 complaints about one another.32 
 A key issue in the disputes over the demilitarized territory was access to water 
resources.33 Other disputes centered around development of the demilitarized territories, 
military and police action within the DMZ, whether the international frontier borders or 
the armistice lines would be ultimately recognized as the permanent borders between 
Israel and Syria, efforts to claim sovereignty over parts of the territory, and disputes over 
the legal authority of ISMAC.34  Although the two states had periods of cooperation and 
diplomatic pragmatism during this period, their disagreements over the armistice regime 
devolved into violent escalations and led to a deterioration of relations between the two 
parties that ultimately led up to the 1967 war.35   
Over six days in June 1967, as Jordan and Egypt fought Israel, Syria invaded 
Israeli territory and used the strategic position of the Syrian Golan Heights as a base from 
which to attack northern Israeli settlements even after Egypt and Jordan ceased fighting.36  
On the fifth day, Israel retaliated against Syria, advancing up the Syrian Golan Heights 
plateau and seizing the territory from Syria, moving 48 kilometers (30 miles) into Syria.37 
                                                
29 Efrat, supra note 9 at 52. According to the agreement, the armistice line was “not to be interpreted as 
having any relation whatsoever to ultimate territorial arrangements,” General Armistice Agreement, July 
20, 1949, Isr.-Syria, 42 V.N.T.S. 327, Art. 5 [hereinafter Israel-Syria Armistice Agreement]. 
30 The Chief of Staff of the UN Supervising Organization in Palestine, Report on the Israel-Syria Armistice 
Agreement, ¶ 6, delivered to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/3353 (Jan. 11, 1955). 
31 M. Brawer, Israel’s Boundaries: Past, Present and Future, a Study in Political Geography (1988) as cited 
in Efrat, supra note 9 at 62. For a summary of Israel and Syria’s positions, see id., at 64. 
32 Most of these complaints were disputes over the demilitarized zone. Efrat, supra note 9 at 58. 
33 For a detailed discussion of Israel and Syria’s disputes over water resources during the armistice regime, 
see Efrat, supra note 9 at 62. 
34 Efrat, supra note 9 at 62. 
35 Id. at 74. 
36 Id. at 80.  
37 Id. at 80. 
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A ceasefire was declared on June 10, 1967 at the request of the Syrians.38  The fallout of 
the war was summed up well by the following: 
In the Six-Day-War, Israel accomplished the expansionist aims that the pre-state 
diplomatic efforts and previous wars had failed to achieve. The war was a 
devastating blow for the Arab regimes. With the conquest of the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip the remainder of Palestine came under Israeli control, Syria 
suffered the loss of 1,250 square kilometers (500 square miles) of its Quneitra 
province, including the provincial capital city Quneitra and the Golan Heights.  
Israel could not carry out a mass expulsion of the Palestinian population of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, but it repeated the expulsion tactics it had 
used against Palestinians in 1948 against inhabitants of the Golan.  Israeli 
Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan ordered his troops to expel the population of 
the Golan.  After the war, all that remained of two cities, 132 villages and 61 
farms were six villages: Majdal Shams, Massa’ada, Boq’ata, Ein Qiniya, Rhajar 
[sic] and S’heita.  All of the others had been destroyed.39 
  
 While some of the territory including Quneitra was ultimately returned to Syria 
through the separation of forces agreement in 1974 after the October war (also called the 
Yom Kippur war) in 1973, the villages that had been in that territory were razed by 
Israeli forces immediately following the 1967 war.40 And “only in a few places does any 
evidence of their existence remain.”41 
 
The Druze in Israel and the Syrian Golan 
The Druze in Israel comprise about 2% of the total Druze who exist mainly in the Middle 
East.42  They are ethnically Arab members of a secretive religious sect sometimes 
characterized as heretical that broke off of Ismaili Islam in 1018 A.D. when the Egyptian 
ruler Halif Hakim pronounced that he was the embodiment of God, and forbid the 
exercise of all other religions.43  In Israel they reside primarily in the mountains of the 
Galilee, although a significant population also resides in the Occupied Syrian Golan 
                                                
38 Id. at 80. 
39 Id. at 82. 
40 Efrat, supra note 9 at 85 (discussing the razing of the villages after their populations were expelled). 
41 Efrat, supra note 9 at 85. 
42 P. HITTI, THE ORIGINS OF THE DRUZE PEOPLE AND RELIGION (1966) as cited in Shmuel Shamai, Critical 
Sociology of Education Theory in Practice: the Druze Education in the Golan, 11:4 BRIT. J. SOC. OF EDUC. 
452 (1990). 
43 Hitti in Shamai, supra note 42. 
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(OSG) in the foothills of Mt. Hermon (Jabal Al-Shaykh).44 They have been characterized 
by scholars as one of the most misunderstood communities in the Middle East,45 and 
history and current affairs are replete with inaccuracies when it comes to information 
pertaining to the Druze.46 One of the primary reasons cited for the confusion surrounding 
the Druze is their commitment to secrecy: 
Druzes have often been misunderstood by outsiders because of their esoteric 
religious doctrine, the secretive nature that such a doctrine has instilled in them, 
and the variety of perspectives or divisions prevalent among members of the 
community. As a result, misconceptions have taken root, multiplied, and 
flourished with time. Druzes themselves, on the other hand, have not countered 
misconceptions about their community; rather, they have developed or 
reinforced attitudes of isolationism, secrecy, and indifference. This is perhaps 
due to the fact that only a select few among them are initiated into the Druze 
religious doctrine. More important, these initiated members are often unwilling 
to comment on the authenticity of the Druze manuscripts and later commentaries 
simply because most of them are not well versed with such clandestine matters. 
Those who are knowledgeable, however, feel that true faith resides in the hearts 
of individual seekers and not in the written word. Thus, spirituality and spiritual 
readiness comes from within.47 
 
While the Druze are frequently characterized as one ethno-religious community, 
particularly in Israeli official rhetoric and policy which will be addressed in this paper, 
they are by no means a monolithic community.  Distinctions between the adherents of the 
Druze sect who reside in the Syrian Golan and the Druze in the Israeli Galilee will 
frequently be drawn in this study, although within those communities as well, all 
members do not always agree.  In general, pro-Syrian Druze in the Syrian Golan 
preferred to be referred to by their national and ethnic identities as Syrian Arabs, as 
opposed to the pro-Israeli Druze in the Galilee, who are frequently referred to as Israeli 
Druze.  Although all are of Arab heritage and all are of the Druze religious sect, the 
various political histories and disparate positions have informed the different 
communities’ preferences for what they should be called. 
                                                
44 According to one account, the Druze began to settle in the foothills of Mount Hermon beginning after the 
sixteenth century. Hitti in Shamai, supra note 42. Contra. Efrat, supra note 9 at 33 (arguing that while the 
Druze elders speak of their settlement before the 17th century, there is no historical evidence from the 
period of Fakhr a-Din to prove this claim, or otherwise, and so their settlement began in the late 17th 
century in the Golan). 
45 Supra note 1 at xi, see also Jon Woronoff, Editor’s Note, in id. at ix. 
46 Supra note 1 at xi. 
47 Supra note 1 at xxxi. 
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Occupation and Annexation of the Syrian Golan 
The OSG has been under Israeli control since its capture in the war of 1967,48 after 
which it was annexed by Israel in 1981 in contravention of the UN Charter through the 
passage of the Ramat Hagolan49 Law or the “Golan Heights Law” which declared that 
Israel henceforth had full administrative and legal control over the Syrian Golan.50  This 
law also replaced Israeli military administration over the territory with civil 
administration.  Under unusual political circumstances, the legislation was passed by the 
Knesset (or Israeli Parliament) within a matter of hours of its introduction, and caused an 
immediate reprimand from the United Nations’ Security Council, the Arab League, and 
the United States in addition to other nations and international organizations.51  In 
contrast with the usual legislative practice, the law took effect on the same day it was 
passed.52  As will be discussed in more detail later, because International Humanitarian 
Law prohibits the acquisition of territory by force, the move was interpreted as an 
effective annexation (which is referred to as a de facto annexation since it is a legal fact 
despite Israel’s refusal to term it an annexation) and is illegal under international law53 
and as such has been condemned by the United Nations and most nations of the world.54  
                                                
48 Immediately after its capture in 1967, Israel took measures interpreted as expressing its intention to keep 
the Golan, including immediately canceling the Syrian educational curriculum and instituting immediate 
military rule as opposed to administering the territories with a series of military orders as they did in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories.  Further, after only one month, they established their first settlement in 
the Occupied Syrian Golan, Mershom Golan.  See Bashar Tarabieh, The Untold Story of Suffering and 
Endurance: The Syrian Community on the Golan Heights, 33:2 THE LINK 3-4 (Apr. - May 2000). 
49 Ramat Hagolan is the Hebrew name for the Golan Heights. 
50 Ramat Hagolan Law, 5742-1981, 36 L.S.I. 7 (1981) (Isr.). [hereinafter: The Golan Heights Law] at 6. 
51 The circumstances are reported in numerous historical accounts of the 1981 events.  See, e.g., Leon 
Sheleff, Application of Israeli Law to the Golan Heights is Not Annexation, 20 BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 334 
(1993-1993) (“The three readings took place on December 14, 1981, with the opening session at 5:22 P.M. 
and the vote on the third reading taking place less than six hours later at 11:15 P.M. The following day, the 
law was formally promulgated. The law was passed in this manner at the behest of the then-Prime Minister 
Menachem Begin at a time when he could take the opposition by surprise. Begin had just left the hospital 
after a brief stay, and the leading opposition figures, Shimon Peres and Yitzehak Rabin, were out of the 
country.”).  
52 Efrat, supra note 9, at 113. 
53 The unilateral annexation of a territory is illegal according to customary law derived from the principle in 
International Humanitarian Law that occupation should be temporary, see A. Roberts, Transformative 
Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT’L. L. 580 (2006), as 
cited in Murphy, supra note 9, at 35. 
54 Numerous United Nations resolutions have documented the illegality of the Israeli occupation of the 
Syrian Golan, e.g., S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1382d mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/ INF/22/Rev.2 
(1967) (calling for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the territories occupied in the 1967 war, 
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No country formally recognized the annexation when it occurred.55  However, many 
Israelis, as well as the Israeli government, consider the “Golan Heights”56 part of Israel.57   
 The Druze are the only Syrians remaining in the OSG because the only six 
villages in the Syrian Golan that were almost entirely comprised of Druze were spared in 
the 1967 war58 when the over 100,000 other residents (about 95% of the total Syrian 
Golan population) residing in 163 villages and 108 farms59 were forcibly expelled,60 
                                                                                                                                            
including the Syrian Golan).  The United Nations Security Council, General Assembly and Economic and 
Social Council have all declared Israel’s decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the 
occupied territories without legal effect (null and void) under international law. See, e.g., id., S.C. Res. 338, 
U.N. SCOR, 28th Sess., 1747th mtg. at 10. U.N. Doc. S/ INF/29 (1973), S/RES/497 (1981); U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/27 (Dec. 1, 2006) and U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/118 (Dec. 14, 2006); ECOSOC 6309 U.N. Doc. 
E/2007/L.19 (2007) as cited in UN Information Service, Economic and Social Council adopts texts on 
Palestinian people, Independence for colonial countries, social development (2007) available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ecosoc6309.doc.htm [hereinafter UN Information Service, 
Resolutions Condemning Syrian Golan Annexation]. 
55 Efrat, supra note 9 at 114. 
56 “Golan Heights” typically refers to the portion of the Syrian Golan that was occupied beginning in 1967, 
see Murphy, supra note 9, at 9. 
57  See Website of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs available at  
<www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/History/Early%20History%20-%20Archaeology/Katzrin%20-
%20A%20Village%20in%20the%20Golan> (arguing that the Golan contains some of the state of Israel’s 
premier archeological and natural sites, including the “ancient Jewish village of Katztrin”, containing the 
remains of an ancient synagogue that existed in a [Syrian] Golan village). More accurately, Katzrin is an 
illegal settlement town, constructed by Israel in modern times around the remains of the synagogue wall 
that was found after the occupation of the Syrian Golan. See also Israel Nature and National Parks 
Protection Authority Website for information on the Gamla Nature Reserve in the [Occupied Syrian] Golan 
which also contains the remains (excavated after the occupation of the Syrian Golan) available at 
<www.parks.org.il/ParksENG/company_card.php3?CNumber=508481>. No mention is made in these 
official sources of the Syrian Golan as being anything other than a part of Israel. 
58 These villages included Majdal Shams (the largest by far), Buqa’ayta, Masadda, ‘Ayn Qinea, S’hita, and 
Ghajar (also written sometimes as Rajar).  The villages with the exception of Ghajar (which overlapped 
with the Lebanese border) existed within a few kilometers of each other near the ceasefire lines.  All were 
almost entirely Druze except for Ghajar, which was mainly Alowite.  See Mara’i, supra note 5, at 79. Many 
historians allege that the Druze were spared at least in part based upon what turned out to be the mistaken 
assumption by Zionist forces that the Druze of the Syrian Golan, like their brethren in the Galilee, would 
ally themselves with the state of Israel. Id. at 80. Another explanation is that the elders who remembered 
when members of their village fled during the fighting of the Great Syrian Revolt in 1925-27 who returned 
to find their village of Majdal Shams destroyed took great pains up to and including physical intervention 
to ensure that villagers did not leave during the fighting in 1967. Id. See also Shay Fogelman, The 
Disinherited: What Happened to the 130,000 Syrian Citizens Living in the Golan Heights in June 1967?, 
Haaretz, July 30, 2010 (describing recently declassified documents that demonstrate that the Druze were 
spared as a matter of IDF policy.  Elad Peled, formerly Commander of the IDF’s 36th division during the 
1967 war, spoke about the policy in a recently declassified report: “Peled recalls there was a clear policy 
determined by the IDF high command - "and it must have come down from the political echelon" - not to 
harm the Druze and Circassian villages. “For numerous reasons, the state had an interest in keeping them 
there," he says, although he does not remember what the policy was in regard to other inhabitants”). 
59 Sakr Abu Fakhr, Voices from the Golan, 29:4 J. Palestine Stud. 5-36 (Autumn 2000). 
60 Fogelman, supra note 58 (pointing out that many prominent Israeli officials disputed the claim that the 
Syrians were forcibly expelled, stating that they fled, and this account of the history of the Syrian Golan 
has appeared in Israeli textbooks, official documents, and reports by Israeli officials to the United Nations 
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fleeing mainly to Syria.61  At the time of the foundation of the state of Israel in 1948, the 
Syrian Golan was a recognized part of Syria, under Syrian sovereignty,62 and the only 
Israeli Druze were those of the Galilee and other parts of Israel (mainly in the north).  
The Galilee Druze resided in villages of a primarily traditional nature, led by Druze 
elders in a strict politico-religious hierarchy.  During the 1948 War, which many Israelis 
refer to as the War of Independence, Druze elders allied themselves politically with the 
Zionist forces,63 leading to the establishment of such close ties with Israel that the Galilee 
Druze are the only non-Jewish minority to be compulsorily conscripted into the Israeli 
Defense Forces.64  The relationship between the Galilee Druze and the Zionists was 
viewed through a lens of historical friendship and religious parallels,65 as both Jews and 
                                                                                                                                            
when confronted with claims that the population was forcibly expelled, and demonstrating that in personal 
accounts, Golan residents and soldiers who were present at the time contested this narrative, providing 
evidence that not only were the residents expelled, but many of those who attempted to return to their 
homes were arrested and then forcibly expelled before their villages were razed.).   
61 Supra note 59. The other villages were comprised of Syrians of a diverse array of ethnic and religious 
descents, including Circassians, Alowite, Christians and Muslims who had coexisted together peacefully 
for ages including with Jews who had lived beside them in ancient times before the formation of the state of 
Israel.  The concentrations were as follows: 13,500 Circassians were concentrated mainly in Qunaytra and 
the villages of al-Mansura, al-Adnaniyya, al-Qahtaniyya, ‘Ayn Ziwan, al-Ghassaniyya, al-Juwwayza, Bir 
‘Ajam, al-Burayqa, al-Khushniyya, al-Faham, Fazara, Ruwayhina, and al-Faraj; Turkomans consisted of 4 
percent of the population and were concentrated in the villages of Hafar, Kafr Nafakha, al-Sindiyana, al-
Razzaniyya, al-Ghadiriyya, al-Husayniyya, al-‘Ulayqa, al-Mughir, al-Dabiya, N’aran, Dayr al-Rahib, al-
Ahmadiyya, ‘Ayn al-Simsim, ‘Ayn ‘Aysha, al-Juwwayza, and al-Mumsiyya; Kurds and Armenians in 
Qunaytra; Maghribis in the villages of ‘Abdin and M’arraba, and 10,000 Palestinian refugees particularly in 
the Butayha region. Id. 
62 Michelle Strucke, Field Observations in village of Majdal Shams, Syrian Golan Heights (Summer 2008) 
[hereinafter Fieldwork]. Many Syrian nationalist vestiges remain in the Occupied Syrian Golan, including 
statues of Syrian nationalist figures from the Syrian Revolution in 1921. Id. 
63 Supra note 4. See also Mara’i, supra note 5 (discussing consequences of the “Palestinian Druze” (or 
Galilee Druze)-Alliance with Zionist authorities on Palestinian-Golan Druze-relations). 
64 Supra note 4 (arguing that other members of religious minorities attempted to voluntarily conscript into 
the Israeli Defense Forces including Sunni Muslims and Christians, but none were granted approval to sign 
up). See id. (discussing the Druze compulsory conscription through the passage of the compulsory 
conscription act on 3 May 1956). See generally Martin Isleem, Colloquial Arabic as a Policy Tool: the 
Case of the Druze Heritage Curriculum in Israel (2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) 
(discussing the Palestinian reaction to the Druze conscription into the IDF, for example that Palestinians 
and Arabs perceived this as a “stabbing in the back”). 
65 Laila Parsons, The Druze and the Birth of Israel, in The War for Palestine 60–70 (2007). See Falah, 
supra note 5, (describing the common understanding Jews have with the Druze and their sympathies when 
it comes to minority issues and the dangers of assimilation, “There is the [Druze] fear of assimilation 
within the Israeli society and the Arab culture… Feeding these voices [calling for taking educational 
action], too, is the feeling that an improvement has taken place in the status of the Druzes in Israel because 
of their good relations with Jews and their contribution to the state.  And, indeed, an attentive ear has been 
found amongst the Jewish public, which as a minority in its Diaspora understands the Druzes’ deep feelings 
infighting against the trends of inter-ethnic mixing and assimilation.”). 
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Druze had been persecuted minorities66 in “closed” religions that seldom, if ever, 
accepted new adherents.67 
 Both groups, according to this narrative, could also constitute a “nationality” or an 
“ethno-religious community,” since both prohibit or discourage intermarriage, leading 
some to characterize their adherents as members of a distinct ethnic group.  In the Druze 
sect, intermarriage was prohibited, and converts were not accepted into the sect under any 
circumstances.  Over time, this led to the ethnic isolation of the Druze, since they on the 
whole were not intermixing with members of any other ethnic groups.  The Syrians of the 
OSG prefer to be called Arab in light of their Arab ethnicity, and Syrian due to their 
nationality.  They do not consider being Druze a distinct ethnicity, but as being a member 
of a religious sect. 
 The alliance between the Galilee Druze and the Zionists led to a strong 
nationalistic presence of Israeli (Galilee) Druze in the armed services and in Israel as a 
whole, gaining them protection as a special minority and the establishment of a special, 
separate educational sector governed by the Israeli Ministry of Education, Culture and 
Sport, based upon Druze history as understood by the Zionists at the time of the alliance.  
It however has been applied to the residents of the Syrian Golan despite stark political 
differences between the two groups, including the major difference that the residents of 
the Syrian Golan are living under occupation and have overwhelmingly refused the offer 
of Israeli citizenship given them (or to many, unsuccessfully forced upon them) by 
Israel.68  Residents of the Syrian Golan, including those who are Druze, do not serve in 
the Israeli military, nor for the most part are they citizens of Israel.69  Rather, their 
                                                
66 The Druze have suffered almost constant persecution since their founding and as a result have declared 
much of their sacred text secret to only some elite members of their religion.  See generally Hitti in Shamai, 
supra note 42. See also supra note 1 at xxxi (discussing the Druze sect’s strict hierarchy of the initiated and 
uninitiated into the religion, “Unlike the early sages of Christianity, who were the ones to study the Bible 
and transmit its meaning to congregations, Druze sages have studied their scriptures and kept the spiritual 
knowledge to themselves; insights were shared only with one’s spiritual equals. In the eyes of these sages, 
not all people are prepared to absorb spirituality”). For a more lengthy discussion of the initiated and 
uninitiated in the Druze community, see id. at p. xxxv – xxxvii. 
67 The degree of “closedness” of the Druze sect is stricter than that of the Jews. The Druze have not 
accepted any converts since 1056 A.D., while many Jewish denominations accept a very limited number of 
converts every year. See generally Hitti in Shamai, supra note 42 (discussing the origins of the Druze 
religion and the closing of the gates of the religion). 
68 Mara’i, supra note 5, at 83-84. 
69 Some residents of the Syrian Golan have accepted Israel’s offer of citizenship, although for doing so they 
have been ostracized and excommunicated by the Syrian Golan community.  The decision to 
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nationality status is “undefined” (the same political status in Israel as the Palestinians in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories, although the residents of the Syrian Golan typically 
enjoy freedom of movement throughout all of Israel70) and Israel considers them 
permanent residents. Most have outwardly resisted the control of their territory and 
education system by Israel since its occupation in 1967 and its illegal annexation of the 
territory in 1981.71  Citizenship and identity have played a major role in the context of 
this resistance.  According to one history of the annexation of the Syrian Golan, the 
residents of the OSG continue to claim, “Our war with Israeli [sic] is conducted on three 
primary levels: identity, land and water. Even after all the years of Israeli occupation and 
annexation, we have remained Syrians.”72 
  
Application of the Israeli Education System 
Education is compulsory in Israel from kindergarten up until the twelfth grade, as of 2007 
when the Compulsory Education Law of 1949 (that had been last amended in 1978 to 
extend to students up to tenth grade) was amended again, expanding the requirement 
from tenth grade to twelfth grade.73  The Israeli public education system is divided into 
several sectors that critics claim are at worst discriminatory, and proponents claim are at 
best reflective of the heterogeneity and multiculturalism of the Israeli populace. Israeli 
public education is divided into three sectors on the basis of religion and ethnicity, one 
                                                                                                                                            
excommunicate those accepting Israeli citizenship, banning them from weddings, funerals, and all social 
and religious events and even from dealing with other community members was made at a general meeting 
called by the Syrian Golan’s Druze elders in March 1981 that was attended by over 6,000 residents.  See 
Mara’i, supra note 5, at 83.  Cf. Efrat, supra note 9, at 121 (noting the text of the public declaration, “Every 
person in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights who dares to replace his Syrian citizenship with Israeli 
citizenship is harming our dignity, national honor, religion and traditions, and he will be ostracized from 
community life and excommunicated from our religion. All others will be forbidden from having any 
relations with such a person,”). 
70 While the residents of the OSG enjoy freedom of movement throughout Israel and for the most part, the 
OPT (excluding Gaza), they are granted only extremely limited freedom of movement to Syria and denied 
travel to other Arab states which do not accept travel from anyone carrying Israeli travel documents (this 
includes nearly all the Arab states except for Egypt and Jordan, which have peace agreements with Israel).  
71 Mara’i, supra note 5, at 83-84. This resistance included a general strike that lasted uninterrupted for over 
five months.  During the strike, Israeli forces blockaded the town of Majdal Shams, not even allowing in 
food or medical supplies from the International Red Cross, as residents resorted to building their own 
sewage system and to taking other measures to resist Israel’s attempts to force them to accept Israeli 
citizenship. Id. See also Efrat, supra note 9, at 121 (describing the general strike). 
72 Efrat, supra note 9, at 124. 
73 Compulsory Education Law, 5709–1949, 3 LSI 125 (1949) (Isr.), as amended by Compulsory Education 
Law Amendment No. 7, 2007, and Compulsory Education Law Amendment No. 11, 1978. See also 
Amendment No. 5, 1969, as cited in Falah, supra note 5. 
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Jewish, one Arab, and one Druze.  The Jewish sector is divided into a State-secular 
education system and State-religious education sector.74  The Druze sector used to be a 
part of the Arab sector, but was divided into two during what scholar of Israeli Druze 
relations Kais Firro calls the attempt to create Druze “particularism” in Israel.75  Firro 
claims that an Israeli policy of ‘“divide and sub-divide’ - or ‘divide and rule’ – was… in 
place and focused primarily on the Druzes.”  The policy, according to Firro, aimed at 
“weaning them away from the larger Palestinian Arab community by fostering ‘Druze 
particularism, the notion that Druze ethnicity and identity make them distinct from other 
Arabs.’”76  
The official aims of education in the Druze sector of Israel are:  
[T]o base education on Druze and Arab cultural values, as well as on the values of 
achievements in science, and the attainment of peace between Israel and its 
neighbors. The love of the homeland is common to all its citizens, and thus the 
Druze are loyal to the State of Israel, and cooperate in the building and running of 
the state.  Druze education aims to emphasize the special as well as the common 
interests of all citizens, the special ties between Jews and Druze; an understanding 
of Jewish culture; the development of an Israel-Druze entity; the firm 
establishment of Druze youth in the culture of the community; and the common 
destiny of all Druze communities in all their lands.77 
 
The Israeli authorities achieved success in this policy at least with the Galilee Druze.  
By legally designating them a separate religio-ethnic group, and replacing the word 
“Arab” on their national ID cards with “Druze” under “nationality”, in addition to other 
                                                
74 See generally MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORT, FACTS AND FIGURES: BASIC 
EDUCATIONAL CURRICULUM OF ISRAEL 2004 (Isr.), Dalia Sprinzak, et. al., (Yedida Segev ed., Sagir 
International Translations, Inc. trans.) [hereinafter Israel Educational Curriculum] available at 
http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Israel/Israel%20Facts%20and%20figures.pdf 
75 Firro uses the term particularism to denote the sectarian identity that many ethno-religious communities 
in the pre-modern era held prior to their adoption of the notion of nationalism. Supra note 4. 
76 Supra note 4. See also State papers of the Foreign Ministry /2402/28, Letter from Dr. H. Hirschberg to 
Palmon, (Oct. 18, 1949) (Isr.) (on file with Israel State Archives, Jerusalem) as cited in Lina Kassem, PhD 
Dissertation, The Construction of Druze Ethnicity: Druze in Israel between State Policy and Palestinian 
Arab Nationalism, (2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cincinnati) (on file with author) at 
120 (discussing Hirschberg’s recommendations on how to best integrate the Arab, non-Jewish population 
in Israel to an inter-ministerial committee of the Israeli government shortly after the founding of the state of 
Israel, in which he concluded that the most important task was to ensure that the Arab groups did not form 
a single Arab minority and suggested the creation of a separate Druze educational curriculum). 
77 Falah, supra note 5, as cited in Randa Abbas, Druze Education in Israel, (Ph.D. Dissertation, Western 
Galilee College) (Abstract) available at http://www.wgalil.ac.il/files/AbstracRandaAbbas.pdf. 
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official measures,78 the Israeli authorities capitalized on their early political alliance and 
succeeded in creating the image of a distinct and separate ethnic group, if not “nation” 
aligned strategically and historically with Jews. 
By some accounts, particularly by Galilee Druze working actively with the Israeli 
government, these distinctions were necessary and in fact called for by members of the 
Druze communities of the Galilee.  Salman Falah, formerly the appointed coordinator of 
the earliest directors-general committee in Israel for Druze affairs in 1975, and later 
serving as Director of Druze Education in the Ministry of Education and then deputy 
director general, was one such voice.  According to his influential narrative, the Galilee 
Druze called for educational action and other means of publicly strengthening Druze 
identity because they were afraid of assimilation within Israeli society and within Arab 
culture, and yearned for “special ethnic expression that was precluded during the 
Ottoman and British Mandatory periods”.79  By his account, the government of Israel 
responded to these voices, creating new policies “to cultivate the ethnic and cultural 
uniqueness of the Druzes.”80 For example, on June 1, 1975, in Resolution 702, the 
government decided to separate Druze matters from the Arab ministries and handle them 
separately.81 And Falah was chosen to be coordinator of the implementing committee for 
Druze affairs.82 
According to Falah, the government was responding to the recommendations of two 
earlier committees it created – one public and one legislative, through the Knesset – to 
explore the causes of Druze “bitterness and demonstration”83 during that time period, and 
“to chart new ways of improving relations between the Druzes and the state of Israel.” 
                                                
78 Other measures included a lack of recognition of Eid el-Fitr (a Muslim holiday) among the Druze, the 
politicization of Druze shrines, and most notably the compulsory conscription of Druze into the Army via 
the ‘Minorities Unit’. See Israel State Archives, FM 2570/11, Letter from Ya’acov Shim’oni, Official of the 
Foreign Ministry of Israel, to E. Sasson (Aug. 16, 1948) (Isr.) (on file with Israel State Archives, 
Jerusalem) as cited in supra note 4 at 42 (discussing Shim’oni having “freely admitted that the 
establishment of the Minorities Unit contributed little or nothing to the Israeli army- its true purpose was to 
use the Druzes as ‘the sharp blade of a knife to stab in the back of Arab unity.’”). 
79 Falah, supra note 5, at 141. 
80 Falah, supra note 5, at 141.  
81 Falah, supra note 5, at 141. 
82 Falah, supra note 5, at 141. 
83 The bitterness and demonstration he referred to most likely referenced the protests by Druze, Arab 
intellectuals at the time, particularly those involved with the Druze Initiative Committee (LMD), which was 
founded in 1972. The protests organized by this committee were cited as one of the factors that spurred the 
creation of the two Israeli-government committees to study problems with the Druze minority. Kassem, 
supra note 76, at 121-122. 
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Both ultimately recommended removing Druze affairs from the stewardship of the Arab 
departments,84 and both emphasized youth issues, particularly education.85  The 
committee headed by Haifa University’s Dr. Gabriel Ben-Dor, 
saw an urgent need to strengthen Druze consciousness through developing a 
special curriculum for the Druze schools.  It expressed concern that Druze children 
did not gain familiarity with the history of their people, tradition, or religion.  The 
committee also expressed its belief that with the introduction of a curriculum in 
these areas, the feelings of frustration stemming from problems of identity would 
disappear.86 
 
In their report, the Committee stated: 
The committee believes that the state of Israel has underestimated the necessity of 
the education for the Israeli-Druze consciousness and that [the state] has done little 
to educate and inculcate the Druze youth with Israeli-Druze consciousness. This 
has done damage to the state and its image. When the compulsory conscription’s 
law was applied on the whole Druze community, the state should have realized it 
needed also to encourage the intellectuals, to develop the foundation of Israeli-
Druze consciousness as an ideological- cognitive basis that could provide Druze 
youth with a logical explanation of and psychological background to his complete 
identification with the state and his readiness to fight for its cause, and to preserve 
meanwhile his Druze particularity. The committee believes that the present 
curriculum in the Druze schools and the way of imparting it to the Druze child and 
teenager does not contribute to the deepening of Druze-Jewish 
brotherhood...preparing an independent Druze curriculum with its own texts is of 
crucial significance, and will serve the continuation of the community’s 
particularist existence.87 
 
By other accounts, the recommendations to establish a separate Druze educational 
curriculum began as far back as 1949, shortly after the foundation of the state of Israel, 
and originated not in Druze voices, but in Jewish voices from within or closely related to 
the Israeli government.  In 1949, an inter-ministerial committee of the Israeli government 
requested Dr. H. Hirshberg’s recommendations on how to best integrate the Arab, non-
Jewish population in Israel into the new state.  Hirshberg concluded that the most 
important task was to ensure that the Arab groups did not form a single Arab minority 
that would “be Arab in its national identify [sic] and Muslim in its religion.” He believed 
                                                
84 Falah, supra note 5, at 210. 
85 Id. One committee presented recommendations in December 1974 and the other in May 1975. 
86 Falah, supra note 5, at 142. 
87 Knesset Report, quoted in KAIS M. FIRRO, THE DRUZES IN THE JEWISH STATE (1999) 227 as cited in 
Kassem, supra note 76, at 123. 
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that education would be the most effective tool with which to divide the Arab populace, 
advocating for the creation of separate schools for different Arab minorities, and for the 
creation of a separate Druze educational curriculum.88  
Whatever their original origins, the discussions surrounding developing special Druze 
curricula stopped short of advocating for teaching the Druze religion to Druze pupils in 
school.  It was suggested, since out of all of the religions represented in the Israeli 
education system, only Druze do not learn their religion as a matter of formal study, but 
the Druze spiritual leadership rejected it outright.  Falah speculated as to their reasons:  
The opposition of the spiritual leadership to religious studies emanates from the 
principle of secrecy of the Druze religion, which principle is a red line not to be 
crossed. Possibly, too, there was a fear that in time a plutocratic religion might 
develop; also, that by granting the ministry proposal, the Druze leadership would be 
inviting a foreign body to intervene in matters of their religion.89 
 
According to Falah, however, many of the fears of the spiritual leaders were allayed 
once the textbooks , were introduced for the “revolutionary innovation,”90 the new Druze 
heritage curriculum.91  He claimed that they found the textbooks actually preserved 
heritage and brought youth closer to their religion, drawing on subjects as diverse as 
Druze religious law, history, folk literature, dance, and music.92  Falah dismissed critics 
of the policy separating Druze from Arab as mainly leftists and nationalists who protested 
for ideological reasons.93 However, some of those critics, including members of the 
Lejnat al-Mubadarah al-Durziya (Druze Initiative Committee or LMD), which was 
opposed to the policy of creating a distinct Druze identity, reported not just with 
sweeping critiques of the texts, but with lists of the specific factual errors in the 
government’s new Druze textbooks, particularly related to history.94 For example, they 
criticized the new textbooks for including geographical regions in the reverse of their 
actual order.95 And in the Galilee, some teachers refused to teach the Druze heritage 
                                                
88 Supra Letter from Dr. Hirschberg, as cited in Kassem, supra note 76, at 120.  
89 Falah, supra note 5, at 142. 
90 Falah, supra note 5, at 144. 
91 Falah, supra note 5, at 143. 
92 Falah, supra note 5, at 143. 
93 Falah, supra note 5, at 143. 
94 Galeb Saif, Druze Initiative Committee, Al Zytoonah (Jan. 1992) at 23, (providing specific examples of 
errors about the history of the Druze people published in several government authors’ textbooks that were 
utilized in teaching history in Druze schools) as cited in Kassem, supra note 76, at 123. 
95 Saif in Kassem, id. 
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components of the curriculum, and the lessons had to be taught by conscripted and 
uniformed Druze soldiers for the IDF.96 
The three educational sectors each contain their own section on heritage and/or 
culture.  However, in line with what critics term Israel’s “divide-and-rule” policy, only 
the Arab and Druze sections are mutually exclusive.  Jewish heritage is infused 
throughout the entire Israeli curriculum, including in civic education, history, and social 
studies, despite comprising an additional separate section taught only in the two sections 
of the Jewish sector.  This is because a stated aim of the curriculum is to “foster Zionist 
values and instill cultural heritage.”97 
The “cultural” heritage of the Druze and the Arabs are taught only in their respective 
sectors.  Although Druze are Arab, it was seen as essential by scholar Haim Blanc who 
was later minister of Arab Affairs, to define the Druze as a separate nation, distinct from 
Arabs and particularly Muslims.98  Blanc, when asked if the Druze were Arab, had the 
following to say: 
As it stands [this question is] unanswerable, since the term “Arabs” is used 
loosely to cover a multitude of meanings… In a cultural sense, however, the 
Druzes are not only “Arabs” but, as it were, “Arabs with a vengeance”… The 
distinctiveness of the Druzes is nevertheless undoubted, and its origins must be 
sought in their religion. [The community] was born and grew in a hostile 
environment; it therefore adopted the principle of taqiyya, a sort of protective 
coloring with religious affiliations, to be “Christian with the Christians, and 
Muslim with Muslims”… The most recent instance of this outward assimilation 
may be seen in present-day Israel.99 
 
Many Israelis mistakenly characterized taqiyya as a uniquely Druze characteristic, 
though it in reality derives from Shi’i Islam,100 and a preoccupation with the quality is 
reflected in the Druze curriculum, exemplifying just one of the type of 
                                                
96 Interview with Dr. Martin Isleem (April 12, 2012). 
97 Israel Educational Curriculum, supra note 74. 
98 Falah, supra note 5, at 143 (discussing the opposition to this policy, who were either “spiritual leaders, 
who feared that it would lead to a disclosure of the secrecy of their religion; and nationalists and leftists, 
who saw in the study of Druze heritage a separation of the Druzes from the Arabs and a strengthening of 
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99 Haim Blanc, Druze Particularism: Modern Aspects of an Old Problem, 3 MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS 
Nov. 1952, 315-21 as cited in supra note 4, at 47. 
100 Taqiyya translates to “prudence” and “carefulness” and derives from a practice in Shi’i Islam of 
protecting one’s inner faith by allowing oneself to adopt Sunni Muslim practices.  It is therefore not unique 
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mischaracterizations and factual errors with which the curriculum is charged.101  Another 
was the selective reading of history that ignores the many Galilee Druze who participated 
in the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939, and focuses instead exclusively on those Druze who 
were pro-Zionist.  Critics interpreted this as an attempt by Israeli authorities to generalize 
all Druze as naturally exhibiting a love for Jews based on their similar histories of 
persecution.102  And the presentation of Druze as a “non-Muslim minority with an 
endemic animosity toward the Muslim majority”103 was another example of potentially 
harmful errors within the curriculum – one that did not encourage friendly relations 
between Arab Muslims and Arab Druze. 
The Arab sector in Israel has been the subject of much criticism, as it is said to 
racialize indigenous Palestinian Arabs and present them in an Orientalist light as 
primitive and backward.104  It has been the focus of debates beginning before the 
founding of the state that continue to this day about textbooks, curricula, and Israel’s 
objectives vis a vis its Arab minority.105  Further, the unequal distribution of funding 
relative to the number of students in the Arab sector resulted in underdevelopment of the 
                                                
101 Falah, supra note 5, at 2 (“As long as the Druzes remain a minority in the Middle East, it seems that the 
question of their origins and identity will remain a subject for disagreement. The various claims made to 
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102 Lisa Hajjar, Making Identity Policy: Israel’s Interventions Among the Druze, 200 MIDDLE EAST 
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‘unbalanced’ portrayal of Arab history and politics. The textbook stated that Palestinian Arabs did not just 
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issue was important enough to merit calling an emergency session of the Education Committee of the 
Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, to discuss banning the book. See Ben Lynfield, Israel bans a textbook 
promoting Arab rights as ‘unbalanced’, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, April 23, 2012, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/0423/Israel-bans-a-textbook-promoting-Arab-rights-
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educational system in Arab areas, reinforcing negative stereotypes about Palestinian 
Arabs. Similar problems plagued the Druze sector upon its creation in 1976, from a 
shortage of school buildings, classrooms and equipment to a staff of mostly unqualified 
teachers.106  In fact, in 1975, “almost no school buildings were erected in the Druze 
sector.”107 As will be shown, evidence of these two trends also exists in the education 
system in the Occupied Syrian Golan.  Problems with the Arab sector’s handling of 
Druze issues in Israel was cited as one of the reasons why the Druze should be separated 
from the Arab sector.108   
The Druze education sector, established by the Committee for Druze Culture and 
Education within the five years following the 1975 committee recommendations on 
Druze education,109 lagged noticeably behind the two Jewish education sectors, and the 
Israeli government did not formally commit to raising the level of services in the sector to 
the level in the Jewish sectors until 1987.110  While the law requiring compulsory 
education for all students had been in effect since 1949, requiring students to attend 
school at least until eighth grade, it was implemented only gradually for girls in the Druze 
sector, leading to the enrollment of 90% of girls by 1979-80 and 97% by 1986-87.111   
Some such as Falah have characterized the Druze and Arab sectors’ inequality from 
the Jewish sectors’ as an inevitable result of the differing periods of time for which they 
have existed.  For example, the Jewish system existed several decades before the 
establishment of the state of Israel, the Arab system for over 60 years, and the Druze 
system for over 30 years.  “This means that the point of departure of the three systems is 
not equal, and that the gap that had been created over the course of the decades, both in 
the physical conditions and pedagogic needs, could not be avoided.”112 Immediately after 
making this claim, however, Falah contradicted himself by noting that the Druze sector in 
                                                
106 Falah, supra note 5, at 210, 225. (reporting that up to 60% of teachers in the Druze sector in 1976 were 
unqualified, problems that were also common to the Arab sector). 
107 Id., at 228. 
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109 Id., at 211. 
110 Id., at 214. 
111 CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF ISRAEL NO. 38 (1987) as cited in Falah, 
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23 
 
its first twenty years already was approaching the levels of the Jewish sectors and had 
already surpassed the level in the “non-Jewish systems”113 (presumably the Arab sector).  
This seems to suggest that the Druze sector may have developed more effectively and 
rapidly than the Arab sector due to factors other than just the inevitable passage of time, 
such as differential planning or funding by the state of Israel.  
The curriculum in the Syrian Golan and the specific exigencies of Syrian Golan 
relations will be discussed next in order to provide background for the ensuing evaluation 
of Israel’s implementation of the right to education in the Occupied Syrian Golan. 
 
State of Education in the Syrian Golan 
Two major problem areas exist in the educational system in the Occupied Syrian Golan 
that broadly parallel the problems in the Arab sector.114  The first is related to the 
allocation of resources and administrative decisions.  The second relates to the 
educational content of the curriculum.  After discussing these obstacles to the realization 
of the right to education in the Occupied Syrian Golan, a discussion of the residents’ 
efforts to provide supplemental education will ensue. 
 
Allocation of resources and administrative decisions 
According to scholarly reports, resources were unequally allocated to the educational 
institutions in the Occupied Syrian Golan, so much so that residents often had to pay out 
of pocket to establish programs guaranteed elsewhere.  Kindergartens for instance were 
for the most part (with the exception of a public kindergarten provided in one village) not 
provided for residents until they took it upon themselves to pay for their establishment, 
and after doing so the schools were forcibly closed by the Israeli authorities.115 
During the period of Syrian rule over the Syrian Golan, educational expenses such as 
the cost of textbooks, school overhead, and “everything except pens and notebooks” were 
                                                
113 Falah, supra note 5, at 210.  
114 Education in the Arab sector has been found to be discriminatory according to several studies including 
most notably Coursen-Neff, supra note 6. 
115 Shamai, supra note 42 (noting that after closing the local Syrian kindergartens, the Israeli authorities 
also closed the public kindergarten). 
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provided free to residents by the Syrian government.116  However after two years of 
maintaining this policy, the Israeli authorities began to charge for textbooks as well as for 
other expenses.  In the words of a former teacher and head of a school in the Syrian 
Golan for nine years, including during the time of the capture and occupation of the 
Syrian Golan by Israel, students had to pay for books and “the state [of Israel] offered 
only the building itself and furniture (in many cases by the taxes of the people of the 
municipality).”117 
The new educational system in the Occupied Syrian Golan was run by Israeli 
authorities, and local residents had little to no input into the design or implementation of 
educational policies or curricula.118  Like the Arab sector, the Druze sector is one of the 
educational sectors in Israel most lacking in autonomy, and as a part of the Druze sector 
in Israel, the educational system in the OSG was no exception.  Unlike in the education 
system under Syria, in the new educational system under Israeli administration, teachers 
were required to be adherents of the Druze sect.  Further, because the Druze teachers 
were residents of the Syrian Golan and were not citizens of the state of Israel, they were 
not granted seniority status and were instead governed by one-year contracts.  According 
to personal accounts of residents of the Syrian Golan, this allowed the Israeli authorities 
to effectively silence teachers whose political views they did not agree with by 
controlling those teachers’ terms of employment, basing job opportunities on their 
perceived cooperation with the state of Israel rather than on merit.  Despite the relative 
political stability of the Syrian Golan, teachers through the duration of the occupation and 
to the present day are routinely dismissed for demonstrating “any level of political 
awareness.”119 
Standards for teachers’ qualifications were much lower than throughout Israel.  Often 
teachers were considered qualified if they simply attended a brief training course in 
Israel.  “The lack of real qualifications of many of these teachers make them compliant 
with the [Occupying] authorities, since they would have difficulty finding jobs 
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elsewhere”.120  This in turn contributed to the lack of quality of the overall education 
received in the Occupied Syrian Golan and to the de-legitimization of authority that has 
already begun occurring among students as a result of living under what residents 
perceived to be an illegitimate authority.  Many students in the Occupied Syrian Golan 
continuously feel alienated from the school system, since they perceive it to be an 
illegitimate organ of a government that does not represent them.121  Often, students seek 
out alternative forms of education that they believe are more authentic, learning about 
their identity and history from their families at home, and from supplementary forms of 
education such as the highly politicized annual summer camps that will be discussed 
momentarily. 
 
Content of the Druze Heritage Curriculum 
The educational curriculum for Druze that was instituted in the Occupied Syrian Golan 
was the same curriculum developed for the Galilee Druze in Israel proper.  As discussed, 
and in the words of an OSG resident, it intended “to inculcate a sense of separate ‘Druze 
identity,’ distinct from the Arab identity-as if members of this eleventh-century offshoot 
of Islam constituted a nation rather than a religious sect.”122  The Committee for Druze 
Education and Culture directed its efforts primarily at creating textbooks and curricula 
that emphasized ‘Druze history and heritage’ and were all prepared by Druze educators 
and administrators who were not from the Syrian Golan.123  “The committee had to start 
from scratch, as all [previous] curricula were suited to the Arab schools, without any 
reference to Druze culture.”124  By 1982, all Druze schools offering a matriculation 
examination used the new Druze curricula, and by early 1988, textbooks on Druze 
history, heritage and civics were published and in circulation.125  These new textbooks 
were for grades 3 to 12, and included Hikayat min Qurana (Tales from our Villages), Min 
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adabina waa’datina (Manners and Customs), Qiyam Wataqalid (Values), among 
others.126 
In Israeli schools, students’ studies of history are divided based upon the ethnic 
and/or religious heritage to which they are assigned at school (Jewish, Druze or Arab).  
For example, students in Jewish schools study Israeli and general history (50% of their 
time spent on each).  In Arab schools, within the same number of hours, students study 
general history (40%), Arab history (40%), and Israeli history (20%).  Finally, in Druze 
schools, the students’ studies are divided even further, into four categories: general 
history (30%), Arab history (30%), Israeli history (20%), and Druze history (20%).127 
Despite the implicit rationale given for Israel’s usage of separate education for Druze, 
which is based on a notion of specificity to the particular group – that is, that the different 
or unique circumstances of the Druze dictate that a different curriculum would be more 
appropriate for them – no similarly specific attention is given to the local history of the 
Occupied Syrian Golan.  “No mention is made of the fact that the Golan Heights has 
always been part of Syria.”128  This means that any history dealing with the forced 
transfer of over 95% of the population of the Syrian Golan, including nearly all of the 
villagers’ neighbors is omitted.  Further, it means that the legal status of the Occupied 
Syrian Golan is presented only in terms of Israel’s position and Israel’s strategic 
objectives, ignoring the position held by Syria, the United Nations, nearly all countries of 
the world, and most notably, the Syrian Golan residents themselves.   
The curriculum as a whole, which reflects the state’s aims to form loyal citizens to 
Israel and enthusiastic adherents of Zionism, encourages the Druze to serve as Israeli 
soldiers who are willing to sacrifice their lives for the state of Israel. When imported 
wholesale into a territory occupied by Israel, its intentions take on a more sinister 
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meaning.  Some might assume that the Israeli authorities are making a factually incorrect 
assumption that the Occupied Syrian Golan is a part of Israel.  But more likely, others 
will take the position – held by the majority of residents of the OSG – that the Israeli 
authorities are aware that the Occupied Syrian Golan is under Syrian sovereignty, that 
their imposition of a nationalist curriculum to an occupied population may be seen as an 
attempt to alter the demographic landscape of the territory, perhaps prejudicing a final 
settlement of the territory with Syria, and as will be discussed, may even violate the 
residents’ rights under IHL and IHRL.  If the latter, many residents of the Syrian Golan 
use this as evidence that Israel is using its curriculum in the OSG to deliberately mis-
educate students in an attempt to satisfy the state’s aims of permanently acquiring 
territory in contradiction of IHL.  It could also suggest the little priority held for the needs 
of the students and residents of the Occupied Syrian Golan themselves.  
The curriculum also intentionally distances Druze Arabs from their Arab ethnicity in 
order to create a unique Druze identity.  One of the functions of separating out the Druze 
has been said to distance them from sentiments of Arab nationalism, pan-Arabism, or 
empathy with the Palestinian Arabs in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.  
Supporters’ efforts to oppose this separation and instead emphasize ties between Druze 
and other Arabs led to accusations that they were “radical elements who, out of political-
ideological motives, were bent on emphasizing the common bond between Druzes and 
Arabs.”129 These supporters of Arab heritage and opponents of the Druze heritage 
curriculum insisted that Druze heritage was part of Palestinian-Arab heritage, and that the 
government was propagating political divisions between non-Druze Arabs and Druze 
Arabs.130 This position is largely the same as the position of many of the residents of the 
Syrian Golan, who in their strong opposition to becoming part of the state of Israel, 
aligned themselves culturally, politically and otherwise with their Palestinian Arab 
brethren.   
Many residents of the Syrian Golan go so far as to say the state through its 
curriculum, in its enthusiasm to instill the values of the national Zionist project in the 
Syrian population, in essence robs the OSG residents of their own history, legitimizing 
                                                
129 Falah, supra note 5, at 230. 
130 Id. at 231.  
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Israel’s occupation of their territory and what they see as the theft of their neighbors’ 
land.  However ineffective this strategy has proved in convincing the inhabitants of the 
Syrian Golan of Israel’s position, it suggests a disregard for the rights of the children in 
question to an accurate portrayal of their history and identity that will be explored in 
relation to IHRL and IHL. 
 
Content of Arabic-language and Hebrew-language Curricula 
In the Arabic language curriculum in Druze schools in Israel, the normal materials taught 
in the Arab sector in Arabic literature are supplemented by Druze literature without 
adding additional class time.  The Druze literature surveyed spans a period of over 1000 
years, from the faith’s founding in 1017 all the way through modern works,131 and was 
implemented as part of the efforts to establish a unique, Druze curriculum. 
The Hebrew language curriculum for Druze schools in Israel also supplements the 
regular materials used in Arab or Jewish sector schools with special Druze-focused texts; 
in this case, works written by adherents to the Druze sect, originally either in Hebrew or 
in Arabic, and translated into Hebrew.132 The associated textbook series for Druze sector 
schools was prepared jointly by the Israeli Ministry of Education and a team from the 
University of Haifa, and is called “Roots”.133  The regular materials include study of 
Jewish holy texts (the Bible and Talmud), Jewish thought and philosophy, and grammar 
and literature aimed at giving students “insight into all aspects of Jewish culture.”134 
When implemented in schools in the Syrian Golan, residents again contested the 
usage of literature that aimed to emphasize their religious identity at the expense of time 
that could have been spent learning about the rich cultural and literary heritage of the 
Arabic language.  Residents lamented that in Syrian schools, students learned about Arab 
                                                
131 Committee for Druze Education and Culture, Minhaj el-Loghah el-Arabia Lel Madaris el-Dorzia wa al 
Mukhtalatah [Arabic Language Curriculum for Druze Schools], Ministry of Education and Culture 
(Jerusalem, 1980) (Isr.) (revised version in print as of 2002) as cited in Falah, supra note 5, at 233. 
132 Ministry of Education and Culture, and the University of Haifa, El-Montakhab (1987) (for 9th grade), 
final edition (Haifa, 1996); Mukhtarat min Tarikh el-Adab Wanusoosihi [Selections from the History of 
Literature] (el-Nahdah, Nazareth) (1984) (for grade 10), revised edition under the name el-Montakhab (in 
print as of 2002) (for junior-high schools); Ministry of Education and Culture and the University of Haifa, 
el-Montakhab (Haifa, 1986) (for 12th grade), (revised version in print as of 2002) as cited in Falah, supra 
note 5, at 233. 
133 Ministry of Education and Culture, The Hebrew Curriculum for Druze Schools, (Jerusalem, 1987) (Isr.) 
as cited in Falah, supra note 5, at 233. 
134 Id. 
29 
 
culture spanning thousands of years, from pre-Islamic poetry onward, a heritage that was 
distilled and reduced down to a superficial focus on grammar and syntax in Arabic, and 
substituted with Jewish literary references translated into Arabic, or sources related in 
some way to the Druze sect.135 The feeling that they were inadequately learning the 
Arabic language, culture and heritage led many residents of the Syrian Golan to take 
advantage of the opportunity to go to Damascus for their higher education, to take up 
traditional artistic or cultural pursuits related to Arabic culture, and to create and pursue 
the non-state sponsored educational initiatives that will be discussed next. 
 
Non-state-sponsored educational initiatives 
In addition to the kindergartens they developed, the Druze residents of the Occupied 
Syrian Golan took it upon themselves to supplement their Israeli public education via 
special summer camps beginning in 1986.136  Many of the camp organizers were arrested 
in the early years of the camp by Israeli authorities for what residents described as 
organizers’ pro-Syrian nationalist and pro-Palestinian leanings.  In fact, according to 
reports of camp organizers in 2008, the IDF only stopped attending their camp in the last 
few years, presumably after having stopped considering it as much of a threat to Israeli 
security.137 
According to its organizers, the intent of the pro-Syrian camp (called Esham, which 
in Arabic means “Greater Syria” or simply “Syria”)138 was to provide the children of the 
Occupied Syrian Golan with what they considered an accurate portrayal of their history, 
identity and culture.  The ten-day camp, which in 2008 boasted 280 participants, educated 
students in Arab culture including Arabic music and literature and Syrian and Golani 
political history, including the names and history of the villages from which their 
neighbors were expelled in 1967, in addition to supplemental lessons in sex education 
                                                
135 Fieldwork (Summer 2008), supra note 62. 
136 Shamai, supra note 42 (describing the competing summer camps that were held, one pro-Syrian 
nationalist and the other pro-Israeli nationalist. After the arrest of several organizers of the pro-Syrian camp 
however, it became definitively the more popular of the two). 
137 Interview with Moatezz Abu Jabal. Majdal Shams, Occupied Syrian Golan (August 2008). 
138 In 1999, the camp was called “Withdrawal” or “al-Jalaa” in Arabic. See Joel Greenberg, The Druse of 
Golan Stay Loyal to Syria, NEW YORK TIMES, August 9, 1999. Available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/09/world/the-druse-of-golan-stay-loyal-to-
syria.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm 
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and sports.  The 2008 camp included a special first-time presentation from a resident of 
Majdal Shams who had been seriously injured by a cluster bomb, who warned children 
about both the dangers of cluster bombs and the landmines which are spread all around 
the borders of the Occupied Syrian Golan, even bleeding into the village of Majdal 
Shams and sometimes causing fatalities.  Finally, the camp situated the history of the 
Syrian Golan in the context of the larger Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, 
and established a connection of solidarity between the two occupied peoples.139 
According to a 1999 news article about an earlier meeting of the summer camp, one 
director (Mr. Abu Jabal) explained the camp’s objectives as being (as summarized by the 
reporter) “set up to counter the Israeli-controlled curriculum of schools on the Golan 
Heights, where Druse children learn Hebrew as well as Arabic and Middle Eastern 
history devoid of Arab nationalist content.”140  The camp director went on to say: ''Israel 
is trying to turn them into Israelis, and we reject that,'' Mr. Abu Jabal said. ''We want to 
teach our children that we have a homeland, a nation, a people that we're very proud 
of.''141 
 However, pride in the residents’ Syrian homeland was not all that campers learned, 
according to the article:  
'We learned to love our homeland, defend our nation and hate Zionism,'' said Badia 
Sabra, a 13-year-old boy from the Druse village of Masadeh.  
 
Khaled Abu Shahin, 14, from the neighboring village of Buqata, said that after three 
summers at the camp, his perspective on Israel had changed. Visiting the ruins of a 
village destroyed after the 1967 war made him feel that ''Israel is unjust,'' he recalled 
in the eloquent Hebrew he learned in school.'' When I saw it, I couldn't believe the 
Israelis could be so harsh,'' Khaled said. ''I had thought they were good. Now I believe 
that only our people are good for us. We want to return to Syria and live with our true 
people, like our grandparents did.'142 
 
The sentiments expressed by campers demonstrate some of the dangers of backlash 
when competing political histories are presented to students due to the lack of accurate 
information at school.  Rather than promote tolerance and friendly relations among 
nations and peoples by teaching two sides of a historical narrative at once, teaching one-
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sided narratives and excluding any other perspective leaves open the possibility that when 
confronted with missing information, a student on either side of a conflict will feel 
betrayed.  This also demonstrates why states exercise caution and even at times 
overcompensate by excluding all potentially controversial information when considering 
how to teach students about violence or conflict in the past.  It also might help explain 
why an occupant may exercise particular caution about including materials in educational 
curricula that may incite anger in the occupied population. 
In addition to such organized attempts to re-educate the children of the Occupied 
Syrian Golan in what many residents view as a correct (albeit traumatic) version of their 
history, culture and identity, residents are also educated about their Syrian identity is at 
home.  Within the homes of Majdal Shams are pictures of Syrian President Bashar al-
Assad, Arabic instruments such as the ‘oud and qanun, and the frequently playing of 
Arabic-language television from Lebanon and Syria and the music of Fairouz and Om 
Kalthoum (famous Lebanese and Egyptian singers).  Despite the difficulties of doing so 
due to the closed borders and travel restrictions, families intentionally maintain ties to 
their families from whom they are separated in Lebanon and Syria in particular, in an 
attempt to show their children that they are Syrian even if they have never seen (or may 
never see) Syria.143 
 
Competing National Histories as a Security Risk 
Israel has at times considered the commemoration of competing historical narratives – 
particularly those related to the Palestinians and their historical grievances against Israel 
– as an incitement to violence, and as such, a security risk for the state.  Evidence of this 
can be found in Israel’s recent outlawing of “Nakba” commemorations,144 or the 
Palestinian commemoration of the historical “catastrophe” that was what Palestinians 
describe as the expulsion of thousands of their brethren from the Palestinian territories in 
                                                
143 Fieldwork (Summer 2008), supra note 62. 
144 Budget Foundations Law (Amendment No. 40) 5771-2011 (22 March 2011) (Isr.), commonly referred 
to as the “Nakba Law”. See High Court Ruling on ‘Nakba Law’ reveals its waning power, January 7, 2012, 
available at http://972mag.com/high-court-ruling-on-nakba-bill-reveals-its-waning-power/32271/. 
(Statement by Adalah: the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel: “this law authorizes the 
Minister of Finance to financially penalize government-funded bodies that engage in activities that amount 
to ‘rejecting the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state” or “commemorating 
Independence Day or the day of the establishment of the state as a day of mourning,”). 
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order to create the state of Israel in 1948.  In the Syrian Golan Heights, commemorative, 
Syrian historical monuments have been attacked by the Israeli authorities, and the Syrian 
Golan residents’ attempts to commemorate aspects of their history that they feel have 
been marginalized by the Israeli authorities – particularly those in which they believe 
they have undergone injustices – have frequently been met with arrests and crackdowns 
on participants.145  This focus by the authorities on political histories and public 
remembrances of key historical events that may challenge the dominant Israeli national 
narrative are indicative of the fact that competing histories, particularly by dissatisfied 
minorities, can be viewed by the state as a security risk or an incitement to violence 
against the state.  This is especially true in the context of Israel, in which the competing 
narratives surrounding the state’s origins and legitimacy are cast in ethnic and religious 
terms. 
 
Special Factors Affecting the Syrian Golan  
Status of Peace Negotiations 
Another important characteristic of the Syrian Golan relates to political status 
negotiations.  The Occupied Syrian Golan is one of the major obstacles to peace 
negotiations between Israel and Syria, which despite a relative lack of overt military 
hostility, have remained in an official state of war since 1967.146  Syria claims that it will 
not sign a peace agreement with Israel until Israel returns the Syrian Golan, and Israel 
desires the Syrian Golan for its natural resources147 and military geo-strategic value.148  In 
November 2010, the Israeli Knesset passed legislation nicknamed the “Golan 
Referendum Law” which requires a public referendum in order to cede any territory that 
is under “Israeli sovereignty” as part of peace concessions, referring in particular the 
                                                
145 Such intervention in the activities of Syrian Golan residents that related to their Syrian political identity 
was at its peak during their heightened resistance activities during the 1980’s.  
146 After the war in 1973, about 100 km of the Golan was returned to Syria and peace negotiations resumed 
and then were again ceased. They have continually begun and then stalled again several times. 
147 Israeli agricultural settlements currently produce considerable amounts of high-quality wine, beef, fruit 
and mineral water for the domestic market and for international export. See Murphy, supra note 9, at 15.   
148 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, (Isr.) last accessed May 16, 2012, available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts+About+Israel/Israel+in+Maps/Golan+Heights.htm (“The Golan Heights 
are strategically important for several reasons: (a) Israeli presence in the Golan Heights provides a 
defensible border against invasion by land; (b) All of northern Israel is within range of direct artillery fire 
from the Golan Heights; (c) The Heights control the main water sources of the State of Israel. The Golan 
Heights have been under Israeli law, jurisdication, [sic] and administration since 1981.”). 
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Golan Heights and East Jerusalem.149  According to its accompanying procedural 
legislation, in order to override the referendum provision, a special majority of the 
Knesset of 80 members is required.150 The legislation is widely viewed as a potential 
obstacle to future peace negotiations.151  Residents of the Occupied Syrian Golan are 
“caught between Israel and Syria,”152 waiting for peace negotiations that are beyond their 
control to resume and to finish, while they and their future are tossed like pawns between 
the two parties.  The uprisings in Syria against the Syrian government that began in 2011 
and have continued into mid-2012 may also affect negotiations. 
 
Comparatively privileged position 
Some OSG residents refer to the Israeli occupation of the Syrian Golan as a ‘five star 
occupation’153 due to the relative ease with which residents can move throughout Israel, 
the positive view many Israelis hold of Syrian Golan residents as a result of their Druze 
heritage, as a result of the positive view of Druze in Israel generally, and their 
comparative economic wealth and lack of discrimination in society, at least in relation to 
the Palestinians in the occupied Palestinian territories.  Because Syrian Golan residents 
benefit from the confusion between them and the Galilee Druze, a unique problem is 
presented: while advocacy aimed at gaining national and international recognition of the 
violations of international law to which the Syrian Golan residents are subject may help 
residents resolve their status in the long-run, it could backfire politically in the short-
term.  Increased recognition within Israel of the problems facing the residents of the 
                                                
149 Syria rejects Israeli referendum law for ceding annexed land, CNN, November 23, 2010, available at 
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-23/world/israel.referendum.bill_1_referendum-peace-deal-knesset-
members?_s=PM:WORLD (describing the legislation’s procedure, in which, if 60 members of Parliament 
approve a peace deal that cedes Israeli-annexed land, the proposal will go to public referendum; yet, if 80 
members of Parliament (or a two-thirds majority) pass the peace deal, then no public referendum would be 
required.). 
150 Jonathan Lis, Ministerial panel decides: Territorial concessions only by referendum, Knesset committee 
to support bill outlining procedural implementation of referendum, making previously approved law viable, 
HA’ARETZ, October 11, 2010, available at http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/ministerial-panel-
decides-territorial-concessions-only-by-referendum-1.318417 
151 Top minister opposes Golan heights referendum bill: Dan Meridor says a law mandating a referendum 
on a Golan withdrawal would tie Israel’s hands in peace talks, HA’ARETZ, October 27, 2009, available at 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/top-minister-opposes-golan-heights-referendum-bill-1.5289 
152 Shamai, supra note 42, at 462. 
153 Fieldwork (Summer 2008), supra note 62. This phrase has also been used to describe the situation of 
Palestinians living in Ramallah due to their relative prosperity compared with Palestinians in occupied 
Palestinian areas of lesser prosperity such as Hebron. 
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Syrian Golan could attract negative attention to residents and cause negative political or 
economic repercussions.  For this reason, it can be contended at least to some degree that 
the current obfuscation of the “Golan Druze” with the Galilee Druze is beneficial to the 
residents of the Syrian Golan.  And correlatively, human rights practitioners’ attempts to 
clarify between the two groups – particularly by highlighting human rights and 
humanitarian legal violations perpetrated by the state of Israel – could negatively affect 
the residents. 
 That being said, the political views of the residents of the Syrian Golan in relation 
to Israel are not a secret and have been written about extensively by both residents of the 
Syrian Golan and journalists.  And particularly given the current political situation with 
the conflict in Syria, it is unlikely that the Syrian Golan residents will enjoy such 
obfuscation for much longer.  
 
Legal Analysis: Violations of Law 
This section will discuss the laws applicable to the Occupied Syrian Golan, including 
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law.  It will discuss the 
applicability of both sets of laws in times of belligerent occupation according to 
international sources, and then Israel’s position on the legal status of the Syrian Golan 
and on the applicability of IHL and IHRL to the Syrian Golan.  It will explain the legal 
reasoning for the determination that the Syrian Golan is occupied as well as Israel’s 
objections to this position.  This discussion will also detail the extraterritorial application 
of human rights law, and specifically of economic, social and cultural rights (of which the 
right to education is one), to occupied territories.  It will then discuss the issue of 
education, first under humanitarian law and more specifically, the laws of belligerent 
occupation, and then under the framework of international human rights law.  It will then 
discuss various frameworks for assessing education rights in order to determine 
procedures for assessing and reporting violations to this right, and apply them to the 
Occupied Syrian Golan.  It will take into account Israel’s contentions that IHL does not 
apply to the Occupied Syrian Golan, and consider the protection of the local inhabitants 
according to both interpretations of the law.  And finally, it will compare and assess the 
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effects of both approaches, with a view to harmonizing conflicting norms between the 
IHL obligations and IHRL obligations regarding education in occupied territories. 
 It should be noted that while in discussions of the applicability of international 
humanitarian law to the territories occupied by Israel, usually Israel’s position in regards 
to the Syrian Golan Heights is afforded little more space than a footnote.  In particular, 
the discussion of whether or not Israel intended to annex the Syrian Golan is typically 
dismissed as irrelevant, since the Security Council condemned its action as illegal 
regardless.  This paper will devote substantially more attention to Israel’s position in 
reference to the status of the Syrian Golan Heights not because it has a legal effect on the 
territory’s status per se, but due to the following assumptions: 1) Israel’s intentions and 
position on the status of the Syrian Golan as well as how they are perceived by the 
inhabitants of the Syrian Golan have an effect on inhabitants’ opinions generally as well 
as in regards to the issue of education, 2) the inhabitants’ consent and cooperation in 
regards to educational matters is of interest to the Occupier in accordance with 
international law, and is therefore relevant to this study, 3) while a legal analysis takes 
into account the letter of the law, where to go after the analysis –or, engaging in problem 
solving, often involves prioritizing based on factors which could be called political, and 
4) no sincere commitment to problem solving can take place without considering the 
intentions, position and justifications of a state actor who may be the perpetrator of a 
violation, since these may affect what legal solutions can be eventually be deemed 
politically expedient or practical.  And finally, conflicting educational aims between the 
Occupier and what is envisioned and required by international law have a fundamental 
impact on the residents that is relevant to this analysis.  This will be discussed in the next 
section. 
 
Problem of the Conflict of Laws in an Occupied Territory 
The Syrian Golan, as an occupied territory under international law, is subject to the 
simultaneous and sometimes-conflicting laws of war (IHL) and laws of human rights 
(IHRL).  The law of occupation – a subset of IHL – is already complex, and is made 
more complex by the situation of prolonged occupation in which the inhabitants of the 
Syrian Golan find themselves.  Questions as to which laws are being applied and why, 
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which laws trump which laws in cases of conflicting provisions between the applicable 
sets of laws, conflicting theories or underlying principles behind these laws, and to what 
extent any of this bears on the realities of education within the Syrian Golan will be 
addressed through this study from a legal point of view.  Depending on whose 
interpretation of law prevails at a political level, the residents of the Syrian Golan could 
end up in a very different situation than the one they are in now, or remain under the 
status quo.   
 
Israel’s Position on Occupation, Annexation and Laws 
Despite the prolonged nature of the Israeli occupation of the Syrian Golan, the 
international attention and political and diplomatic consequences of its capture and 
effective annexation, and the international spotlight on Israel as a result of its conduct 
within the occupied Palestinian territories – little has been written on the exact legal 
position of Israel vis a vis the Syrian Golan.  Much can be inferred through statements by 
Israeli heads of state and political leaders, rulings of the High Court of Justice, and 
through comparative study of Israel’s reasoning as regards the application of various 
international legal instruments to the other occupied territories such as the West Bank and 
East Jerusalem, but the clearest positions have come from the analysis of Israeli 
submissions to UN bodies. This portion of the present study undertakes to analyze these 
positions as thoroughly as possible given the scope of this study. 
According to Israel, was or is the Syrian Golan occupied by Israel?  
Israel recognized Syrian sovereignty over the Syrian Golan Heights most notably in 1949 
in the conclusion of an Armistice Agreement with Syria,154 but has since alluded to 
Syrian sovereignty numerous times through public statements.155  When the United 
Nations adopted Resolution 242 concerning the illegality of the acquisition of territory 
                                                
154 Israel-Syria Armistice Agreement, supra note 29. 
155 See, e.g., MOSHE MA’OZ, SYRIA AND ISRAEL: FROM WAR TO PEACEMAKING (1995) at 249 (discussing a 
statement of Shimon Peres, current President of Israel, recipient of the joint-Nobel Peace Prize with Rabin 
and Arafat in 1994, and then-Foreign Minister to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on July 19, 1994, “We 
have acknowledged Syrian sovereignty on the Golan Heights, time after time,” and also noting that in the 
same context, Peres “mentioned the Israeli government’s resolution of 19 June 1967, offering to withdraw 
the [Israeli] army to the international boundary with Syria in return for full peace…” and that Peres “later 
implied in the Knesset that there was a need to change the 1981 Golan Law (which, in fact, meant the 
annexation of the Golan to Israel) and that he believed that more than half of the Knesset was prepared to 
make such a change.”). 
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through force, and identified Israel’s resulting obligation to return territories it occupied 
in 1967, Israel agreed to the resolution even while disputing which territories were meant 
for withdrawal.156   
 Israel does not believe that the Syrian Golan is currently occupied.157 Since 
extending its civil administration to the Syrian Golan through the Golan Heights Law in 
1981, Israel considered its occupation of the OSG ended, and the Syrian Golan part of its 
sovereign territory.158 This will be discussed in more detail in relation to a following 
question relating to the application of IHL to the Syrian Golan. 
Would an annexation of the Syrian Golan by Israel be legal according to international 
law?  
Israel claimed that the Syrian Golan was captured in self-defense, resulting from Syrian 
provocations that began the 1967 war and resulted in the capture of the Syrian Golan 
Heights by Israel – although these facts have been disputed.159  This formed a part of its 
                                                
156 Israel’s key argument in regards to withdrawal is that the wording of Resolution 242 does not specify 
that Israel will withdraw from “all territories occupied…”or “the territories occupied,” but merely from 
“territories occupied.”  See, e.g., EUGENE V. ROSTOW, PEACE IN THE BALANCE: THE FUTURE OF U.S. 
FOREIGN POLICY 163-64 (1972); JULIUS STONE, NO PEACE-NO WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST 39 (1968) as 
cited in Asher Maoz, Application of Israeli Law to the Golan Heights is Annexation, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 
356-357 (1993-1995) (arguing that reference should be made to the French text, which uses the word “the” 
in the French when it states: "des territoires occupes lors du recent conflit" [the territories occupied in the 
recent conflict]. According to Israel’s interpretation of this position –which is bolstered by domestic 
political and religious pressures in relation to religious, historical and strategic claims to the occupied 
territories- certain territories are intended to remain part of Israel, and others are intended to be returned. 
The Golan was originally meant to be returned, but members of the Israeli public and Knesset have 
increasingly have argued that it should be a part of the permanent borders of the state.) 
157 Murphy, supra note 9 at 37-38. 
158 Id. 
159 AVI SHLAIM, THE IRON WALL: ISRAEL AND THE ARAB WORLD (2001) at 235-236 (discussing the origins 
of the 1967 hostilities, arguing that they resulted primarily from the conflict with Syria, which was 
escalated and provoked through Israel’s direct military provocations in order to gain more land from Syria, 
“Israel’s strategy of escalation on the Syrian front was probably the single most important factor in 
dragging the Middle East to war in June 1967, despite the conventional wisdom on the subject that singles 
out Syrian aggression as the principal cause of war. It is an article of faith among Israelis that the Golan 
Heights were captured in the Six-Day War to stop the Syrians from shelling the settlements down below.  
But many of the firefights were deliberately provoked by Israel. Support for this revisionist view came in 
1997 from an unexpected quarter: Moshe Dayan [an IDF Commander]… Dayan confessed that his greatest 
mistake was that, as minister of defense in June 1967, he did not stick to his original opposition to the 
storming of the Golan Heights. [Rami] Tal [a reporter who published private conversations with Dayan 
after Dayan’s death] began to demonstrate that the Syrians were sitting on top of the Golan Heights. Dayan 
interrupted, ‘Never mind that. After all, I know how at least 80 percent of the clashes there started.  In my 
opinion, more than 80 percent, but let’s talk about 80 percent.  It went this way: We would send a tractor to 
plow someplace where it wasn’t possible to do anything, in the demilitarized area, and knew in advance 
that the Syrians would start to shoot.  If they didn’t shoot, we would tell the tractor to advance farther, until 
in the end the Syrians would get annoyed and shoot.  And then we would use artillery and later the air force 
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argument that its occupation and subsequent extension of its law, administration and 
jurisdiction to the Syrian Golan was legal. 
An excellent example of the original reasoning that dictated Israel’s contention 
that the Israeli annexation of the Syrian Golan Heights was legal was articulated by 
Lauterpacht, who claimed that since international law distinguishes between wars of 
aggression and wars of self-defense, the prohibition of the acquisition of a territory by 
force is only relevant to cases of territorial acquisition by force in a war of aggression.  
When territory is acquired in self-defense, annexation of that territory is not prohibited.160  
This position was articulated in relation to the contention that the war of 1967 had been 
begun by Syrian aggression.  Part of the claim however included the caveat that holding 
territories in wars of self-defense was only valid as long as it remained within the 
essential security needs of the victim state to do so, since giving up the territory would 
pose a significant threat to the state.  However, once the territory was deemed to never 
again pose a threat to the state’s security, it could give up the territory.161 
A second articulation of Israel’s argumentation can be found in the statement of 
the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s legal adviser, Elyakim Rubinstein, at the time of the 
extension of Israeli administration and law to the Syrian Golan.  When asked about the 
legal justification for annexation, he claimed that the “legal situation has been elevated” 
and “no private rights [of Arab citizens of the Syrian Golan] have been changed or 
prejudiced.”162  His contention that the situation was a legal improvement for the 
inhabitants of the Syrian Golan was based on his assertion that prior to the Israeli capture 
of the Syrian Golan in 1967, Syrian law applied to the Syrian Golan was but “rarely 
enforced”, causing a “legal vacuum” into which Israel entered, first imposing a military 
                                                                                                                                            
also, and that’s how it was. I did that, and Laskov and Chara [Zvi Tsur, Rabin’s predecessor as chief of 
staff] did that, and Yitzhak did that, but it seems to me that the person who most enjoyed these games was 
Dado [David Elzar, OC Northern Command, 1964-69].’ In retrospect, Dayan could not point to a clearly 
formulated strategic conception that governed Israel’s behavior in the DMZ between 1949 and 1967. All he 
suggested was that he and some of his fellow officers did not accept the 1949 armistice lines with Syria as 
final and hoped to change them by means that fell short of war, by “snatching bits of territory and holding 
on to it until the enemy despairs and gives it to us.”). 
160 ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, JERUSALEM AND THE HOLY PLACES, 51-52,1968 as cited in supra note 156, at 
356-357. 
161 S.M. Schwebel, What Weight to Conquest?, 64 AM. J. INTL L. 345-6 (1970) as cited in supra note 156, 
at 356-357. 
162 John Yemma, Israelis seek to justify annexing Golan Heights, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 22 
December 1981. 
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government and then with a civil government.163  In relation to charges that Israel’s 
unilateral legal move was in violation of international law, Rubinstein said, ''International 
law is subject to reasonable time and conduct… Syria has passed in our view these 
reasonable conduct and time limits by announcing time and again it will not negotiate 
with or recognize Israel… even the Law of Occupation cannot be relied upon too long… 
good faith is necessary.''164   
These statements seem to suggest that Israel held the opinion that there was a time 
limit on the length of time a territory may be held in the temporary state of occupation 
before the occupant may unilaterally extend its sovereignty over the territory.165  This 
perspective is also suggested by historical accounts emphasizing Syrian President Hafez 
al-Assad’s statement during the same time period that he would not accept peaceful 
relations between the nations.166  Taken together, Rubinstein’s statements emphasizing 
his idea of a time limit and the emphasis within historical documents on Syria’s refusal to 
negotiate, seem to indicate that Israeli policymakers believed that Assad had relinquished 
his claim to the Syrian Golan through his rejection of peace agreements on Israel’s terms.  
While problematic for a number of reasons, this perspective is still cited as justification 
for the extension of Israeli sovereignty over the Syrian Golan. 
According to Israel, is the Syrian Golan annexed to Israel? 
Historically, Israel officials claimed that they did not “annex” the territory, although this 
claim is disputed by historians.167 As noted by Benvenisti, the text of the Golan Heights 
Law (as in the case of East Jerusalem prior to the formal annexation law passed by Israel) 
“was vague enough to permit the interpretation that the measure did not effect the formal 
                                                
163 Id. For further articulation of the claim that the Golan Heights was a “legal vacuum,” see Sheleff, supra 
note 51, at 337 (contending that Syrian jurisdiction, prior to the passage of the Golan Heights Law, had 
“ceased to be an effective legal instrument.”). 
164 Supra note 162. 
165 Contra. [Untitled Editorial], HA’ARETZ, December 15, 1981, reprinted in Chaim Herzog, Golan 
Annexation: Israeli Comment, 11 J. PALESTINE STUD. (1982) at 174 (criticizing the perspective on a time 
limit prior to annexation in an op-ed published shortly after the passage of the Golan Heights Law, “It will 
be difficult for us [Israelis] to justify the imposition of Israeli sovereignty on an area that was outside the 
sphere of the League of Nations mandate over Eretz Israel by the fact that Syrian[sic] is not ready to sign a 
peace treaty with us.”).  
166 David Shipler, The Golan Heights Annexed by Israel in an Abrupt Move: Begin Pushes the Legislation 
through Parliament – US Criticizes the Action, NEW YORK TIMES, December 14, 1981, at A1 (“It was 
Syria's hard-line stance that Mr. Begin cited as an immediate reason for his action. He quoted a report in the 
Kuwaiti newspaper Al Rai Al Amm on Sunday that President Hafez al-Assad of Syria had expressed the 
determination to refuse to recognize Israel "even if the Palestinians deign to do so."). 
167 Supra note 159. 
40 
 
annexation of the area into Israel.”168 Others have taken this position, including Leon 
Sheleff, who argued that because no Basic Law169 was passed (as was done in the case of 
East Jerusalem170) formally annexing (or extending Israeli sovereignty over) the Syrian 
Golan, it remains a captured, occupied territory according to Israeli law.171 He further 
argued that the act of recognizing some measure of legal autonomy within a territory or 
allowing the extension of a certain type of law (such as tribal law) did not automatically 
serve as a waiver of one’s sovereignty, citing examples of the American recognition of 
Native American tribal law by the U.S. Supreme Court.172  This position has been refuted 
by Moaz Asher, who stated that such examples are not analogous, and that the key 
characteristic making the extension of the law and jurisdiction of one state over another a 
“quintessential act of sovereignty” was in that state’s unilateral action, that is, without the 
consent of the state to whom sovereignty, in reality, belongs.173  In the case of the Syrian 
Golan Heights, Syria did not consent to the extension of Israeli law over the territory, 
making the Israeli act an illegal extension of its sovereignty over the Syrian Golan. 
Rubinstein’s statements above could be viewed as a statement that suggests the 
Israeli intent to effect formal annexation.  The High Court of Justice of Israel, or the 
Israeli Supreme Court, has made the clearest statements in regards to the view that Israel 
through the Golan Heights Law extending its administration and jurisdiction over the 
Syrian Golan amounted to the annexation of the Syrian Golan Heights. Supporters of the 
                                                
168 See HCJ 205/82 Kanj Abu Salakh v. Minister of Interior [1983] IsrSC 37(2) 718 [hereinafter: Kanj Abu 
Salah] (approving Justice Cohen’s opinion in HCJ 283/69 Ruweidi v. Military Court in the Hebron District 
[1969] IsrSC 24(2) 419, 423) as cited in EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION, 
Princeton University Press, 2004 (first printing 1993), at 114 [hereinafter: Int’l Law of Occupation] 
(arguing that Kanj Abu Salakh is one example of the High Court’s refusal to adjudicate the issue of whether 
or not the Israeli government’s reservation regarding the de jure applicability of the law of occupation is 
applicable to the territories, “But cf. Justice Kahan’s opinion in Ruweidi, holding the 1967 declaration as 
affecting annexation,”). See discussion at 110-112 of id. 
169 Israel does not have a formal written constitution.  Rather, it has a series of 11 Basic Laws that serve as 
the constitutive laws of the state, serving the same purpose as a constitution. 
170 Basic Law: Jerusalem: The Capital of Israel, 1979-1980 S.H. 186 (Isr.) translated in 34 L.S.I. 209 
(1979-1980). 
171 Supra note 51, at 335 (admitting that in a constitutional law textbook on Israel, only one cursory 
mention was made of the Golan Heights Law, and it stated that the law annexed the territory to Israel, and 
describing the intentional lack of use of the term annexation during the passage of the law as evidence for 
the assertion that the Knesset did not want to state the purposes of the law explicitly “for reasons of 
sensitivity to international public opinion,” citing that an opponent of the law, Member of the Knesset 
Charlie Biton, unsuccessfully proposed changing its name to "The Law for the Annexation of the Golan 
Heights."). 
172 Id. at 347. 
173 Supra note 56. 
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idea that the Golan Heights Law did affect annexation, meaning that it transferred 
sovereignty over the territory to Israel, draw upon an Israeli High Court decision bearing 
on the question of the status of the Syrian Golan after the passage of the Golan Heights 
Law174 in which the Court was petitioned by residents of the Syrian Golan Heights 
regarding whether they were required to carry identity cards.  The residents’ request 
squarely addressed the question of whether the Golan Heights Law meant that the 
residents were legally in Israel, and therefore obligated under the Israeli law to carry their 
identification cards.175  In response, the Court stated: “Wherever in the law it says Israel 
or the state of Israel, Ramat HaGolan [the Golan Heights] is included.”176 While the 
Court clarified that simply extending Israeli administration over a territory outside of the 
state does not by itself affect annexation of the territory: annexation is determined by a 
host of other factors including the political conditions and intentions of the legislators at 
                                                
174 Some of the confusion here may arise from the differing English renderings of the case title: it is 
alternately written, Kanj Abu Salakh v. Minister of Interior, as in Int’l Law of Occupation, supra note 168; 
Kanagh Abuzalah v. the State of Israel, Abu Salah v. Minster of the Interior, and S. Cang’ Abu Zalach et al 
v. The Minister of the Interior et al as cited in Ora Schmalz, A Survey of a Selection of Judgments 
Delivered by the Supreme Court of Israel, 19 ISRAEL L. REV., (1983), and Kang Abou Tzalach v. Minister 
of the Interior, as cited in Sheleff, supra note 51, at 345.  The author has relied upon others’ reports of the 
text of the case, including both supporters and opponents of annexation who have written in English after 
translating the Hebrew text themselves, since no English rendering is available on the High Court of Justice 
website or elsewhere.  Most sources consulted however reached similar conclusions regarding the meaning 
of the Court’s holding. 
175 Kanj Abu Salah, supra note 168, (bearing on legislation contained in the Emergency Regulations 
(Possession and Presentation of Identity Certificate) (Extension of Validity) Law, 5731- 1971, 1970-1971 
S.H. 109, translated in 25 L.S.I. 108 (1970-1971)) as cited in supra, note 156, at 381; see also Schmalz, 
supra note 174, (referring to Kanj Abu Salah, “The argument for the petitioners, contending that the duty to 
accept and to hold Israeli Identity Cards does not apply to them, was based on the opinion that the Ramat 
HaGolan Law did not make the area part of the State of Israel, and that therefore a person who is lawfully 
in the Golan Heights is not lawfully in Israel. Hence he has no duty to accept, to hold, and to produce an 
Identity Card. The argument for the respondents was that in consequence of the Ramat HaGolan Law, a 
person lawfully staying in the Golan Heights must be regarded as a person being in Israel lawfully. Barak J. 
resolved the case by stating that in his view, all legal norms applying to Israel have, by force of the Ramat 
HaGolan Law, been applied to that area. He stated that the applicants' interpretation leads to absurd 
consequences. He emphasized that the Laws enacted by the Knesset must be interpreted in order to achieve 
their aim. The judge stated further that in line with this attitude, there can be no doubt that the legislative 
aim and the wording of the relevant provision is to equate the Golan Heights, for the purpose of the Law, 
the Jurisdiction and the Administration, to the State of Israel itself. Each applicant is, therefore, "a resident" 
for the purpose of the Population Registry Law, and the Law requiring the possession and the presentation 
of an Identity Card, and therefore the duty to accept, to carry with him, and to produce, an Identity Card 
applies to him.”). 
176 Kanj Abu Salah, supra note 168, as cited in Rael Jean Isaac & Erich Isaac, Should None Dare Call It 
Treason?, OUTPOST, Dec. 1994, at 4 [hereinafter: Treason]. 
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the time of adopting the legislation,177 it further stated, “In the matter before us, the 
language of the law and the legislative purpose will lead to the conclusion that wherever 
there is reference to 'Israeli law', 'Israel', or another expression that refers to the state, 
Ramat HaGolan is also meant.”178  
While the decision has been interpreted by many to indicate that the court 
answered the question of annexation in the affirmative, a careful reading of this phrasing 
could lead one to come to the conclusion that the Court did not mean that the state had 
effected formal annexation, and that it simply reiterated the text of the Golan Heights 
Law using different wording.179   
One argument in support of the idea that Israel intended to annex the Syrian 
Golan through its passage of the Golan Heights Law, and yet did not want to jeopardize 
its claim over the territory through a public, international announcement, can be found in 
an argument published in an op-ed by former Israeli Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations and Knesset member Chaim Herzog shortly after the passage of the law.  
Herzog suggested that David Ben Gurion, one of the founders of the state of Israel, 
advocated a strategy of “ambiguity in what was said on the one hand, and the fact that we 
were there on the ground on the other” as the “best combination”180 of tactics in relation 
to the task of defining Israel’s borders in Israel’s favor.181  Herzog criticized the 
enactment of the Golan Heights Law as unnecessarily compromising Israel’s best 
chances of winning the territory, accusing the Knesset of engaging in “unnecessary 
detail” in legislation, and putting what would be criticized as the illegal annexation of the 
Syrian Golan permanently on the United Nations agenda.182  The strategy advocated by 
Herzog demonstrates clearly what critics of Israel have alleged, namely, that Israel 
                                                
177 Kanj Abu Salah, supra note 168, (“In a case that dealt with the question of the legal status of the Golan 
Heights, in light of the Golan Heights Law, Justice A. Barak noted, in line with the comments of Justice H. 
Cohen, that "application of Israeli norm X on place Y outside the borders of the State does not necessarily 
make place Y part of Israel. Everything depends on the purpose, language, and implementation of the norm 
being interpreted") (B’Tselem, trans.) as cited in B’tselem: The Israeli Information Center for Human 
Rights in the Occupied Territories, A Policy of Discrimination: Land Expropriation, Planning and Building 
in East Jerusalem: Comprehensive Report, May 1995 at 13. 
178 Treason, supra note 176, at 4. 
179 This is the conclusion that is reached by Sheleff, supra note 51, at 345. 
180 Herzog, supra 165, at 174. 
181 This tactic has been criticized internationally as Israel’s attempt to use territorial ambiguities and 
settlement policies to engage in unlawful territorial expansion, or “land grabs.”   
182 Herzog, supra 165, at 174. 
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intentionally employs such strategies of legal ambiguity combined with actions that 
physically encroach on the territory it occupies in order to expand its borders through 
creating “facts on the ground.”   
The clear acknowledgement of such a strategy also casts doubt over Israel’s 
assurances that it did not intend the de facto annexation of the Syrian Golan through its 
passage of the Golan Heights Law.183  It is possible that Israel’s statements in regard to 
its intentions are unreliable, given the possibility that – in line with Ben Gurion’s strategy 
as articulated previously – Israel intentionally conceals its intentions as a matter of public 
policy strategy.   
While the government of Israel typically avoids use of the term “annexation” in 
reference to the Syrian Golan, discussions of “maintaining Israeli sovereignty” over the 
Syrian Golan abound.  Such phrases as “retaining Israeli sovereignty over the Golan” are 
common, as used in the Government of Israel’s Guidelines in 2010, or the High Court of 
Justice’s consideration of a question in which a petitioner claimed that a local Syrian 
Golan-based Israeli association was using funds in order to create propaganda aimed at 
maintaining Israeli sovereignty over the Syrian Golan and preventing any attempts to 
relinquish control over the territory.184  Furthermore, the 2010 “Golan Referendum Law” 
was widely reported by news agencies to require a public vote for any attempts to cede 
the territories “under Israeli sovereignty,” including the Syrian Golan Heights.185 
The issue of Israeli sovereignty over the Syrian Golan has been such a passionate 
issue of debate in Israel that it has been claimed by prominent Israelis that any person 
who is acting under the intention of removing any part of the sovereign territory of Israel 
is committing treason according to the Israeli penal code – a crime punishable by death or 
                                                
183 Accord Asher, supra note 156, at 366 (describing the doublespeak when it came to the interpretation of 
the initial Israeli extension of its law, administration and jurisdiction to East Jerusalem as effective 
annexation, which later became apparent through more clear legislation in the form of a Basic Law on 
Jerusalem, “it was almost natural that while the leaders of the state were making it clear both within and 
without the Knesset that East Jerusalem had been annexed to Israel, the representatives of the state in 
international forums fervently denied that this was the result.”). 
184 HCJ 2838/95 Greenberg v. Katzrin Local Council [1997], available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/95/380/028/B01/95028380.b01.pdf. 
185 See e.g., Jonathan Lis, Knesset Pushes Golan Referendum Law, HA’ARETZ, December 9, 2009, available 
at http://www.haaretz.com/news/knesset-pushes-golan-heights-referendum-law-1.2474. 
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life imprisonment.186  As recently as 2008, a Member of the Knesset remarked: “There is 
not a sane nation in the world that gives up the territory of its homeland… Whoever 
removes land from the State of Israel's sovereign territory is subject to the death 
penalty… Giving away the Golan Heights to Syria is treason, and the punishment for a 
person who commits treason under Israeli law is death.”187  
 The above discussion should serve as strong evidence to suggest that despite 
Israel’s early claims to the contrary, and its refusal to use the explicit term annexation in 
relation to the Syrian Golan, Israel takes the position that it has extended its “full 
sovereignty” over the Syrian Golan, which according to the rules of international law 
which will be discussed later, constitutes effective annexation.  However, as will also be 
discussed later, regardless of Israel’s official position, the 1981 Golan Heights Law is 
considered an ‘effective annexation’ under international law. 
Israeli Reasoning for Continuing to Hold the Syrian Golan 
Since 1981, Israel continues to hold the Syrian Golan Heights based on the assertions 
that, (a) as mentioned previously, the Syrian Golan Heights were legitimately captured as 
a means of self-defense during unprovoked warfare by Syria, (b) The Syrian Golan 
Heights is a strategic plateau that is vital to Israel’s defense of its borders, which 
according to Security Council Resolution 242, are guaranteed to be “secure and 
recognized”.  Because of the physical characteristics of the Syrian Golan Heights, which 
overlooks Israel, and its proximity to unfriendly, warring Arab states, it represents a 
territory that – if given up – would compromise Israel’s security.  As an example of the 
vulnerability to Israel that the Syrian Golan Heights poses, Israel cites its cities being 
shelled by Syria from positions on the Syrian Golan Heights.  Israel interprets the word 
“secure” in Resolution 242 to mean that its borders be “defensible”.(c) Alternately, some 
                                                
186 The revised penal code cited in Treason, supra note 176, at 4, was adopted by the Knesset in 1981 and 
according to the authors, “Chapter 7, entitled "Security of the State, Foreign Relations and Official 
Secrets," includes paragraphs covering treason which were incorporated verbatim from earlier revisions of 
the penal code adopted in 1957. Paragraph 97b reads: "Anyone who does something with the intention of 
removing territory from the sovereignty of the state or making that territory part of the sovereignty of a 
foreign state or has performed an act that is likely to bring this about--the penalty is death or life 
imprisonment.” See also Louis Rene Beres & Zalman Shoval, On Demilitarizing a Palestinian “Entity” 
and the Golan Heights: An International Law Perspective, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L., Nov. 1995 at 970; 
see also HOWARD GRIEF, THE LEGAL FOUNDATION AND BORDERS OF ISRAEL UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
2008, at 562-563. 
187 Nissan Ratzlav-Katz, MK Eldad: Death Penalty for Golan Land Concessions, ISRAEL NATIONAL NEWS, 
May 26, 2008, available at http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/126304 
45 
 
prominent Israelis take the position that the Syrian Golan Heights is a part of the 
historical borders of Eretz Israel or the Biblical “Land of Israel”. This is the position 
sometimes afforded by Israeli heads of state regarding the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip,188 and is also at times position that officials use to justify the establishment of 
permanent settlements in the Syrian Golan Heights, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.189 
Others however see the Syrian Golan Heights as temporarily under Israeli control, 
pending a peace agreement with Syria in which the Syrian Golan Heights will be returned 
to Syria.190 (d) Still others claim that the Syrian Golan Heights is primarily held due to 
political battles over access to vital water resources that benefit the state of Israel.191 
According to Israel, does international humanitarian law apply to the Syrian Golan? 
Regarding the applicability of international law to the Syrian Golan Heights, and to the 
occupied territories more broadly, Israel maintains that it upholds international law in its 
administration of the occupied territories.192  It disagrees however with the interpretations 
under which certain standards of international humanitarian law would apply to the 
territories it occupies. Because the Hague Regulations form part of customary 
                                                
188 In an NBC Meet the Press interview of April 25,1982, Begin was asked about allegations that Israel was 
“moving unmistakably” to annex the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. He replied, “Well, first of all, I would 
like to say a word about the term annex, or annexation.  You can annex foreign land. You cannot annex 
your own country.  Judea and Samaria are part of the Land of Israel, or in foreign languages, Palestine, in 
which our nation was born. There our Kings ruled and our prophets brought forth the vision of eternal 
peace. How can we annex it?” as cited in ZVI HARRY HURWITZ, BEGIN: HIS LIFE, HIS WORDS, HIS DEEDS, 
(2004) at 167-168. See transcript of full interview available at Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, (Isr.), 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20since%201947/19
81-1982/118%20Interview%20with%20Prime%20Minister%20Begin%20on%20NBC%20Tel 
189 In particular, this is the position of the “messianic” movement Gush Emunim that was the first to 
establish many settlements.  Other justifications for settlements include that they are placed for security 
reasons to use as a “front line warning system,” see Dan Simon, Israel’s Settlement Liability, LOS ANGELES 
TIMES, May 25, 2011, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/25/opinion/la-oe-simon-israel-
netanyahu-20110525 
190 This has been the position of several Israeli administrations that have been willing to negotiate with 
Syria according to the “land for peace” formula. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) at 1, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess. Supp. 
No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), Art. 4.  
191 Supra note 148 (listing water as one of the reasons for the Golan’s strategic importance to Israel). 
192 This is Israel’s position as described in U.N. documents, see, e.g., Core Document Forming Part of the 
Reports of States Parties: Israel, delivered July 25, 2008, U.N. Doc. HRI/CORE/ISR/2008, November 21, 
2008 at 42, ¶103, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4964a6362.pdf [hereinafter: Israel Core 
Human Rights Document], For historical position, see, e.g., Prime Minister Begin’s Statement to the 
Knesset on his visit to the U.S. 27 July1977, available at 
http://www.archive.org/stream/israelsforeignre00medz/israelsforeignre00medz_djvu.txt (“The State of 
Israel upholds international law, but if anyone relies upon the Geneva Convention of 1949, which is 
designed to protect the civilian population in occupied areas, I must say, first of all, that Jewish settlement 
does not in any way of under any circumstances do harm to the Arabs of Eretz Yisrael. We have not 
dispossessed, and will not dispossess, any Arab from his land.”). 
46 
 
international law,193 and Israel has an internal policy of automatically incorporating 
customary law into its laws, Israel agrees that it is bound by the Hague Regulations.194  
However, because other conventions concerning international humanitarian law to which 
it is bound, most notably the Fourth Geneva Convention, it considers partially 
inapplicable because it has not formally incorporated the legal provisions into its 
domestic law, which since it is a declaratory treaty, it must do through enacting and 
passing its own legislation.195  However, Israel agrees that the “humanitarian provisions” 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention form a part of customary law, so they agree to respect 
these provisions in accordance with their interpretation of the Fourth Geneva Convention.   
Israel repeatedly argues that it does not consider itself bound by the Fourth 
Geneva Convention as concerns the West Bank and Gaza, and Gaza, based on its 
interpretation of Article 2(2) of the Fourth Geneva Convention196 and its analysis of the 
historical circumstances that bear upon the question of to whom sovereignty belonged.197 
In this situation, it applies the “humanitarian provisions” of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, but not any “political provisions.”198  It also claims that because it allows the 
ICRC to operate in the occupied territories, the ICRC effectively ensures compliance 
with the rest of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which Israel insists it effectively respects 
since it does not stand in the way of the operation of the ICRC and in fact, complies with 
most of its requests.199   
With regard to the Syrian Golan, this argument disputing the former sovereignty 
of the territory is inapplicable.  And yet, little has been written on Israel’s legal position 
concerning the Syrian Golan and the de jure application of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention.  Since Israel contends that its civil law and administration extend to the 
Syrian Golan, and that the Syrian Golan is part of its sovereign territory, Israel on that 
                                                
193 See, e.g., Mazen Qupty, The Application of International Law in the Occupied Territories as Reflected 
in the Judgments of the High Court of Justice in Israel, available at http://quptylawfirm.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/Application-of-international-law-in-occupied-territories.pdf at 3. 
194 Id. 
195 Israel Core Human Rights Document, supra note 192 at 42, ¶103. 
196 Supra, note 193 at 11. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 In addition to numerous HCJ cases and other official statements of Israel’s government describing its 
cooperation with the ICRC, see International Committee of the Red Cross website, The ICRC in Israel and 
the Occupied Territories, January 3, 2012, available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/where-we-work/middle-
east/israel-occupied-territories/overview-israel.htm (describing work in the occupied territories since 1948). 
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basis rejects the application of IHL to the Syrian Golan.200  The residents of the Syrian 
Golan are considered permanent residents of Israel, and Israel rejects the residents’ 
claims to Syrian nationality.201  However, it should be noted that Israel allows UN 
Peacekeepers to operate in the Syrian Golan in the Demilitarized Zone, cooperates with 
the International Committee of the Red Cross on specific humanitarian issues related to 
the Syrian Golan’s inhabitants, and recognizes the existence of a military conflict 
between itself and Syria. 
According to Israel, does international human rights law apply to the Syrian Golan? 
Since Israel’s position is that all of the laws of Israel extend to the Syrian Golan, it is 
understood that Israel believes that human rights law applies to the Syrian Golan to the 
extent which human rights laws are incorporated into Israeli domestic law.  Because 
Israel does not automatically incorporate legislation from international treaties it ratifies 
into its domestic law, requiring specific legislation in order to do so,202 only the 
provisions of human rights treaties it has ratified that have made their way into Israeli 
domestic law through such legislation, or that are considered customary international 
law,203 are considered applicable by Israel to any of what it considers its territory, 
including the Syrian Golan.  Israel contends that, “the Supreme Court has ruled, that both 
customary and treaty law affect Israeli law, since Israeli law operates under the 
presumption of compatibility between the domestic law and the international norms Israel 
has undertaken to uphold.”204 Thus, human rights treaties constitute an important tool for 
                                                
200 Israel does not recognize the de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention or the Hague 
Regulations to the Syrian Golan. T. Davenport, A Study of Israel’s Occupation of the Golan Heights, Irish 
Centre for Human Rights (2008) (unpublished manuscript, National University of Ireland, Galway) (on file 
with Al-Marsad: the Arab Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Golan), as cited in Murphy, supra, 
note 9, at 36. For an analysis of the Israeli Supreme Court’s jurisprudence related to the occupied 
territories, see D. Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice – The Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied 
Territories (2002) State University of New York as cited in Murphy, supra, note 9, at 36.  
201 Murphy, supra, note 9, at 38. 
202 Israel Core Human Rights Document, supra note 192 at 42, ¶103. 
203 Customary law applies as long as it does not contradict any law of the Israeli Knesset (Parliament). See 
H.C.J. 785/87 Affo et. al. v. Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank [1988] P.D. 42(2), 4 as cited in 
Israel Core Human Rights Document, supra note 192 at 42, ¶103. 
204 H.C.J. 2599/00 Yated - Non-Profit Organization for Parents of Children with Down Syndrome v. The 
Ministry of Education [2002] P.D. 56(5), 834 as cited in Israel Core Human Rights Document, supra note 
192 at 42, ¶104. 
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the interpretation of national legislation, and serve to further enhance and entrench 
international human rights norms in the domestic sphere.”205  
This position leads to the common recommendation by international human rights 
bodies that Israel incorporate specific, neglected portions of the treaties to which it is 
State Party into its domestic law, and in regards to the Syrian Golan, respect its 
international human rights law obligations in full.   
Israel’s position on its IHRL obligations in reference to the Syrian Golan differs 
from its position on the applicability of its IHRL obligations in the West Bank and Gaza 
because Israel contends that there is no simultaneous applicability of IHL and IHRL.  
Israel is one of the few remaining states to maintain this position.206  
It should be noted that in relation to Israel’s human rights reporting obligations 
with the United Nations, Israel’s statistics – in line with its position that the Syrian Golan 
is part of Israel’s sovereign territory – include the Syrian Golan since 1981 as part of its 
northern district, in the Golan sub-district.207 
 
Relationship between IHL and IHRL  
In order to understand Israel’s dual obligations related to the right to education in the 
territory it occupies, the Syrian Golan, a brief discussion of the relationship between IHL 
                                                
205 Israel Core Human Rights Document, supra note 192 at 42, ¶104. 
206 See, e.g., Al Haq, et al., Joint Parallel Report to the UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD) on the occasion of the Consideration of Israel’s 14th, 15th and 16th Periodic 
Reports on the Implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, 80th Sess., Feb. 13 – March 9, 2012 (January 30, 2012) available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/AL-HAQ_BADIL_ADDMEER-
WCLAC_Israel_CERD80.pdf, at 7, ¶11-12. 
207 See for example CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF ISRAEL, GEOGRAPHICAL 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION, POPULATION DENSITY PER SQ. KM. OF LAND, BY DISTRICT AND BY 
SUB-DISTRICT (2005) available at http://www1.cbs.gov.il/shnaton57/st02_04.pdf. This has also been noted 
in numerous reports carried out by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), e.g., OECD, Study on the Geographic Coverage of Israeli Data, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/19/48442642.pdf at 19, ¶53, (“As noted in Para 41, the fundamental 
description of the land area covered by “Israel “or “the State of Israel” is provided in the generic 
Explanatory Notes in the Statistical Abstract. That description clearly indicates that Israel’s geographic 
area, as defined by the Israeli authorities, includes East Jerusalem, since July 1967, and the Golan Sub-
District, since December 1981. The Israeli Settlements in the West Bank are not mentioned in the 
description of the “State of Israel", though they are mentioned in metadata on specific statistical 
programs.”) See also id. at 22, ¶61 (“Within the [Central Bureau of Statistics] CBS geographic hierarchy, 
the entire area of the Golan Heights is identified as a distinct Sub-district, entitled the Golan Sub-district. 
Statistics available at the Sub-district level are also available for the Golan Sub-district.”). 
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and IHRL is necessary.  International Humanitarian Law208 governs the conduct of 
hostilities under international law and the protection of civilians and other vulnerable 
populations who are affected by warfare. The breadth of humanitarian law (also called 
the law of armed conflict) is wide, and it governs all aspects of armed conflict, from the 
jus ad bellum (regulations concerning the justifications for war), jus in bello (regulations 
concerning how war ought to be waged) to the jus post bellum (regulations concerning 
conduct following the cessation of hostilities), in all times and on all types of terrain, 
from land warfare to warfare conducted at sea or by air. It has been said, however that 
“the bulk of the rules governing the conduct of hostilities has been created for the basic 
purpose of protecting certain groups of persons, including peaceful civilians, from the 
worst of the hardships in a conflict.”209  
                                                
208 The majority of International Humanitarian Law is contained in the 1907 Fourth Convention Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter: 
Hague Regulations] and the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War (1949) 75 UNTS 287, entered into force on 21 October 1950 [hereinafter: Fourth Geneva 
Convention].  The other three Geneva conventions are 1) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; 2) Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; and 
3) Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; all three are dated August 12, 1949.  
The text of all four instruments, as well as the full particulars of the committee discussions and plenary 
sessions of the 1949 conference, are found in the three volumes of the Final Record of that meeting, as 
cited in GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY… A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW 
AND PRACTICE OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION (1957) at p. 25-26 [hereinafter: Occupation of Enemy 
Territory]. There are various narratives for what International Humanitarian Law is and why it was created.  
Most of them attempt to draw a line of historical trajectory connecting various legal and historical events in 
a neat line that leads to the development in the present.  Many of these narratives rely upon an assumption 
that progress has been made, and connect the building and development of legal institutions and codes (or 
legal positivism) to this idea that such actions constitute a step in the right direction. They also in varying 
ways use assumptions that international law is developed as a whole, unified body. According to some of 
the most commonly cited narratives, IHL has its origins in the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, and the 
Hague peace conferences of 1899 and 1907, and the Lieber Code of 1863, which only extended to 
American soldiers but was nonetheless used as inspiration for several other military codes which served as 
the precursor to the 1864 Geneva Convention. See, e.g. Geoffrey Best, Peace Conferences and the Century 
of Total War: The 1899 Hague Conference and What Came After, 75 INT’L AFF. 619, 625 (1999) as cited in 
Alejandro Lorite Escorihuela, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: the Politics of Distinction, 19 
MICH. ST. U. COLL. L. J. INT’L L 299 2010-2011, [hereinafter: Politics of Distinction] at 306; According to 
the ICRC’s version of the history of IHL, IHL in its codified form began with the Geneva Convention of 
1864, but scattered codes and laws regulating the conduct of hostilities existed for millennia beforehand, 
but not in a binding, internationally-recognized, codified format. These included the Viqayet, a code of 
warfare from 1280, written during the height of Moorish (Arab-Muslim) rule of Spain. See What are the 
Origins of International Humanitarian Law?, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (Jan 1., 2004) available at 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5KZFR8 as cited in Politics of Distinction, at 306. 
209 Baxter, Constitutional Forms and Some Legal Problems of International Military Command, 29 BYIL 
(1952) at 357-359, as cited in Occupation of Enemy Territory, supra note 208, at 22-23. 
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 International Human Rights Law has the noble aim of protecting “everyone,” and 
zeroes in most specifically on the most vulnerable categories of people, including those 
who are specially protected under international humanitarian law, and others, 
guaranteeing everything from the rights of the accused to the right of a people to self-
determination.  Human Rights Law was created in after World War II response to the 
horrific abuses of unchecked state power on individuals and members of groups in 
violation of their common humanity.  As such, on a fundamental level, Human Rights 
Law aims to promote the inherent dignity of mankind through the protection individuals 
from the abuses of the state.  It has expanded from a primary focus on the rights of the 
individual to include the notions of collective rights, rights for members of particularly 
vulnerable or disadvantaged groups, and into protections of individuals and peoples from 
abusive actors other than the state. 
While intending to protect “everyone,” human rights have been primarily 
articulated, defined and enforced through the organ of the state and its official 
representatives.  States, not individuals, are signatories to human rights treaties and are 
charged with the responsibility for ensuring their respect, even though the system focuses 
on the protection, for the most part, of individuals.  And states are also responsible to 
some degree through their involvement in international legal and judicial organs and 
United Nations committees for their enforcement.   
It may seem contradictory that a system was created in which states – themselves 
the abusers of human rights whose shocking conduct spurred the creation of the system of 
international human rights – were charged with guaranteeing that those rights are 
protected.  Based in part on this critique, more individual-based reporting mechanisms of 
human rights violations have been instituted to allow the individual a voice in reference 
to its state’s conduct, most relevantly to this study by the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights.210  However, one of the most hallowed principles underlying the 
international legal system is the notion of state sovereignty, which demarcates limits on 
the ways in which violations of human rights within a state can be enforced.  In effect, 
the human rights system operates around the ability of states to shame other states 
                                                
210 For more information on complaints procedures, see Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Human Rights Bodies: Complaints Procedures, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/index.htm [last accessed May 16, 2012] 
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through exposing and critiquing other states’ human rights violations, and as such, has 
often been a factor leading to charges that the system of human rights is politicized.211  
This is often a distinction that is drawn in contrast with the historically neutral character 
of humanitarian law, which is guaranteed by a neutral international body, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, as opposed to a Human Rights Committee 
comprised of representatives of what in comparison appear to be squabbling states. 
Traditionally, it was interpreted that human rights law applied in a time of peace, 
while international humanitarian law applied during a time of war.212  However, this 
opinion no longer prevails in regards to the application of law during a time of armed 
conflict.  Very few countries today adopt the doctrine that the two types of law are 
mutually exclusive, although of the few that adopt this position, Israel is one.213  While 
debates rage over the particulars of how the two bodies of law intersect during a time of 
armed conflict, it is now generally agreed that the two apply concurrently during times of 
war.214  This has been affirmed in multiple resolutions of the UN Security Council215 and 
                                                
211 Israel repeatedly alleges that the United Nations system is biased, and that the human rights mechanisms 
in particular unfairly “single out” Israel related to its human rights record.  Israel often critiques the United 
Nations human rights system as being politicized. 
212A more traditional viewpoint was that the laws of armed conflict superseded the laws of IHRL during a 
time of conflict, based on a theory of distinction between the laws of peace and the laws of war.   See, e.g., 
J. PICTET, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS, (1975), at 15, as cited in YUTAKA 
ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE LAW OF OCCUPATION: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW, AND ITS INTERACTION WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, 2009 at 402 
[hereinafter: Continuity and Change of IHL] (“… the two legal systems (the law of armed conflicts and 
human rights) are fundamentally different, for humanitarian law is valid only in the case of an armed 
conflict while human rights are essentially applicable in peacetime, and contain derogation clauses in case 
of conflict. Moreover, human rights govern relations between the State and its own nationals, the law of 
war those between the State and enemy nationals.  There are also profound differences in the degree of 
maturity of the instruments and in the procedure for their implementation… Thus the two systems are 
complementary…. But they must remain distinct, if only for the sake of expediency.”). 
213 Despite adopting this stance, the HCJ has considered specific human rights in several cases related to the 
OPT, but based on the reasoning that the rights were incorporated into domestic law – so Israel’s state 
practice is not exactly consonant with its position on the applicability of IHRL treaties. See, e.g., H.C.J. 
1890/03, Bethlehem Municipality & 21 others v. The State of Israel – Ministry of Defense, Supreme Court 
of Israel Sitting as the High Court of Justice (February 3, 2005) (Isr) (discussing competing claims of rights 
to freedom of religion and freedom of movement). Further, the HCJ has ruled occasionally that IHL and 
IHRL apply concurrently in the OPT. See, HCJ 769/02, Public Committee against Torture in Israel et al. v. 
Government of Israel et al., Supreme Court of Israel sitting as the High Court of Justice (December 2006) 
(Isr.) as cited in Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, From Legal Theory to Policy 
Tools: International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory (Policy Brief: May 2007), available at 
http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/IHRLbrief.pdf 
214 Some of the earliest articulations of the position that human rights applied during times of occupation 
and armed conflict were related to Israel and its actions within the territories it occupied.  For example, in 
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General Assembly,216 as well as three times by the International Court of Justice in 
separate advisory opinions.217 
This position of parallel applicability might seem confusing, since IHRL and IHL 
have unique and fundamental characteristics that pose some difficulties for the potential 
for them to govern conduct simultaneously.  These include some of the most basic 
premises behind the bodies of law, and could cause some to see the two bodies as so 
divergent as to be irreconcilable.  For example, the jus in bellum regulations mentioned 
previously govern the ways in which war should be waged.  Warfare, by its nature, even 
in a situation in which it is most optimally regulated and controlled, is an exceptional 
state that goes outside the norm, by definition causing extreme destruction, loss of life, 
maiming, and destruction of property.  During times of peace, such situations would 
constitute violations of international human rights law of the most extreme nature.218 It 
seems almost bizarre that human rights could coexist at the same time as war, when a 
state of war is itself a violation of the human rights of individuals on a grave scale; and 
yet, to take the opposite approach, one could find it absurd if human rights did not apply 
during a time of war.  Disallowing the application of human rights law could be viewed 
                                                                                                                                            
1967, the UN Security Council stated, “essential and inalienable human rights should be respected even 
during the vicissitudes of war,” in GA Res. 237, ¶2, preambular ¶2, UN Doc. A237/1967, June 14, 1967. 
See also GA Res. 2252 (ES-V), UN Doc. A2252/ESV, July 4, 1967, which refers to this resolution, as cited 
in Cordula Droege, The Interplay Between International Humanitarian Law and International Human 
Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, 40 ISRAEL L. REV. 315 (2007) [hereinafter: Interplay Between 
IHL and IHRL]. One year following this resolution, the Tehran International Conference on Human Rights 
represented the United Nations’ adoption of the phrase “human rights in armed conflict,” which was used 
in a series of resolutions following the first resolution of the Tehran conference, which was entitled 
“Respect and Enforcement of Human Rights in the Occupied Territories,” Final Act of the International 
Conference on Human Rights, UN Doc. A/Conf.32/41 (Apr. 22-May 13, 1968). 
215 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1019, UN Doc. S/RES/1019 (Nov. 9, 1995) and S.C. Res. 1034, UN Doc. 
S/RES/1034 (Dec. 21, 1995)(in regard to Former Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. UN Doc. S/RES/1635 (Oct. 28, 
2005) and S.C. Res. 1653, UN Doc. S/RES/1653 (Jan. 27, 2006)(Great Lakes region) as cited in Interplay 
Between IHL and IHRL, supra note 214, at 316.  
216 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 50/193, UN Doc. A/RES/50/193 (Dec. 22, 1995)(Former Yugoslavia); G.A. Res. 
3525 (XXX), UN Doc. A/3525 (Dec. 15, 1975)(territories occupied by Israel); G.A. Res. 46/135, UN Doc. 
A/RES/46/ 135 (Dec. 19, 1991)(Kuwait under Iraqi occupation); G.A. Res. 52/145, UN Doc. 
A/RES/52/145 (Dec. 12, 1997)(Afghanistan) as cited in Interplay Between IHL and IHRL, supra note 214, 
at 316.  
217 Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ, 8 July 1996 [hereinafter: ICJ 
Use of Nuclear Weapons]; Judgment, Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, 
ICJ, 19 December 2005; Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ, 9 July 2004. 
218 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS (Henry J. Steiner et al. ed., 
Oxford University Press 3rd) (2007) [hereinafter: Law, Politics, Morals]. 
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as abandoning people when they are the most vulnerable and the most in need of their 
protection.  The balance of these two points of view suggests that, however contradictory 
the two bodies of law might seem, it makes the most sense to apply human rights law and 
humanitarian law simultaneously, attempting to guarantee to the best of the law’s ability 
the protection of those most affected by warfare in an extraordinary situation such as 
conflict. 
While now understood that both sets of laws apply simultaneously, questions 
(especially in light of the above tensions between the two bodies of law) are raised as to 
the practical application of legal norms from the two bodies of law in specific situations. 
One approach that has been advocated in relation to dealing with the parallel application 
of IHL and IHRL focuses on the “complementarity between their norms in most cases 
and prevailing of the more specific norm when there is contradiction between the two.”219  
This is the approach that the ICJ has arguably adopted in its advisory opinions that 
reference the relationship between IHL and IHRL.220  
For example, when legal obligations conflict, questions are raised as to which law 
supersedes the other.  To answer this question, scholars look to the doctrine of lex 
specialis.  The full phrase is lex specialis derogat generali, meaning that a specific rule 
should take precedence over a general rule.221 In the ICJ’s 1996 Advisory Opinion on the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ affirmed the lex specialis—lex generalis 
relationship between the two bodies of law, explaining that the right to life must be 
interpreted through the rules of humanitarian law such as proportionality, indiscriminate 
use of force, and precautionary measures as outlined under IHL,222 so that international 
humanitarian law is lex specialis to international human rights law in relation to the right 
to life.223  Horowitz explains that this means that: 
                                                
219 Interplay Between IHL and IHRL, supra note 214, at 312. 
220 Elizabeth Mottershaw, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Armed Conflict: 
International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law, 12 INT’L. J. HUM. RTS. 457 
(2008) [hereinafter: Rights in Armed Conflict]. 
221 “Comment on Relationships Between International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law,” in Law, 
Politics, Morals, supra note 218, at 395. 
222Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ, 8 July 1996, para. 25 as cited 
in Jonathan Horowitz, Human Rights, Positive Obligations, and Armed Conflict: Implementing the Right to 
Education in Occupied Territories, 1 INT’L HUMAN. LEGAL STUD. 306–307 (2010) [hereinafter: Right to 
Education]. 
223 Id. 
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where obligations that an occupant has to human rights law and occupation law 
overlap, human rights obligations remain applicable but must be interpreted 
through international humanitarian law.  This is because international 
humanitarian law is more appropriately tailored for the situation under inspection, 
namely occupation.224  
 
In a later opinion, the Court posed three options in relation to how IHL could 
relate to IHRL more broadly: some rights could be only issues of IHL, some of IHRL, 
and some both.225 
Some have argued that in its opinion on the Legality of the Construction of a Wall 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the ICJ indicated that in the case of certain rights – 
for example, certain economic, social and cultural rights such as the right to education – 
human rights law provides for the more specific articulation of a right.226  
Some, such as commentators Doswald-Beck and Vite in the International Review 
of the Red Cross, have argued that:  
The major legal difference is that humanitarian law is not formulated as a series of 
rights, but rather as a series of duties that combatants have to obey.  This does 
have one very definite advantage from the legal theory point of view, in that 
humanitarian law is not subject to the kind of arguments that continue to plague 
the implementation of economic and social rights.227 
 
This theory however is based on a distinction between economic, social and 
cultural rights and civil and political rights that has been displaced by a newer 
understanding of the character of the rights.  The original theory was that economic, 
social and cultural rights imposed positive duties on states, whereas civil and political 
rights primarily imposed negative duties on states.  This conceptual understanding has 
been displaced by wider acceptance of the idea that both sets of rights impose both 
positive and negative duties on states, and that the types of rights are closer in character 
                                                
224 Id., at 236 
225 Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, ICJ, 9 July 2004, para. 106. 
226 This is the interpretation of the ICJ decision presented in Rights in Armed Conflict, supra note 220, at 
457. Mottershaw argues, “… the ICJ’s formulation in the wall opinion ‘might be understood to mean that 
the human rights law obligations would remain of primary relevance.’  In fact, where human rights law 
provides more detail – and in the case of economic, social and cultural rights it does – this is the only way it 
can be understood.  The rights are clearly a matter of both and it is self-evident that the law that provides 
most detail will have the most relevance.” 
227 Louise Doswald-Beck & Sylvain Vite, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 293 
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 94–119 (1993) as cited in Law, Politics, Morals, supra note 218, at 459. 
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than originally argued.228  Others have argued that humanitarian law does not simply 
impose duties or obligations on states, but also implies certain rights.229  
The laws of occupation – a subset of IHL in which one warring army takes 
territory of its enemy party under its control – also has unique characteristics which 
complicate its simultaneous function with IHRL.  The thrust of the law of occupation is 
related to the maintenance of the status quo within a territory, during a time in which an 
enemy power within an armed conflict holds a territory while it continues to wage war 
against the territory’s sovereign.  This status, while as will be explained later has 
developed and changed in recent years, perhaps in response to the increasing importance 
of human rights protection, has been seen as in conflict with the transformative notion of 
a state’s human rights obligations.  As mentioned previously, states are obligated under 
human rights law to take both positive and negative legal measures to ensure the 
protection of human rights.  The primary problem arises in regards to the state’s positive 
obligations, acts that can often involve legally disruptive and intrusive measures such as 
the overhaul of legislation or the creation of new institutions in a territory.  Occupiers, 
under international law, are traditionally prohibited from interfering in these more 
permanent ways with the territory, a principle that has been termed the conservationist 
principle.230  And yet, under the guise of fulfilling human rights obligations that allow for 
the Occupying Power to make sweeping but unnecessary changes to a territory under its 
control, the Occupier can act for its sole benefit, against the wishes of the population.231   
These tensions will be discussed more specifically within the context of the right 
to education as it relates to the competing obligations states have when both sets of law 
apply. And the distinctions in the two fields of law – the law of occupation under IHL, 
and the right to education under IHRL – will be handled in this study through a dual 
                                                
228 Rights in Armed Conflict, supra note 220, at 455. 
229 One example of this is Article 13 of the Third Geneva Convention, related to the humane treatment of 
prisoners of war, which Greenwood argues ‘implicitly states a right’, as cited in Rights in Armed Conflict, 
supra note 220, at 455-456. 
230 Roberts describes it as follows: “the cautious, even restrictive assumption in the laws of war (also called 
inter- national humanitarian law or, traditionally, jus in bello ) that occupying powers should respect the 
existing laws and economic arrangements within the occupied territory, and should there- fore, by 
implication, make as few changes as possible. This conservationist principle in the laws of war stands in 
potential conflict with the transformative goals of certain occupations.” Adam Roberts, Transformative 
Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights, 100 Am. J. Int’l L. 580, 2006, at p. 
580 
231 Right to Education, supra note 222, at 307 
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emphasis on the obligations that both sets of law have in common, namely the positive 
legal obligations that are imposed on states by the right to education and the duties of 
states related to education under IHL. 
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights in Occupied Territories 
According to Horowitz, the idea that extraterritorial application of human rights applies 
in occupied territories is based on:  
the general notions that 1) a state has obligations under human rights treaties to 
the people within its jurisdiction, 2) that the territorial jurisdiction is extended to 
the areas that a state has ‘effective control’ over, and 3) in an occupied territory, 
as defined in Article 42 of the Hague Regulations, is under the ‘effective control’ 
of the Occupying Power.232  
 
As indicated by the above, the notion of territory under which a state has 
“effective control” is a conditio sine qua non (or requisite condition) of whether a 
territory is under belligerent occupation.  Once it is determined that an area is under the 
“effective control” of a belligerent power, it can be demonstrated that the threshold has 
been met that determines whether human rights norms apply in those areas. As such, the 
notion of “effective control” will be explained in the context of the Syrian Golan in the 
following section on whether the Syrian Golan is occupied.233 
While discussions of the extraterritorial application of human rights have 
primarily revolved around discussions of the application of civil and political rights, the 
ICJ has stated that the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well as the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child must be applied extraterritorially during times of 
occupation if the state is party to those treaties.234  
                                                
232 Id., at 236. Horowitz also notes in his footnote that an extensive discussion of domestic and Strasbourg 
case law on the extraterritorial application of human rights see Al Skeini v. Secretary of State for Defence 
[2004] EWHC 2911 (QB), and the Court of Appeal, [2005] EWCA Civ 1609. 
233 Opposition to this point of view has been expressed by the UK in the Al-Skeini case, in which it 
advocated the point of view that “effective control” has different meanings within IHL versus IHRL.  
However, a majority of international lawyers writing on the subject of IHL and IHRL disagree with this 
approach. 
234 From footnote, “The Court also notes that this view has been advanced by the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights.” Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, International Court of Justice (ICJ), Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, paras. 112, 113 and 114 as 
cited in Right to Education, supra note 222, at 236.  This position of the ICJ was not unanimous; In a 
separate opinion, Judge Rosalyn Higgins stated: “So far as the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights is concerned, the situation is even stranger, given the programmatic requirements for 
the fulfillment of this category of rights,” as cited in Law, Politics, Morals, supra note 218, at 469. 
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 Questions have also been raised as to the degree of responsibility an occupant has 
to the occupied population compared with its own population.  The Human Rights 
Committee in General Comment 31 commented on this matter in relation to the ICCPR, 
advocating an expansive definition of rights-holders under the terms of the treaty.  Under 
their interpretation, Covenant rights must extend not simply to the citizens of States 
Parties to the ICCPR, but to “all individuals, regardless of nationality or statelessness,” 
including those within the effective control of a State Party “acting outside its 
territory.”235  Based on this evidence, Horowitz concluded that “generally speaking, it 
is.”236  
As previously discussed, the right to education is seen as a basic, inalienable 
human right as evidenced in its inclusion in some of the basic international human rights 
treaties, as will be demonstrated below.  Specifically, it is seen as “binding under all 
circumstances and to be protected in all situations, including crises and emergencies 
resulting from civil strife and war.”237  
Some have taken the existence of derogation clauses in human rights treaties as 
evidence that human rights norms are expected to apply in all situations, with only 
certain, specified exceptions.  For example, in the ICCPR, derogation from certain rights 
is permitted in times “of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation.”238 
Mottershaw notes that the ICESCR does not have any such derogation provision, which 
could be more logically taken to mean that economic, social and cultural rights apply at 
all times including during times of armed conflict, than to read a prohibition into the text 
where there was none.239  She also notes that the drafters of the ICESCR found a 
derogation clause unnecessary, since they believed that Article 2(1) governing the general 
                                                
235 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), General comment no. 31 [80], The nature of the general legal 
obligation imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 26 May 2004, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 as cited in 
Right to Education, supra note 222, at 237. 
236 Id., at 237. 
237 REPORT ON THE STRATEGIC PARALLEL SESSION ON EDUCATION IN SITUATIONS OF EMERGENCY AND 
CRISIS (International Committee of the Red Cross) (2000). 
238 ICCPR, supra note 331 at Art. 4, as cited in John Cerone, Human Dignity in the Line of Fire: the 
Application of International Human Rights Law During Armed Conflict, Occupation, and Peace 
Operations, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1453 (2006). 
239 Rights in Armed Conflict, supra note 220, at 457. 
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applicability of treaty obligations was “sufficiently flexible,”240 and may have seen the 
nature of economic, social and cultural rights, found “the case for derogation as ‘less 
compelling’.”241 
 
Legal Status of the Syrian Golan 
Applicability of IHL and Occupation Law 
The Syrian Golan Heights is considered occupied under international law, and as such is 
subject to the laws of international humanitarian law and a subset of that law, which is 
the law of belligerent occupation.  However, because occupation law is complex and the 
Syrian Golan Heights’ legal status is contested by Israel, this paper will consider the 
question of whether the Syrian Golan Heights is considered occupied under international 
law, and if so, what recent developments in the law of occupation have meant for the 
topic of education under occupation. 
What is an “occupied territory” according to international law? 
Occupation is a subset of International Humanitarian Law (also known as the Law of 
International Armed Conflict or LOIAC) that has a long history in the legal tradition.  
Throughout history, it has been essentially determined through facts, 242 and is defined 
under the Hague Regulations in Article 42. 
Article 42 of the Hague Convention states:  “Territory is considered occupied 
when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends 
only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.”243 
As explained by Dinstein, the second paragraph indicates two clear conditions for 
whether a territory is considered occupied: 
(i) “the establishment of authority by the Occupying Power as a matter of 
fact (‘has been’) 
(ii) the ability of the Occupying Power to exercise that authority (‘can’)”244 
                                                
240 M. C. R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A 
PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 27 (1995) as cited in Rights in Armed Conflict, supra note 220, at 451. 
241 Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 217 (1987) as cited in 
Rights in Armed Conflict, supra note 220, at 451. 
242 Gerhard von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory… A Commentary on the Law and Practice of 
Belligerent Occupation, 1957, University of Minnesota at p. 29. 
243 The Hague Regulations, supra note 208, at Art. 42. 
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It has been noted by commentators that every area within the territory under the control 
of the invading forces does not need to be physically occupied in order to establish a state 
of effective occupation.245  For example, an occupation by the only the air force of the 
occupying state might rise to the definition of effective occupation.246  One such 
commentator, von Glahn, noted that, “as long as the territory as a whole is in the power 
and under the control of the occupant and as long as the latter has the ability to make his 
will felt everywhere in the territory within a reasonable time, military occupation exists 
from a legal point of view.”247    
The notion of the degree of the invader’s control over the territory is often 
encapsulated by the phrase “effective control.” The notion of effective control is tied in 
with the notion of occupation, since effective control is a prerequisite for defining a 
territory as being occupied.  Determining what constitutes effective control has been a 
matter discussed by legal commentators: 
The test for effective control is not the military strength of the foreign army which 
is situated outside the borders that surround the foreign area. What matters is the 
extent of that power's effective control over civilian life within the occupied area; 
their ability, in the words of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, to 'restore and 
ensure public order and civil life.248 
 
This has been interpreted to mean when: 
[territory] is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army… Thus there 
is assumed an invasion of the enemy state, resisted or unresisted, as a result of 
which the invader has rendered the enemy government incapable of publicly 
exercising its authority; the invader has successfully substituted his own authority 
for that of the legitimate government in the territory invaded. Invasion as such 
does not ordinarily constitute occupation, although it precedes it and may coincide 
with it for a limited period of time.  In other words, while invasion represents 
mere penetration of hostile territory, occupation implies the existence of a definite 
                                                                                                                                            
244 YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 42 (2009) [hereinafter: 
Belligerent Occupation]. 
245 Gerhard von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory… A Commentary on the Law and Practice of 
Belligerent Occupation, 1957, University of Minnesota at p. 28. 
246 Gerhard von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory… A Commentary on the Law and Practice of 
Belligerent Occupation, 1957, University of Minnesota at p. 28-29. His idea of an “air force occupation” at 
the time was a theoretical one, as certain conditions would need to be met in order to establish control over 
the territory even in this case.  See p. 28. 
247 Gerhard von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory… A Commentary on the Law and Practice of 
Belligerent Occupation, 1957, University of Minnesota at p. 29. 
248 Eyal Benvenisti, Responsibility for the Protection of Human Rights under the Interim Israeli-
Palestinian Agreements, 28 ISR. L. REV. 297, 308–09 (1994) [hereinafter: Protection of Human Rights]. 
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control over the area involved.  In the former case, the invading forces have not 
yet solidified their control to the point that a thoroughly ordered administration 
can be said to have been established.249  
 
In addition to being misunderstood, the requirements for what constitutes the 
“effective control” threshold that makes up an essential component that determines 
whether a territory is under belligerent occupation itself can be complex.  As noted by 
Dinstein, whether the control of an occupier is “effective” as per the requisite standard is 
highly subjective, since even what constitutes “effective” control as required by IHL 
could vary based on a number of factors including everything from the terrain of the area 
to the displaced sovereign’s prior degree of control.250  And while the opinions of 
authoritative international bodies such as the ICRC, the ICJ, and the UN Security Council 
can be persuasive, these opinions themselves are not binding, except those issued by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.251  
Occupation must be maintained “in every respect” by the occupying forces in 
order for the territory to continue being in a state of belligerent occupation. 252 In other 
words, simply demonstrating that a de facto state of occupation has occurred is not 
sufficient to determining that it continues.  The determination, however, is a factual one, 
and so the factual circumstances and degree of control of the occupant must be 
continually analyzed in order to determine whether a territory remains under occupation. 
Despite the consistency of the legal definition of “Occupation,” as a term the 
definition has become increasingly complicated, both politically and legally.  Its usage in 
recent years in particular has demonstrated that occupants and alleged occupants 
themselves dispute the meaning of the term and its applicability to their particular 
situation.253  Since the ascendancy of the principle of self-determination in international 
                                                
249 Gerhard von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory… A Commentary on the Law and Practice of 
Belligerent Occupation, 1957, University of Minnesota at p. 28. 
250 Belligerent Occupation, supra note 244 at 44. 
251 It is widely accepted that UN Security Council Resolutions based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter are 
legally binding on all members of the United Nations. 
252 Gerhard von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory… A Commentary on the Law and Practice of 
Belligerent Occupation, 1957, University of Minnesota at p. 29. 
253 For example, in the 2003 US and UK-led invasion of Iraq, despite their declaration that they would 
“strictly abide by their obligations under international law, including those relating to the essential 
humanitarian needs of the people of Iraq,” did not explicitly refer to themselves as occupants or their 
conduct in Iraq as rising to the legal level of “occupation.” Letter from the Permanent Representatives of 
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law, a principle that is enshrined in the founding documents of the United Nations, and 
the processes of decolonization undertaken by members of the United Nations after its 
founding, foreign occupation has increasingly been characterized as illegal and equated 
with colonization.254 The political stigma therefore associated with the term occupation 
has further clouded the term’s meaning in recent years. As has been noted by scholars 
such as Yoram Dinstein, belligerent occupation itself is not necessarily illegal.255  
However, there is evidence to suggest that such a category of occupations – illegal 
occupations – does exist, as has been noted by statements by Kofi Annan, former UN 
Secretary General, and the UN Security Council.256 
Is the Syrian Golan under Israel’s effective control and occupied according to IL? 
The Syrian Golan Heights has been declared occupied according to international law by 
authoritative institutions such as the United Nations Security Council for years.  The 
rationales for declaring it occupied are as follows: 
Israel captured the Syrian Golan during the course of the war between Israel and 
Arab states in 1967. This was territory acquired by force in contravention of the UN 
Charter. 
                                                                                                                                            
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, to the United 
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255 Belligerent Occupation, supra note 244 at 2. 
256 Annan asks Israel to end occupation: First use of term “illegal,” DAWN, Mar. 13, 2002, 
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The occupation has continued.  No legal facts determining that the occupation has 
ceased have arisen.  For example, Syria and Israel continue to be at a state of war; no 
peace treaty has convened between the two parties; and Israel’s Golan Heights Law 
extending Israeli civil law and sovereignty over the Syrian Golan has been declared “null 
and void” according to the U.N. Security Council, and is therefore irrelevant to a 
determination of legality.  This determination that the effective annexation was null and 
void can be explained by the reasoning that customary international humanitarian law 
indicates that an occupation must be temporary.257  Derived from this is the idea of a 
principle of “non-annexation,” which is the principle adopted here by the United Nations. 
The justification for calling the Syrian Golan illegally annexed, as stated previously, 
relies on the idea that International Humanitarian Law prohibits the acquisition of 
territory by force.  The annexation (which is referred to as a de facto annexation since it 
is a legal fact despite Israel’s refusal to term it an annexation) is illegal under 
international law258 and as such has been condemned by the United Nations and most 
nations of the world.259 Israel has effective control over the territory, as evidenced by its 
                                                
257The unilateral annexation of a territory is illegal according to customary law derived from the principle 
in International Humanitarian Law that occupation should be temporary, see A. Roberts, Transformative 
Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights’ (2006), 100 American Journal of 
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administration of the territory in virtually every aspect of residents’ daily lives. From a 
military standpoint, the IDF also operates from the Syrian Golan and can make its 
presence felt to the occupied population within a very short period of time, in further 
support of the notion that Israel has effective control over the Syrian Golan. 
Are IHL and IHRL simultaneously applicable to the Occupied Syrian Golan? 
The Occupied Syrian Golan, therefore, is governed by both the rules of International 
Humanitarian Law in addition to International Human Rights Law.260  It has been 
demonstrated most clearly by the International Court of Justice in its 2004 Advisory 
Opinion that humanitarian law in addition to human rights law applies in relation to 
Israel’s conduct in the occupied territories.  The Court stated, “the protection offered by 
human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save through the 
effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in Article 4 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”261  
Israel, as party to several human rights conventions, is obligated under those 
conventions to all of its provisions (provided that no reservation was made by Israel at 
the time of its ratification).  Additionally, each state must abide by its treaty obligations 
in all of its territory in addition to all areas under its effective control.  The occupied 
territories including the Occupied Syrian Golan fall under the definition of territories 
under Israel’s effective control. 
Applicability of Fourth Geneva Convention 
 Israel has disputed the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the 
occupied Palestinian territories on the basis of several arguments that mainly have to do 
with the prior sovereignty of those territories.  Israel bases this argument on an 
interpretation of the wording of a provision of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and on its 
                                                
260 The international system of states is governed by (and itself creates) international law.  The rights of 
individuals on the international plane are primarily governed by a regime of “interrelated, interdependent” 
human rights, and the law regulating war as well as that which explicates states’ obligations to protect and 
provide for civilians during conflict is contained in international humanitarian law.   These broad categories 
of international law are derived from several primary sources – notably treaties (such as those enumerating 
the rights and obligations of international human rights and humanitarian law), customary international law, 
general principles of law, and the works of jurists (at a supplementary level).  The most authoritative 
illustration of the sources of international law is found in STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE art. 38, para. 1(a). 
261International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories, 2004 
64 
 
contention that only some of the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention have arisen 
to the status of customary law.  However, because the prior sovereignty of the Syrian 
Golan was not in question, these arguments are not relevant here.  The applicability of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Syrian Golan has been affirmed by numerous 
UN resolutions mentioned previously in this paper. 
 
Problem of Education in an Occupied Territory 
“Education’s best claim is that it teaches a person to value what deserves to be 
valued.” 
William James 
Education holds an important rhetorical place in our globalized world.  As an 
empowerment right, education has been alternately viewed as a stimulator of good and of 
evil, but both its critics and champions appear to hold the same opinion about its power, 
believing in education’s ability and potential to create either angels or monsters.  Some 
(such as UN Special Rapporteur on the right to education Katarina Tomasevski) have 
called education “the message carrier,”262 allowing for both society’s latent and manifest 
messages to be passed along to its members by means of institutions of education, 
educational curricula, and what some social scientists call the “hidden curriculum”263 
experienced in what schools promote and fail to promote, in what they emphasize and 
how they emphasize it, and in what they ignore and conceal.  Education has been charged 
with creating both good and evil citizens, promoting and institutionalizing societal evils 
such as racial discrimination and promoting societal “good” such as democratization, and 
being used as a tool for peace and for war and violence, up to and including inciting 
genocide. 
Governments, including colonial powers, and their militaries have long attempted to 
persuade populations through the control, manipulation, or “reform” of a country’s 
educational systems.  Particularly after World War II, American writers located in 
education the site of the attitude of hatred that created the conditions leading to the 
                                                
262 KATARINA TOMASEVSKI, EDUCATION DENIED: COSTS AND REMEDIES 184 (2003) [hereinafter: Education 
Denied]. 
263 For an overview of the origins of the term “hidden curriculum,” see Stephen J. Farenga & Daniel Ness, 
Encyclopedia Of Education And Human Development 1 (2005) at 16. 
65 
 
horrors of the Holocaust in Europe.  They called for “re-education” or what came to be 
called “re-orientation” of the populations in countries formerly controlled by the Axis 
powers, leading to sweeping military-led changes in the educational systems in those 
countries in an effort to “educate away” their intolerant attitudes toward minorities.264  
Other examples abound, all tied together by a common experience of promoting 
intolerance and difference on the basis of race, whether or not the racial groups 
demonized were present in the classroom or relegated to a separate educational 
institution.265   
Citizenship education, in particular multicultural and democracy-promoting 
citizenship education, has been the focus of much of recent scholarship on curricular 
reform and educational reform in the West, particularly in the United States.  National 
education serves multiple objectives within a democratic nation state, most notably the 
aim of nation building by means of socializing the state’s population (particularly youth) 
to serve as good citizens.  State compulsory educational curricula are designed with these 
aims in mind, most notably that of inculcating the values and perceptions of the dominant 
group and cultivating loyalty to the state.  The content of education therefore can serve as 
a map, instructing us in the state’s primary goals for its citizens. 
In the state of Israel, for instance, the state’s “Jewish and Democratic” character bled 
into its goals for citizenship education, generating an approach dedicated to the 
cultivation of “education for Zionist citizenship”.266  The state attempted to at the same 
time promote Israeli nationalism and democracy, but remains trapped in a race and 
religion-centered debate concerning how much emphasis should be placed on 
“universalistic” or plural values versus “national” or specifically Zionist values.267  This 
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is particularly an issue in a society with minorities such as non-Jews (who are primarily 
Arab) that do not fit into the national ideology and who even dispute to varying degrees 
the state’s foundation. 
States, Israel among them, which according to sociologists serve as the “site of on 
going conflicts among and between various class, gender and racial groups”268 even in 
the most manifestly democratic societies are run by a dominant group of decision-makers 
who control schools and decide on educational content.  And as in any decision, a 
decision for something contains a latent decision against something else. 
What schooling systematically does is to valorize…some values, perspectives, 
ways of speaking, showing, and saying as if they really were Value, Validity, 
Language – and thus to render all other ways of life/thought/feelings/embodiment 
as invalid in comparison with what is passed off as neutral, natural, universal and 
obvious.  Other ways (in all senses) are diluted, denied, distorted, above all – de-
formed; that is they are refused recognition as really alternative approaches to 
understanding social identity in relation to specific combinations of space and 
time.269 
 
As in this conceptualization of education and the quote by William James, one of the 
founders of modern psychology, education has the potential to simultaneously legitimize 
and de-legitimize perspectives, and very often legitimizes the majority viewpoint at the 
expense of minority perspectives.  It is this capacity of the dominant group in a nation 
state to de-form contrasting perspectives of minority groups through public education that 
serves as the impetus for this inquiry. 
In a situation of long-term or prolonged occupation, attempts by a nation-state to 
promote nationalist values linked to the occupying nation are complicated.  In other 
occupations such as the Japanese occupation of Korea, the Ethiopian occupation of 
Eritrea, the American occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, or the Chinese occupation of 
Tibet, similar waves of protest and resistance have occurred by residents under 
occupation who are resentful of the attempt of the occupying power to assimilate them.  
This also fits into narratives of postcolonial resistance, where often culture serves as the 
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site of conflict.  Since culture is taught in public schools run by the occupying power, and 
public schools are one of the most pervasive institutions of an occupying power in its 
attempt to socialize citizens, public schools often become symbolic sites of conflict 
between those attempting to resistant and those attempting to control a population.  
Motives on both sides can appear malicious to those on the other side, but both can be 
justified.   
One final note should be highlighted in relation to the teaching of historical events.  
While competing versions of history exist in reality, states typically choose one narrative 
to teach their students, one specific version of events.  Sometimes, states even omit key 
events, particularly related to their own country’s mistakes, suffering from what 
researcher David Tyack calls the ‘pedagogy of patriotism,’ “rarely describing abuses 
committed by one’s own government against populations of other countries or the people 
in one’s own country, although history abounds with such examples.”270 There are 
particular challenges facing states when it comes to addressing difficult parts of the 
state’s history, and states often suffer from the blindness that can accompany their sense 
of victimization, propagating one-sided viewpoints.271  States also at times use such 
negative expressions as xenophobia to attempt to inculcate a sense of patriotism among 
their population,272 and believe that the history and geography curriculum they teach is 
objective – a quality that as Tomasevski aptly states, “is as impossible as it is 
widespread.”273 
 
General Characteristics of Occupation Law 
Legal Instruments 
Most of occupation law is contained in the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, although state practice can be found in military manuals and other 
authoritative documents used to instruct armies on the laws.  Occupation law in one of its 
most essential characteristics aims to protect and preserve the status quo.  It allows an 
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Occupant to hold a territory and take necessary steps to win its military engagement, with 
regard for the restrictions upon it under the law and in keeping with the principles of 
protection of civilians and other protected persons, but it as will be explained below – it 
discourages the occupant from taking steps to fundamentally change the character of the 
occupied territory, including through legislative means.  This is in tension with a 
fundamental characteristic of human rights law, which envisages the state as an entity 
with abilities to transform a territory through the continual improvement of human rights 
conditions.  As the section on recent developments will show, the aims of IHL and IHRL 
have come closer in recent years, but these fundamental characteristics still remain an 
obstacle to the harmonization of the two types of law in a situation of prolonged 
occupation. 
Principles of Occupation Law 
Since the Golan Heights is governed by the law of occupation, some overriding principles 
of occupation law will be relevant to the later discussion of education under occupation.  
The Law of occupation rests on four basic principles:  
1. Sovereignty does not pass from the hands of the occupied state to the hands of the 
occupying force.  This is primarily inferred through scholars’ emphasis on the limited 
powers given to the occupant and on Art. 43 of Hague Regulations which instructs the 
occupant to respect the laws in the country unless they prevent the occupant from 
carrying out its duty to restore and ensure ‘public order and [civil life]’”.274  Numerous 
authorities have noted this lack of a transfer of sovereignty, for example von Glahn notes 
that: 
“the consensus of opinions of writers on international law is that the legitimate 
government of the territory retains its sovereignty but that the latter is suspended 
during the period of belligerent occupation.  In other words, the occupant does not 
in any way acquire sovereign rights in the occupied territory but exercises a 
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temporary right of administration on a trustee basis275 until such time as the final 
disposition of the occupied territory is determined.”276  
 
2. Occupants are not to interfere in local law, as set out in Art. 43, which states: 
the authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the    
occupant, the latter should take all the measures in his power to restore, and 
ensure, as far as possible, public order and [civil life], while respecting, unless  
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.277 
 
The ICRC Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention (in commenting on Art. 64 of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention, which is an elaboration of Art. 43 of the Hague 
Regulations), states that respect for the law in force is a principle that ‘dominates the 
whole of occupation law’.278   
This does not mean that the occupant can never alter the laws.  However, the high 
threshold of necessity that must be met in order to change the laws will be addressed in 
the context of legislation related to education. 
Also in question is to what extent an absent government can legislate for the 
occupied territory (i.e. changing the “laws in force”). Von Glahn also comments on this 
idea, noting that up until at least 1944, the U.S. Judge Advocate General’s School “taught 
that the legitimate sovereign could not legislate for an occupied portion of his 
territory.”279   However he notes that (at least by 1957) the prevailing opinion was that 
“the legitimate sovereign may legislate for an occupied portion of his territory, provided 
that his laws do not conflict with the powers of the occupant as outlined in conventional 
international law.”280  
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3. The “occupant must not injure the local population, and must provide them with 
care.”281  
4. The “occupant may not undertake activities for the sole benefit of its native state.  
It must direct its actions toward the local population or toward military necessity; any 
actions outside those two realms are prohibited.”282  
These principles will be relevant in the discussion of the Occupant’s duties and 
restrictions in relation to education in the Syrian Golan. 
Relevant Developments in Occupation Law 
Benvenisti, a prominent legal scholar on the issue of occupation law, notes that the 
development of occupation law has made it more difficult for states to determine what 
their obligations are – as he puts it, “…recourse to the law of occupation was a 
complicated undertaking, because it was not simply a task of looking up the relevant 
articles in the Hague Regulations or the Fourth Geneva Convention.”283  Therefore it is 
necessary to take a look at the recent developments in the law of occupation that bear on 
this discussion. 
Occupation law has developed in particular in the interwar period, and has been 
affected in particular by the postwar processes of decolonization including the pursuit of 
self-determination and self-rule, such that, according to Eyal Benvenisti, “if the Geneva 
law focused on the welfare of individuals, the modern law of occupation has to consider 
also the claims of peoples as distinct subjects of international law.”284  He further notes 
that the distinct phenomena of the “recalcitrant occupant” and the emergence of 
“prolonged occupation(s)” such as Israel’s in the OSG and OPT have posed a double 
challenge to the law of occupation: “a challenge to the principles that underlie the laws of 
occupation, and a challenge to their enforceability.”285  
Many of the recent developments that have occurred in the laws of occupation 
were reflected in Security Council Resolution 1483 related to the invasion of Iraq.  
Several already-existing principles of occupation law were importantly affirmed.  These 
included a) an affirmation of the neutral connotation of the doctrine – namely, that 
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‘occupation is a temporary measure for reestablishing order and civil life after the end of 
active hostilities, benefiting also, if not primarily, the civilian population…occupation 
does not amount to unlawful alien domination that entitles the local population to 
struggle against it;”286 b) an affirmation that “sovereignty inheres in the people and 
regime collapse does not extinguish sovereignty,”287 and c) the recognition of the 
continued applicability of IHRL during conflict and occupation, simultaneously with 
occupation law.288  
Others reflected changes or important developments in the law, most notably, that 
the role of the Occupant has changed from the “disinterested occupant”289 or “inactive 
custodian”290 envisioned under the Hague Regulations to the “heavily involved 
regulator”291 required in modern times.  As Benvenisti notes, 
Resolution 1483… calls upon the occupants to pursue an “effective 
administration” of Iraq… The call to administer the occupied area “effectively” 
acknowledges the several duties that the occupants must perform to protect the 
occupied population.  It precludes the occupant from hiding behind the limits 
imposed on its powers as a pretext for inaction.292 
                                                
286 Id., discussing UN Security Council Resolution 1483 
287 (“thus the Resolution implicitly confirms the demise of the doctrine of debellatio, which would have 
passed sovereign title to the occupant in case of total defeat and disintegration of the governing regime”, 
see Protection of Human Rights, supra note 248 at xi – Also see Michael N. Schmitt, Debellatio, MAX 
PLANCK ENCY. PUB. INT’L L. (2009), which “examines the concept of debellatio in international law, 
including the issue of whether it survives in contemporary law” (according to its abstract). 
288 The wording recognizes “in principle [of] the continued applicability of international human rights law 
in occupied territories in tandem with the law of occupation. Human rights law may thus complement the 
law of occupation on specific matters.” Protection of Human Rights, supra note 248 at xi 
289 Id.  
290 Id.  
291 Id. 
292 Id. Benvenisti’s opinion here (of the opinion of the Security Council) seems in 
consonance with the approach taken by criminal tribunals in establishing culpability or 
criminal responsibility of states in commenting on states’ tendency to attempt to 
circumvent their legal obligations by using legalistic pretexts.  For example, Cohen cites 
the Nuremburg Tribunal who, in their discussion of the notion of debellatio, says 
“However, calling occupation by the name of debellatio (premature annexation) will not 
excuse the occupant from international obligations.”(Judgment of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, 30 Sept. 1946, Proceedings in the Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the 
International Military Tribunal, as cited in E. Cohen at p. 30); Protection of Human Rights, 
supra note 248 at 107; it further seems consonant with the approaches taken by other 
criminal tribunals such as the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia) and 
the Ethiopian-Eritrean Claims Commission, when they stated the following: in its Tadic 
case in 1999, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY focused on “protected persons” in the 
hands of powers to whom they owe no allegiance,” and described the ‘necessary 
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These recent changes in occupation law, particularly in the increased emphasis on the 
Occupant as an active custodian of the occupied population, demonstrate that a new 
approach to the simultaneous applicability of IHL and IHRL is needed and suggest that a 
new approach would involve more direct action by the Occupant for the benefit of the 
local population. 
 
Education under International Humanitarian Law 
The justification for the protection of children under the laws of armed conflict is 
summed up well in Pictet’s authoritative official commentary of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention: 
The indescribable tragedy which the Second World War brought into the lives of 
millions of children forms one of the most distressing chapters in the history of 
the conflict and one which arouses the greatest pity.  Children were the innocent 
victims of events which afflicted them all the more cruelly because they were 
young and weak; they suffered hardships in violation of one of the most sacred of 
human laws—the law that children must be protected, since they represent 
humanity’s future.293 
 
                                                                                                                                            
implications of the evolution of the law from a tool that defined armies’ obligations 
toward each other into ‘international humanitarian law’ that aimed at securing the well-
being of individual civilians”—(Protection of Human Rights, supra note 248 at viii) stated 
“Article 4 of Geneva Convention IV, if interpreted in the light of its object and purpose, 
is directed to the protection of civilians to the maximum extent possible. It therefore does 
not make its applicability dependent on formal bonds and purely legal relations. Its 
primary purpose is to ensure the safeguards afforded by the Convention to those civilians 
who do not enjoy the diplomatic protection, and correlatively are not subject to the 
allegiance and control, of the State in whose hands they may find themselves.  In granting 
its protection, Article 4 intends to look to the substance of relations, not to their legal 
characterization as such.” Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, 580 (May 7, 1997) 
Partial Award, Central Front, Ethiopia’s Claim No. 2, April 28, 2004, paras 28, 29 (available at 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/EECC/ET%20Award.pdf) 
 as cited in Protection of Human Rights, supra note 248 at vii-viii).  And the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims 
Commission “rejected the link between the disputed status of certain territories and the protection of 
individuals present in those territories” (Protection of Human Rights, supra note 248 at viii) when it said, 
‘The alternative could deny vulnerable persons in disputed areas the important protections provided by 
international humanitarian law.  These protections should not be cast into doubt because the belligerents 
dispute the status of the territory.” In Partial Award, Central Front, Ethiopia’s Claim No. 2, April 28, 2004, 
paragraph 28 (http://www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/EECC/ET%20Award.pdf) as cited in Protection of 
Human Rights, supra note 248 at viii at footnote 2. 
293 IV JEAN PICTET, GENEVA CONVENTION 1949, OFFICIAL COMMENTARY (1952). 
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 Children represent humanity’s future.  Educating children allows one generation 
to pass its knowledge on to another, and make one of the only impacts it can on 
humanity’s future.  Children are specially protected under IHL, and according to the first 
additional protocol to the Fourth Geneva Convention, “shall be the object of special 
respect and shall be protected against any form of indecent assault. The Parties to the 
conflict shall provide them with the care and aid they require, whether because of their 
age or for any other reason.”294  Due to its special protection of children during times of 
war, educational institutions, as institutions devoted to children, are protected places 
requiring special attention during warfare generally, as well as by the Occupant in a 
situation of belligerent occupation. 
Educational institutions are generally considered institutions of a civilian 
character. Distinguishing between civilian and military objects is a requirement that is at 
the heart of humanitarian law.  Known as the principle of distinction, it is one of the most 
important (and inviolable) principles of IHL.  At its most essential it requires warring 
parties to distinguish between civilian and military targets to minimize harm to civilians 
during warfare. The First Optional Protocol to the Fourth Geneva Convention states, 
“Civilian objects are all objects which are not military objectives…”295 These, with few 
exceptions, include educational institutions.  
 According to the Hague Regulations – which form part of customary law – 
educational institutions are among those which should be protected and treated as private 
property during conflict: 
The property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to religion, charity 
and education, the arts and sciences, even when State property, shall be treated as 
private property. All seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions 
of this character, historic monuments, works of art and science, is forbidden, and 
should be made the subject of legal proceedings.296 
 
It is surprising however that international humanitarian law is rarely invoked 
when discussing states’ obligations to ensure education in conflict generally or in 
                                                
294 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (1977) 1125 UNTS 3, entered into force on 7 
December 1978.] 
295 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed conflicts (Protocol I) 8 June 1977, entry into force 7 December 1978. 
http://www.icrc.org/ihlnsf/full/470?opendocument. Article 52(1). 
296 The Hague Regulations, supra note 208, at Art. 56 
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situations of occupation.297  This is in spite of the fact that education is protected under 
specific situations of crisis and armed conflict, in conflicts of both an international and 
non-international character, as well as under the laws of belligerent occupation.  This has 
been the case since at least 1957, when von Glahn wrote: 
The accepted rules of international law are unfortunately silent on [the extent to 
which an Occupant could interfere legitimately with the educational system of a 
territory under his control] and while a very few writers on the law of nations 
have briefly commented on education under belligerent occupation, little has 
actually been contributed toward the solution of this very real and important 
problem in our age of ideological conflicts.298 
 
 Several aspects of education are protected under International Humanitarian Law.  
These include the proper functioning of educational institutions, access to education for 
internees,299 and access to education that respects the moral and religious wishes of 
parents.  As an international armed conflict and a situation of occupation, the most 
notable provision related to the right to education under International Humanitarian Law 
– Article 50 of the Fourth Geneva Convention – states: 
The Occupying Power shall, with the cooperation of the national and local 
authorities, facilitate the proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and 
education of children... Should the local institutions be inadequate for the 
purpose, the Occupying Power shall make arrangements for the maintenance and 
education, if possible by persons of their own nationality, language and religion, 
of children who are orphaned or separated from their parents as a result of the war 
and who cannot be adequately cared for by a near relative or friend.300 
 
 These protections cannot be derogated from due to a state annexing the territory 
that was being occupied.  According to the Fourth Geneva Convention,  
Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case 
or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any 
change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the 
institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded 
between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power, nor 
                                                
297 Through the 1990’s, humanitarian law was barely discussed even in relation to the most basic forms of 
education. See Sobhi Tawil, International Humanitarian Law and Basic Education, 839 INT’L REV. RED 
CROSS 4 (2000). 
298 Von Glahn, see note 28 in Right to Education, supra note 222, at 327. 
299 “All possible facilities shall be granted to internees to continue their studies or to take up new subjects. 
The education of children and young people shall be ensured; they shall be allowed to attend schools either 
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300 Geneva Convention IV, Article 50 
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by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory.301 
 
The Fourth Geneva Convention also provides specifically for the education of children 
under the age of 15 who have been separated from their families:  
The Parties to the conflict shall take the necessary measures to ensure that 
children under fifteen, who are orphaned or are separated from their families as a 
result of the war, are not left to their own resources, and that their maintenance, 
the exercise of their religion and their education are facilitated in all 
circumstances. Their education shall, as far as possible, be entrusted to persons of 
a similar cultural tradition.302 
 
This emphasis on maintaining a child’s original identity and heritage, as indicated by the 
above provision, occurs repeatedly in IHL articles concerning children.  Although many 
of those are not directly applicable to the context in the OSG related to education, they 
shed further light on IHL’s special protection of the identity of children in general and 
respect for the wishes of their parents related to their cultural, national, religious and 
moral traditions. For example, during non-international armed conflicts: “Children shall 
be provided with the care and aid they require, and in particular: (a) they shall receive an 
education, including religious and moral education, in keeping with the wishes of their 
parents, or in the absence of parents, of those responsible for their care.”303 
 And in cases of necessary evacuation of children, the Fourth Geneva 
Convention stipulates: “Whenever an evacuation occurs pursuant to paragraph 1, each 
child's education, including his religious and moral education as his parents desire, shall 
be provided while he is away with the greatest possible continuity.”304 
 Other articles refer to states’ obligations to ensure that children are provided 
with clear identifying information, including information about their family heritage, 
                                                
301 Geneva Convention IV, Article 47 
302 Geneva Convention IV, Article 24 
303 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, Section II: Humane Treatment, 
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nationality, religion, and language spoken by their family.305 These provisions indicate 
IHL’s emphasis on maintaining the continuity of a population’s identity during conflict 
and suggest the importance in international humanitarian law of respecting children’s 
heritage, religion and culture, and national origins. 
Responsibilities to maintain educational institutions  
According to Art. 50 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Occupants have a responsibility 
to facilitate the proper working of institutions for children. Commentators for the 
International Committee of the Red Cross have interpreted this broadly to mean that any 
institution that is devoted to the care and education of children, whatever its status under 
the country’s laws (including whether they are privately run or state-sponsored), must be 
protected.  Institutions of a wide variety are included in Pictet’s interpretation, including 
child welfare centers, orphanages, children’s camps, day cares, and social welfare 
services, among others.306 Pictet notes that these institutions take on roles of increased 
importance during wartime, since many children are left without their natural protectors 
and rely on these institutions during critical points in their development. 
Occupants have an obligation to ensure, in cooperation of the local and national 
authorities, the proper working of children’s institutions has been interpreted in both a 
passive and an active sense.  According to the ICRC’s Commentary, this means that not 
only must an Occupant avoid interfering with the actions of local or national authorities 
in respect to children’s institutions, but “also to support them actively and even 
encourage them if the responsible authorities of the country fail in their duty.”307 This 
includes facilitating the access to facilities, food, medical supplies, and anything else they 
need to carry out their duty, and ensuring that they receive these even when resources are 
inadequate.  Pictet emphasizes the importance of ensuring the proper functioning of 
children’s institutions by saying, 
This provision assures continuity in the educational and charitable work of the 
establishments referred to and is of the first importance, since it takes effect at a 
                                                
305 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
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point in children’s lives when the general disorganization consequent upon war 
might otherwise do irreparable harm to their physical and mental development.308  
 
While this helps to explain what types of institutions are meant to be properly 
working, the Commentary does not explain what “properly working” means in the 
context of educational content or program structure.309  Further, some questions remain in 
regards to what an Occupant is responsible for doing if the national and local authorities 
either refuse to or are unable to cooperate.310  Can the Occupant take matters into its own 
hands and act unilaterally? Or can the Occupant excuse itself from its obligations?  
These vague areas leave room for other, more specific rules to weigh in where 
relevant. This will be discussed further in the section related to the convergence of IHL 
and IHRL on education.  
Powers and Restrictions to form separate schools and to interfere with educational 
content  
 State practice is one way to determine how states have previously interpreted their 
obligations in relation to IHL.  Occupants in the past have seized upon the potential of 
educational institutions as a way to radically transform the “enemy’s” worldview.  While 
an occupant does have some latitude to interfere with the educational program in a 
territory it occupies, primarily those areas are limited to matters of military security and 
necessity.  Yet as has been established, state practice demonstrates that Occupants 
typically wield more influence than they are entitled to under international humanitarian 
law in relation to interfering with educational content in territories under their control.   
According to prominent IHL commentator von Glahn: 
[I]f it is true that lawful interference with the educational program and system of 
an occupied enemy territory exists only over a limited range of activities primarily 
connected with military security and necessity, then there would appear to exist a 
distinct conflict between the theoretical and legal rights of an occupant in this 
field and the far-reaching remolding of education envisaged by those who would 
re-educate the youth of the enemy.311 
 
                                                
308 Pictet, Geneva Convention 1949, Official Commentary, Vol. IV, at p. 287.   
309 Right to Education, supra note 222, at 304-328 
310 Id. 
311 Gerhard von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory… A Commentary on the Law and Practice of 
Belligerent Occupation, 1957, University of Minnesota at p. 67. 
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The actual practice of states as belligerents differs strikingly from what is 
permitted and prohibited in theory according to the texts of humanitarian law and what 
von Glahn describes as the “rather tolerant attitude” of commentators on the subject of 
interference in education.  For example: 
In almost every single major belligerent occupation in recent history, the 
occupying power has quickly taken steps far beyond a mere supervision of native 
schools and institutions of higher learning;312 in many instances far-reaching 
changes have been effected while in others a temporary or lasting elimination of 
large portions of an educational system was perpetrated by a military occupant313  
 
There are many examples of widespread, detailed interference with educational 
systems, such as when Germany occupied Belgium during WWI and in addition to 
devoting resources to prohibiting anti-German instruction in schools, forbade the singing 
of patriotic Belgian national songs and the conduct of patriotic exercises.314  Von Glahn 
in noting one such example notes the ambiguities of what is allowed in terms of 
regulating interference with content of education under occupation:  “Such detailed 
regulation of educational institutions exceeds by a wide margin the limitations agreed 
upon by writers of international law; yet, in the acknowledged absence of a binding set of 
rules on the subject of education under occupation, interference beyond military necessity 
appears to be customary rather than exceptional.”315  
The interference with educational content is at times due to Occupants’ attempts 
to remove hate-filled content or other content that could potentially politicize or incite 
violence among the occupied population.  However it has also provided a tempting 
opportunity for an Occupant to wield its influence to attempt to alter the population of the 
enemy state’s beliefs.  During WWII, a large number of American writers advocated for 
educational reform (of teachers as well as curricula) as the only way to reform the 
attitudes of the people of aggressor nations to a less “war-minded and intolerant 
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attitude”.316 He claims that the writers called for “the youth of totalitarian countries 
should be “educated away” from the doctrines of fascism…. and that they should be 
taught in such a way as to stimulate the growth and development of democratic ideas.”317  
Historical narratives however, as well as ideologies, are often subjective, largely 
dependent on who has the power to approve the narrative and therefore to determine 
whether or not actions – particularly actions involving political violence – are hateful or 
nationalistic.  One example of this distinction is highlighted by Noam Chomsky’s 
discussion of whether to call certain armed groups “freedom fighters” or “terrorists,” 
depending on whose perspective is privileged in discourses of political violence.318 This 
demonstrates the tension between a nationalistic narrative that might be promoted by an 
occupant, vs. a totally opposite nationalistic narrative that might be promoted by an 
occupied population as part of their history. 
Some educational content can be prohibited by the Occupant: “There can be little 
doubt that the occupying power may prevent any and all teaching which serves to 
provoke hostility toward the occupant’s forces, disrespect to the latter and to their 
commands, or passive resistance to the lawful orders given to the civilian population.”319   
Such lawful interference is that which is directed toward purging content that 
directly targets the occupant and its forces and/or administration, and as such is limited in 
scope.   
If existing international rules and the precepts laid down by writers in 
international law were to be applied in full, little could be done in the way of re-
education beyond a pattern comprising a very general supervision of education 
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and the elimination of definite methods and ideas aimed specifically against the 
occupant and his administrative authorities.320  
 
Short of the two types of interference that are stated, namely removing speech that 
would lead to incitement against the occupant and/or its administration, and the 
suspension of discussions of political matters, according to von Glahn, “the occupant 
does not appear to possess any additional rights to interfere with educational matters in 
occupied enemy territory.”321  He supports his argument by citing Garner, commenting on 
actions of Germany during WWI to turn the University of Ghent into a Flemish 
institution, who stated:  
Its courses of instruction, the language in which they were given, and the 
selection of its professors were matters of no legitimate concern to the military 
occupant so long as the conduct of the university and the character of its teaching 
were not such as to endanger the military interests of the occupant or threaten the 
public order.322  
 
According to von Glahn, some governments in their official instructions allowed 
for the suspension of discussions of political matters in schools while under occupation, 
although “no binding definition of the extent of such prohibition or suspension is known 
to the writer.”323  He notes that the American instructions (at least by 1957), which he 
calls “semi-official”, since they were teachings from the Ann Arbor School operated by 
the Judge Advocate General’s Department during WWII were the most detailed in this 
regard, stating:  
…schools must be permitted to continue their ordinary activity, provide that the 
teachers refrain from references to politics and submit to inspection and control 
by the authorities appointed.  Schools may be closed temporarily if military 
necessity requires, especially during the operational phase of the war.  Further, 
                                                
320 Gerhard von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory… A Commentary on the Law and Practice of 
Belligerent Occupation, 1957, University of Minnesota at p. 67.  He notes that this could be subverted in 
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schools may be closed, if the teachers engage in politics or refuse to submit to 
inspection.324   
 
Also, Art. 19 of the Bellot Rules325 discussed the prohibition on discussions of a 
political nature, proposing that any teacher who violated this prohibition could be 
removed from his/her position and replaced with a teacher of the same nationality as 
him/her.326 
Commentators have stated that the occupant does not have a right to “introduce 
his own language as the official language of instruction”327 nor does he have the right to 
replace teachers with teachers of the occupant’s nationality.328 
All told, these interpretations indicate that an Occupant has limited latitude to 
interfere with the content of educational programming in territories it occupies, and can 
restrict content due to military necessity with respect to political or other matters that 
might incite a population against the Occupant.  However, the Occupant’s powers stop 
short of allowing it to impose its own ideology, culture or language upon the local 
population.   
Other areas in which the Occupant might wish to interfere with educational 
content are more ambiguous in the letter of the law of IHL, but are supported (as will be 
discussed later) in IHRL in its requirement that education “promote understanding, 
tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and 
further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.”329  State 
practice in IHL however supports Occupants’ attempting to purge what it sees as 
problematic ideologies and to reeducate a population.  Although, when it comes to 
purging educational materials of hate-filled rhetoric or hateful ideologies, there is a risk 
that Occupants’ may move beyond the latitude they are given and attempt to remove 
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ideologies that threaten its worldview, or educate a population according to its ideology 
beyond the necessity required by security and public order, in a manner solely benefitting 
the Occupant.  And as discussed previously, this could contravene a basic principle of 
occupation law.  This is an area that will be explored in more detail in the case of the 
OSG. 
 
Education under International Human Rights Law 
Legal Instruments respecting the Right to Education 
Israel has ratified many of the core multilateral human rights treaties: 
• The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD),330 ratified by Israel 2 February 1979. 
• The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),331 ratified by 
Israel 3 January 1992. 
• The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),332 
ratified by Israel 3 January 1992. 
• The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 
ratified by Israel 2 November 1991. 
• The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),333 ratified by Israel 2 November 
1991. 
• The Convention Against Discrimination in Education (CADE),334 ratified by Israel 
22 September 1961. 
Many of these agreements contain provisions respecting the right to education.  
Under the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, one of the foundational 
human rights treaties, education is an essential human right and “an indispensable means 
of realizing other human rights.”335  As such, it is guaranteed in two articles in the 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Articles 13 and 14, and the right to 
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education is most comprehensively outlined in this treaty.  Education for children is 
further stipulated in the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Articles 28 and 29 and 
provisions relating to aspects of the right to education exist in other international legal 
agreements including all those listed above including the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (1966), Article 18(4),336 and the UNESCO Convention Against 
Discrimination in Education (1960), Article 5.337 Despite the importance of the right to 
education and its prominence in such an array of authoritative international legal 
agreements, its meaning and scope are not always clear.  What is meant precisely by 
education?  The covenants do not provide an explicit definition of education,338 nor do 
their commentaries.  Some, such as UNESCO in its Recommendation concerning 
Education for International Understanding, Cooperation and Peace and Education relating 
to Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1974, have conceptualized education in 
a wide scope, stating that implied in education is “the entire process of social life by 
means of which individuals and social groups learn to develop consciously within, and 
for the benefit of, the national and international communities, the whole of their personal 
capacities, attitudes, aptitudes and knowledge.”339  
However, education in the context of both international and regional UN legal 
instruments guaranteeing the right to education adopts the narrower approach, relating to 
                                                
336 ICCPR, supra note 331. It should be noted that this provision does not guarantee a right to education 
generally as outlined in the other treaties, but instead guarantees the right of parents to ensure the moral 
education of their children in accordance with their wishes. 
337 Supra note 334, Art. 5. The right to education is also contained in the European Convention on Human 
Rights, Protocol I (1954), Article 13; the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981), Article 
17; the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Article 17(3); and the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Article 12; among other non-binding declarations such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Article 26; the Declaration on the Rights of the Child 
(1959), Principle 7;and the Declaration on Social Progress and Development (1969), Article 10. 
338 The CADE provides the following explanation of education, but it falls fart short of being a 
comprehensive definition: “For the purposes of this Convention, the term "education" refers to all types and 
levels of education, and includes access to education, the standard and quality of education, and the 
conditions under which it is given.” Recognizing the need for a further definition of at least basic 
education, UNESCO produced the following definition of basic education (original in French) in 2007: 
UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, EXPERT CONSULTATION ON 
THE OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF BASIC EDUCATION: CONCLUSIONS 4(2009). 
339 UNESCO, Recommendation concerning Education for International Understanding, Co-operation and 
Peace and Education relating to Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1974, Article 1(a) as cited in 
Klaus Dieter Beiter, The Protection of the Right to Education by International Law: including a systematic 
analysis of Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 82 INT’L. 
STUD. IN HUM. RTS. 18–19 (2006) [hereinafter: Cultural Rights]. 
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the institutional transmission of knowledge.340 This narrower definition refers to 
“instruction imparted within a national, provincial or local education system, whether 
public or private,”341 and is primarily related to instruction within educational 
institutions. This distinction between narrower and wider conceptions of education was 
also noted by the European Court of Human Rights when it stated: “[Education in a wider 
sense refers to] the whole process whereby, in any society, adults endeavour to transmit 
their beliefs, culture and other values to the young, whereas teaching or instruction 
[education in a narrower sense] refers in particular to the transmission of knowledge and 
to intellectual development.”342   
In 2007, recognizing the need for a more comprehensive definition of basic 
education, UNESCO sponsored a meeting of experts to produce a definition.  In their 
conclusions, the experts produced the following definition: 
For the purposes of this definition, basic education covers notions such as 
fundamental, elementary and primary/secondary education. It is guaranteed to 
everyone without any discrimination or exclusion based notably on gender, ethnicity, 
nationality or origin, social, economic or physical condition, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, or belonging to a minority.  
 
Beyond pre-school education, the duration of which can be fixed by the State, basic 
education consists of at least 9 years and progressively extends to 12 years. Basic 
education is free and compulsory without any discrimination or exclusion.  
 
Equivalent basic education is offered for youth and adults who did not have the 
opportunity or possibility to receive and complete basic education at the appropriate 
age.  
 
Basic education prepares the learner for further education, for an active life and 
citizenship. It meets basic learning needs including learning to learn, the acquisition 
of numeracy, literacies, and scientific and technological knowledge as applied to 
daily life.   
 
Basic education is directed to the full development of the human personality. It 
develops the capability for comprehension and critical thinking, and it inculcates the 
respect for human rights and values, notably, human dignity, solidarity, tolerance, 
democratic citizenship and a sense of justice and equity.  
                                                
340 M’Bow, A., “Introduction” in: Mialaret, 1979, p. 11 as cited in Cultural Rights, supra note 339 at 19. 
341 Cultural Rights, supra note 339 at 18-19. 
342 Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom, Judgement of 25 February 1982, Publications of the 
European Court of Human Rights, Series A, Vol. 48, para. 33 as cited in Cultural Rights, supra note 339 at 
19. 
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The State guarantees the right to basic education of good quality based on minimum 
standards, applicable to all forms of education, and provided by qualified teachers, as 
well as effective management along with a system of implementation and assessment.   
 
Basic education is provided in the mother tongue, at least in its initial stages, while 
respecting the requirements/needs of multilingualism.  
 
In those States where basic education is also provided by private schools, the State 
ensures that such schools respect fully the objectives and content as mentioned in the 
present definition.343  
 
This definition, while instructive, is not binding as it is based on a combination of 
authoritative treaties binding on state signatories, and domestic definitions of education.  
For example, the section stipulating the length of education is not based on any treaty 
law.344  Therefore, while more comprehensive than what is contained in the balance of 
multilateral treaties respecting the right to education, it cannot be completely relied upon 
when determining states’ obligations.  However, it does provide an overview of what’s 
commonly recognized by practitioners as what is required of states in achieving basic 
education. 
While not explicitly defining education, other UN bodies and commentators have 
provided characterizations of the right to education.  Some describe it as a social and 
cultural right, and others as a civil right.  Some, such as former UN Special Rapporteur 
on the right to education Katarina Tomasevski describe the right to education as an 
empowerment right.  This interpretation of education as an empowerment right, or a right 
upon which other rights are contingent, aligns with the Supreme Court’s explanation in 
landmark court case Brown v Board of Education of Topeka in which the Court stated: 
“In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life 
                                                
343 UNESCO, The Right to Education, Expert Consultation on the Operational Definition of Basic 
Education: Conclusions, 17-18 December 2007, Original: French, Published in 2009 by the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Education Sector, Division for the 
Promotion of Basic Education, Section for the Promotion of Rights and Values in Education, 7 place de 
Fontenoy, 75352 Paris 07 SP, France (ED-2009/WS/19) - CLD  746.9, at 4. 
344 UNESCO, The Right to Education, Expert Consultation on the Operational Definition of Basic 
Education: Conclusions, 17-18 December 2007, Original: French, Published in 2009 by the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Education Sector, Division for the 
Promotion of Basic Education, Section for the Promotion of Rights and Values in Education, 7 place de 
Fontenoy, 75352 Paris 07 SP, France (ED-2009/WS/19) - CLD  746.9, at 8. 
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if he is denied the opportunity of an education.”345 While many characterizations are 
debated by scholars, the right to education is typically viewed in relation to states’ 
obligations under the ICESCR, and consider it an economic, social and cultural right. 
A related question is who is the subject of the right to education. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights describe the right as applicable to “everyone.” As Article 13, paragraph 1 
of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states, “the States Parties to the 
present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to education.”346 
Although education is guaranteed to everyone, in practice the right is primarily dealt 
with as it concerns children of a specific age group.  As noted by Tomasevski, while it is 
stated that education must be in the best interests of children according to international 
legal instruments, in reality, children do not have a say in the creation of those treaties or 
their interpretation, nor (usually) in any facets of the education they receive.  Rather, the 
best interests of the child, and accordingly, the content and quality of the education they 
receive, are determined by the state, parents, and the community.347 The role played by 
parents and community members in determining what is best for their children vis a vis 
their education is an important component of the right to education and will be revisited 
in more detail shortly. 
The right to education broadly guarantees access to quality educational institutions 
and calls for respect in education for human rights and friendly relations among nations.  
Article 13, paragraph 1 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to 
education.  They agree that education shall be directed to the full development of 
the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms.  They further agree that education 
shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or 
religious groups, and further the activities of the United Nations for the 
maintenance of peace.348 
 
                                                
345 Brown vs Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) at 493 as cited in Cultural Rights, supra 
note 339 at p. 18. 
346 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 13, paragraph 1. 
347 Tomasevski, 1999a, para. 79 (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/49) as cited in Cultural Rights, supra note 339 at 
20, footnote 8. 
348 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 13, paragraph 1. 
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      Article 13, paragraph 2 (e) of the same Covenant states: “The development of a 
system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued, an adequate fellowship system 
shall be established and the material conditions of teaching staff shall be continuously 
improved.”349 
However, other than these broad guarantees of respect, understanding, tolerance, and 
friendship, it has little to say regarding the content of education. According to former UN 
Special Rapporteur on the right to education Katarina Tomasevski, there are some limits, 
for example, “International human rights law obliges individual states to ensure that each 
child has access to education, but it also prohibits them from monopolizing education, let 
alone transforming it into institutionalized indoctrination”.350  She goes on to admit that 
“what happens in schools, public or private, is seldom examined through the human 
rights lens.”351  The content of education is primarily dealt with in the CRC and will be 
examined later in this section. 
Traditionally, the task of educating children fell under the purview of parents, but 
according to international legal agreements, the entity that is primarily responsible for 
guaranteeing the right to education is the state.  However, it is “increasingly recognized” 
internationally that other entities also have responsibilities in the sphere of education. 352  
Parents do have some say in the education of their children, particularly related to 
religious and moral values and to the choice of which schools their children attend.  
Article 13(3) of the ICESCR states: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of 
parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to choose for their children schools, 
other than those established by the public authorities, which conform to such 
minimum educational standards as may be laid down or approved by the State and to 
ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their 
own convictions.353 
 
                                                
349 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 13, paragraph 2 (e). 
350 Education Denied, supra note 262 at 15. 
351 Id. 
352 “It is, moreover, increasingly recognised that non-governmental and other sectors bear some form of 
responsibility in the sphere of education. Article 7 of the World Declaration on Education for All, adopted 
by the World Conference on Education for All, held at Jomtien, Thailand from 5 to 9 March 1990, states 
that “[n]ew and revitalised partnerships at all levels [are] necessary . . . [including] . . . partnerships 
between government and non-governmental organisations, the private sector, local communities, religious 
groups, and families””, as cited in Cultural Rights, supra note 339 at p. 21. 
353 ICESCR, Art. 13 (3) 
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And the ICCPR also contains a similar provision respecting parents’ choices regarding 
education: “The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the 
liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral 
education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.”354 
Parental choice in schools is also discussed in the CADE in the context of educating 
children according to parents’ wishes using separate schools.  For example, under certain 
circumstances,355 forming separate schools or educational systems “offering an education 
which is in keeping with the wishes of the pupil's parents or legal guardians,” does not 
constitute discrimination.356 This allowance for entire separate educational systems as a 
means to respect the wishes of parents demonstrates the critical importance that human 
rights law places on parents’ choices when it comes to the moral and religious schooling 
of their children, and in maintaining continuity with children’s linguistic heritage.  It 
should be noted that this provision does not speak of ethnic segregation or segregation on 
the sole basis of nationality. 
The CADE also pays special attention to parental choice in education for national 
minorities, in particular in allowing them to “carry on their own educational activities.” 
In Article 5(1), States Parties agree that: 
(b) It is essential to respect the liberty of parents and, where applicable, of legal 
guardians, firstly to choose for their children institutions other than those 
maintained by the public authorities but conforming to such minimum educational 
standards as may be laid down or approved by the competent authorities and, 
secondly, to ensure in a manner consistent with the procedures followed in the 
State for the application of its legislation, the religious and moral education of the 
children in conformity with their own convictions; and no person or group of 
persons should be compelled to receive religious instruction inconsistent with his 
or their conviction; 
 
(c) It is essential to recognize the right of members of national minorities to carry 
on their own educational activities, including the maintenance of schools and, 
depending on the educational policy of each State, the use or the teaching of their 
own language, provided however: 
                                                
354 ICCPR, supra note 331 at Art. 18 (4) 
355 The separate schools or educational systems must be established “for religious or linguistic reasons… in 
keeping with the wishes of the pupil's parents or legal guardians” and does not constitute discrimination “if 
participation in such systems or attendance at such institutions is optional and if the education provided 
conforms to such standards as may be laid down or approved by the competent authorities, in particular for 
education of the same level;” CADE, Art. 2 (b) 
356 CADE, Art. 2 (b) 
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(i) That this right is not exercised in a manner which prevents the 
members of these minorities from understanding the culture and language 
of the community as a whole and from participating in its activities, or 
which prejudices national sovereignty; 
 
(ii) That the standard of education is not lower than the general standard 
laid down or approved by the competent authorities; and 
 
(iii) That attendance at such schools is optional.357 
This article again emphasizes the importance in IHRL of allowing parents to choose 
the religious and moral education of their children, as long as the education is optional so 
as to ensure that no one is forced to receive education against his or her convictions.  It 
also emphasizes that any alternative education should conform with educational standards 
so as to be at a similar quality as the education the student would otherwise receive. And 
finally, it stresses that alternative education for national minorities should not exclude the 
students from society or its activities, and should not prejudice national sovereignty.358  
All of these aspects suggest the importance in IHRL of respecting the moral and religious 
convictions of individuals and the wishes of their parents in education, in a manner that is 
specific to the individual. 
Education is most often characterized as an economic, social and cultural right due to 
its placement in the ICESCR.  Like other economic, social and cultural rights, it must be 
progressively realized, according to Article 2, with two exceptions that will be discussed 
momentarily. 
Progressive realization of rights refers to Article 2 of the ICESCR, which states: 
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps… to the maximum of 
its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly 
the adoption of legislative measures.”359 
                                                
357 CADE, Art. 5 (1) (b) (c) 
358 According to a UNESCO-published Commentary on the CADE, “This may mean, in particular, that the 
rights granted to minorities must not be interpreted as allowing minorities to isolate themselves from the 
community as a whole.” YVES DAUDET & PIERRE MICHEL EISEMANN, COMMENTARY ON THE CONVENTION 
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION, ADOPTED ON 14 DECEMBER 1960 BY THE GENERAL 
CONFERENCE OF UNESCO 31(2005). 
359 ICESCR, Art. 2 
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This provision has often led to the charge that the economic, social and cultural rights 
contained in the ICESCR take a back seat to the civil and political rights enshrined in the 
ICCPR, whose full realization must be achieved immediately. 
  Two areas must be achieved immediately.  The non-discrimination provision must 
be achieved immediately, as affirmed by the General Comment related to the right to 
education.360  The second is states’ obligations to provide the most basic forms of 
education immediately.361  
In order to achieve non-discrimination in education, which is a non-derogable 
provision even in cases of national emergency, states must understand what constitutes 
discrimination. This is explained in further detail by the CADE:  
For the purpose of this Convention, the term "discrimination" includes any 
distinction, exclusion, limitation or preference which, being based on race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic 
condition or birth, has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing equality of 
treatment in education and in particular: 
 
(a) Of depriving any person or group of persons of access to education of any type or 
at any level; 
(b) Of limiting any person or group of persons to education of an inferior standard; 
(c) Subject to the provisions of article 2 of this Convention, of establishing or 
maintaining separate educational systems or institutions for persons or groups of 
persons; or 
(d) Of inflicting on any person or group of persons conditions which are incompatible 
with the dignity of man.362 
 
Establishing separate educational systems does not constitute discrimination under the 
treaty, as discussed previously, in specific cases related to the wishes of parents regarding 
their children’s moral, religious and linguistic education.  The other exceptions are for 
gender-separated schools provided that the education provided is of the same quality, 
with the same quality staff and similar or the same educational content,363 and for private 
schools, provided that the education provided conforms with state standards, and “ if the 
object of the institutions is not to secure the exclusion of any group but to provide 
                                                
360 U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 on the right to education (art. 13), General Comment no. 13, at paragraph 31. 
361 In cases in which the state is unable to implement free education for all immediately, the state must 
work out a detailed plan that will take place over a reasonable number of years to provide free compulsory 
education for all in territories under its jurisdiction. Article 14, ICESCR.  
362 CADE, Art. 1 (1). 
363 CADE, Art. 1 (a) 
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educational facilities in addition to those provided by the public authorities”364 and “if the 
institutions are conducted in accordance with that object.”365 
In order to comply with non-discrimination obligations according to the CADE, 
States Parties are obligated to ensure that no differences of treatment are occurring 
between nationals “except on the basis of merit or need,”366 and no restrictions or 
preference “based solely on the ground that pupils belong to a particular group.”367 And 
States Parties have an obligation “to give foreign nationals resident within their territory 
the same access to education as that given to their own nationals.”368  It is important to 
note that the obligation here refers to access to education, not to providing identical 
curricula to non-nationals.  
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has stated that 
enforcement of the right to education has been challenging.369 This led the CESCR in a 
General Comment to articulate “minimum core obligations” for each right including the 
right to education that states are obliged to achieve lest they commit a violation of the 
right in question.370 Of these there are “minimum essential levels” of each right which 
must be achieved immediately in order to avoid depriving the Convention of its raison 
d’etre, and notes that states cannot use the progressive realization clause or cite a lack of 
resources to excuse itself from not fulfilling them.371  For the right to education, this 
                                                
364 CADE, Art. 1 (c) 
365 CADE, Art. 1 (c) 
366 CADE, Art. 3 (c) 
367 CADE, Art. 3 (d) 
368 CADE, Art. 3 (e) 
369 The Nature of States Parties Obligations, General Comment 3, adopted 13-14 Dec. 1990, U.N. ESCOR, 
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rts., 5th Sess., at 86, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23, annex III (1990) as cited in 
Sital Kalantry et al., Enhancing Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Using Indicators: A 
Focus on the Right to Education in the ICESCR, 32 HUM. RTS. Q. 271 (2010) [hereinafter: Enhancing 
Enforcement]. 
370 Id. 
371 General Comment 13: The Right to Education, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10/(1999), para. 9-10, 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as cited in Right to Education, supra note 222, at 314. 
The Committee does admit in paragraph 10 that there might be cases in which a State Party does not have 
the resources to fulfill its minimum core obligations, it has the burden of demonstrating this: “In order for a 
State Party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations to a lack of 
available resources it must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its 
disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations.” 
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includes providing the most basic forms of education immediately.372  While some 
questions remain about whether these standards are fixed minimums applicable to all 
countries regardless of resource limitations, or whether they are flexible standards,373 
they are still a useful and widely adopted measure of what is minimally required in order 
to achieve compliance with the right to education under the ICESCR. 
With respect to the right to education, the Committee stipulated the following five 
minimum core obligations (as summed up by researchers Kalantry et al.): 
1. to ensure the right of access to public educational institutions and programmes 
on a non-discriminatory basis; 
2. to ensure education conforms to the objectives set out in article 13(1) [of the 
Covenant]; 
3. to provide [free and compulsory] primary education for all;  
4. to adopt and implement a national education strategy which includes provision 
for secondary, higher and fundamental education; and  
5. to ensure free choice of education without interference from the State or third 
parties, subject to  with “minimum educational standards” (arts. 13(3) and (4)).374 
 
Based on these minimum standards, Tomasevski developed a 4-A’s scheme, the “4-A 
Right to Education Framework” that has been adopted by the CESCR375 and has been 
widely adopted as a standard worldwide.  The four core contents of the right to education 
according to this scheme are: Availability, Accessibility, Acceptability, and 
Adaptability.376 
                                                
372 In cases in which the state is unable to implement free education for all immediately, the state must 
work out a detailed plan that will take place over a reasonable number of years to provide free compulsory 
education for all in territories under its jurisdiction. Article 14, ICESCR.  
373 Enhancing Enforcement, supra note 369 at 272. 
374 The Nature of States Parties Obligations, General Comment 3, adopted 13-14 Dec. 1990, U.N. ESCOR, 
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rts., 5th Sess., at 86, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23, annex III (1990) as cited in 
Enhancing Enforcement, supra note 369 at 272. Kalantry points out that some scholars called for additional 
minimum core obligations, such as the right to be educated in one’s native language and others. She lists 
for example suggestions by Fons Coomans, who suggested that “the minimum core obligation should also 
include: (1) the provision of special facilities for persons with educational deficits such as girls in rural 
areas or working children; (2) the quality of education; and (3) the right to receive an education in one’s 
native language.” FONS COOMANS, IN SEARCH OF THE CORE CONTENT OF THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION, IN 
CORE OBLIGATIONS: BUILDING A FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 217, 229-
30 (2002) as cited in Enhancing Enforcement, supra note 369 at 272-273. 
375 The Right to Education, General Comment No. 13, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rts., 
21st Sess., ¶ 45, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (1999) [hereinafter General Comment No. 13] as cited in 
Enhancing Enforcement, supra note 369 at 274. 
376 These were first proposed in Preliminary Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, 
Ms. Katarina Tomasevski, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 55th Sess., ¶¶ 50–74,U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1999/49 (1999). 
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Availability refers to the government’s obligations to allow the establishment of 
schools (as outlined under the ICCPR) and to ensure that free and compulsory education 
is available to all children of an appropriate age for school (as outlined in the 
ICESCR).377 
Accessibility refers to the government’s obligations to provide access to education for 
all children who meet the age requirements for compulsory education.378 For higher 
levels of education that are not compulsory, and for which tuition and fees are often 
required, accessibility is assessed by whether it is affordable.379 
Acceptability refers to the quality of education, which can include health and safety 
standards, requirements for teachers’ professional training, and other factors such as the 
language of instruction.380 
Adaptability refers to the schools’ ability to adapt to the best interests of the child 
(according to the standards set out by the CRC).381  As Tomasevski points out, “This 
change reversed the heritage of forcing children to adapt to whatever schools may have 
been made available to them.”382 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child contains even more expansive treatment of 
the right to education in relation to the aims of education.  In addition to containing a 
provision respecting access to education, contained in Article 28, the CRC describes the 
aims of education in Article 29.  Art. 29, paragraph 1 of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child states: 
1. States parties agree that the education of the child shall be directed to: 
a. the development of the child’s personality, talents and mental and physical 
abilities to their fullest potential; 
b. the development of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
and for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations; 
c. the development of respect for the child’s parents, his or her own cultural 
identity, language and values, for the national values of the country in 
which the child is living, the country from which he or she may originate, 
and for civilizations different from his or her own; 
                                                
377 Education Denied, supra note 262 at 51. 
378 Id. 
379 Id. 
380 Id. 
381 Id., at 52. 
382 Id. 
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d. the preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the 
spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship 
among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of 
indigenous origin; 
e. the development of respect for the natural environment.383 
 
The enjoyment of these rights, like the enjoyment of all fundamental human rights, is 
linked to the dignity of the person.384  The provisions of this article demonstrate clearly 
that the right to education as outlined in the CRC is not simply limited to providing 
access to education, but is qualitative, linked to the content of the education.385   
While also not explicitly defining education or calling for specific curricula, the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child has often called upon states to make curricula more 
relevant to children, and has set out the way forward in doing so: states should encourage 
more active participation by children in schooling.386 
The CRC requires States Parties to direct their actions toward the best interests of the 
child. “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best 
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”387 This includes through ensuring 
that educational institutions are suitably staffed and take care to protect the children who 
attend in terms of their physical safety and health, among other factors. The same Article 
goes on to require States Parties to “ensure that the institutions, services and facilities 
responsible for the care or protection of children shall conform with the standards 
established by competent authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the 
number and suitability of their staff, as well as competent supervision.”388   
                                                
383 The Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 29, paragraph 1. 
384 U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2001/1 on the Aims of Education, 17/04/2001, General Comment No. 1 of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2001 at 1. 
385 U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2001/1 on the Aims of Education, 17/04/2001, General Comment No. 1 of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2001 at 3. 
386 E.g. CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Costa Rica (UN Doc. UN Doc. CRC/C/94, 2000), para. 
233 and Italy (UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.41, 1995), para. 21, and E.g. CRC Committee, Concluding 
Observations: Cameroon (UN Doc. CRC/C/111, 2001) para. 380; Saudi-Arabia (UN Doc. CRC/C/103, 
2001) para. 414 and the Netherlands Antilles (UN Doc. CRC/C/118, 2002), para. 576, as cited in A 
COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 27 (Mieke Verheyde 
et al. ed., ) (2006). 
387 CRC, Article 3 (1). 
388 CRC, Article 3 (3). 
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The CRC also calls for respect for children’s heritage and national origins, and 
parents’ or legal guardians’ choices.  In its preamble (a non-legally binding statement at 
the beginning of the Convention that draws attention to the Convention’s overall object 
and purpose, priorities and its influences), the Convention takes account of “the 
importance of the traditions and cultural values of each people for the protection and 
harmonious development of the child.”389  In Article 3, the Convention calls on States 
Parties to respect the rights of children’s parents, requiring that they: 
undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or 
her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal 
guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, 
shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures.390 
 
While not specifically mentioning education, the Convention’s wording in these 
Articles appear to extend to all aspects of a child’s life in the state.  Children also have 
the right to acquire a nationality, and the right to “preserve his or her identity, including 
nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful 
interference.”391  In cases where children are rendered stateless due to being illegally 
deprived of their identity (or parts of their identity), States Parties are required to 
“provide appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to re-establishing speedily his 
or her identity.”392  
Together, these provisions indicate that the CRC, like the ICESCR, places a strong 
emphasis on maintaining children’s cultural and national identity, whether through 
education or in other closely related aspects of life, such as family life and cultural 
heritage. 
School separation and educational content 
Regarding the provision of non-discrimination, questions have been raised as to whether 
separate schooling for religious or linguistic minorities constitutes discrimination under 
these legal instruments.  This is particularly in light of the fact that the history of the 
notion of human rights is often told as a means of curbing state abuses of their 
populations that was brought to the world’s attention following the abuses of 
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governments of the Axis Powers (such as Nazi Germany) during World War II.  Much of 
the horror of World War II, according to many of these narratives, began through the 
governments’ abuse of educational institutions to indoctrinate their citizens with racially 
supremacist ideas that dehumanized members of religious minorities.  Other states have 
struggled with divisions in education on the basis of ethnicity, color, or nationality. 
As discussed previously, the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in 
Education permits the separate schooling of religious minorities (and does not consider it 
discriminatory treatment), if it is optional, and in accordance with the wishes of their 
parents.  The wording of the article is: 
When permitted in a State, the following situations shall not be deemed to 
constitute discrimination, within the meaning of Article I of this Convention:  
 
… b) The establishment or maintenance, for religious or linguistic reasons, of 
separate educational systems or institutions offering an education which is in 
keeping with the wishes of the pupil’s parents or legal guardians, if participation 
in such systems or attendance at such institutions is optional and if the education 
provided conforms to such standards as may be laid down or approved by the 
competent authorities, in particular for education of the same level.393 
 
In 1978, UNESCO established the concept of a “right to be different.”  Tomasevski 
described this right as indicating that “all individuals and groups have the right to be 
different, to consider themselves as different and to be regarded as such.”394  Indeed, 
many see the preservation of minorities’ heritage as a key component of their human 
rights more broadly, including their rights to freedom of expression, freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion, and human dignity more generally.  In fact, the ICCPR 
guarantees minority protection in Article 27, which states: “In those States in which 
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall 
not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy 
their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own 
language.”395  And yet, there is a fine line between heritage preservation and celebration 
                                                
393 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Convention against Discrimination in 
Education, Adopted by the General Conference at its eleventh session, Paris, 14 December, 1960, entered 
into force 22 May 1962 at Article 2(b) 
394 Education Denied, supra note 262 at 143. 
395 ICCPR, Art. 27 
97 
 
or practice of culture, and segregation of the group itself – and according to human rights 
law, whether the distinction is based on religion, language, or other factors. 
Historically, differences have been accommodated through segregation.  The 
boundaries have followed internationally prohibited grounds of discrimination…. 
Communities are educating their children within the boundaries of belonging defined 
by religion, ethnicity, or language.  The model of all-encompassing public education 
aims to overcome such boundaries and the underlying division of children into ours 
and theirs. Although that model is embodied in the spirit and wording of international 
human rights law, it does not guide education strategies.396  
 
These boundaries of permissible segregation that do not constitute discrimination are 
inclusive of religion, but not race.  Religious schools have had a long history. “Different 
from race, religion has always constituted a boundary of belonging, throughout the 
history of education.  Religious schools are older than secular schools.  It is likely that 
more children attend religious than secular schools today.”397  
Further, as mentioned previously, what constitutes acceptable segregation in 
schooling is bounded by important requirements, including that parents have a choice as 
to whether their children will attend a segregated school, the quality of education does 
not suffer, and that students are not excluded from the linguistic and cultural life of the 
society in which they live. 
When allowing for separate educational institutions for religious education, there is 
no distinction made in human rights law for whether these institutions need be public or 
private. 
According to former UN Special Rapporteur on the right to education Katarina 
Tomasevski, “Questions about what children are taught are asked much too rarely, and 
abuses of education are detected retrospectively, if at all…The assumption that any 
education is better than none is as unfounded as it is prevalent.”398    
Many countries have struggled with internal debates over the content of educational 
curricula, particularly as it relates to sensitive issues such as the relations between 
minorities and varying versions of history, especially in relation to conflict.  For example, 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, separate schools with separate curricula were instituted on the 
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basis of religious and other identities for students, a move which was criticized since it 
arguably avoided the difficult task of educating students democratically.  One such critic 
alleged that:  
Education is often misused by providing students with different interpretations of the 
same facts. For example, curricula and textbooks may present the start of the war as 
aggression and occupation, or a fight for liberation and national emancipation. Was it 
genocide and ethnic cleansing of some parts of the territory, or it was it self-
defense?399 
 
Another example of the manipulation of educational content to promote particular 
political ideologies related to identity is accomplished by excluding key parts of 
minorities’ history from the curriculum.  For example, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, “In 
municipalities where the Bosniak population is the majority, school leaders exclude 
attributes of the Croat nation and Croat culture from the school curriculum. Some Croat 
teachers and students refuse to attend schools with the Bosniak majority, and would 
rather conduct class under tents, using curricula from neighboring Croatia.”400      
Although exclusions of content, and the suggestion of the resulting impression that a 
minority group is not important, or has not contributed to the nation, is not the only 
method states have used historically to manipulate identity politics in schools.  The 
“over-emphasis” of a particular group’s ethnic or cultural background can itself be a 
problem. “By over-emphasizing someone's ethnic, linguistic or religious preferences, one 
often forgets other characteristics of an individual, such as gender, social, generational, 
professional, intellectual, and many others. Educational practice fenced in by a 
nationalistic-political frame can not only cripple all other dimensions of a personality but 
also its developmental potential.”401   
This is the same problem that is often identified as a critique of cultural relativism, in 
that it places an emphasis on culture above all other factors and variables.  A group may 
be described as so culturally unique that it is reduced to stereotypical depictions, or 
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depictions that overly focus on the “traditional,” overshadowing the group’s modern, 
integrated context. 
Education must, through its provision institutionally and through its content, meet the 
standards set out in the ICESCR and other human rights instruments, and for example as 
stated in the ICESCR, “promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all 
nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups,” but no specific syllabi or educational 
programs are required.  In fact, a corollary that may be assumed is that educational 
content will differ between different societies.402 
There are certain key places in a curriculum in which “abuses” or attempts at state 
indoctrination have occurred in the past, such as within history or civics curricula, mostly 
in the contexts of situations of armed conflict.  It is important to note that not all of these 
problematic educational content areas can occur in subjects such as history or social 
studies where they might be expected.  Some of these attempts occur in surprising places, 
such as mathematics curricula.  For example, “In Hitler’s Germany, a mathematics 
textbook nudged learners to calculate the financial savings that would ensue from 
eliminating mentally ill people.  ‘The construction of a lunatic asylum costs 6 million 
DM. How many houses at 15,000 DM each could have been built for that amount?’”403    
And in the United States, mathematics were also used to achieve political propaganda 
objectives: “One maths book printed in the US during the USSR’s Afghanistan war for 
use amongst Afghani refugees offered the following mathematical problem: ‘If you have 
two dead Communists, and kill three more, how many dead Communists do you 
have?’”404  
Education has also played a role in the encouragement of war and the incitement of 
violence.  As Tomasevski noted, “Throughout history, education has been particularly 
effective in the militarization of boys.  Participation in warfare has been part of 
traditional initiation rituals through which boys become men.  Glorification of war 
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continues by means of history textbooks which are dotted with wars and war heroes.”405   
For example, it was reported that education (at the urging of the state) played a role in the 
conditioning of the population to commit genocide in Rwanda, through the propagation 
of so-called “scientific” theories about ethnic difference.406 
 While extreme, these examples demonstrate the importance of holistically 
examining educational content across a curriculum, and of the importance of paying 
particular attention to portrayals of national minorities, and perceived social ills. They 
also highlight how important educational curricula during a conflict can be, particularly 
as it relates to ethnic minorities, and underscore why authorities in situations of conflict 
may be suspicious of content which appears to be related to potentially sensitive subjects 
that may bear on national security such as political content, or content which is 
nationalistic, related to identity, religion, or minority relations, or foreign affairs. 
 The abuses of state power to determine educational content produced curricular 
content that undermined human dignity and ran counter to the provisions of IHRL related 
to education.  They are instructive in demonstrating some of what would constitute a 
violation of the right to education.  They also violate other articles of human rights 
treaties such as the ICCPR, which while not specifically dealing with education, prohibit 
the advocacy of “national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence”407 or promotion of propaganda for war.408  And as a 
whole, they undermine the cause of human dignity with which human rights law is 
concerned. 
 
Protection of Education by IHL vs. IHRL  
                                                
405 “The schools took it upon themselves to develop actual theories of ethnic difference based ona number 
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In 2008, the International Committee of the Red Cross undertook a study in which they 
explored the mutual compatibility of IHL and IHRL.  In line with this approach, Jonathan 
Horowitz outlined an approach to the right to education compatible with both IHL and 
IHRL in a time of occupation.  The author will adopt the approach advocated by Jonathan 
Horowitz in relation to the conflicting norms and potential reconciliation of norms of the 
right to education under IHL and IHRL simultaneously.  Namely, it will be demonstrated 
that the positive obligations required by the state under IHRL can fit into the vague 
requirements of the Occupying Power. And through applying, based on an assessment of 
the appropriate context, either a lex specialis or lex posterior approach as the primary 
lens through which the norms can be viewed or limited, either occupation law or human 
rights law can harmonized into a more definitive set of obligations agreed upon between 
the two bodies of law. 
 Horowitz first raises a number of questions regarding which provisions of IHL or 
IHRL might supersede the other.  For example, as previously discussed, the right to 
education is an economic, social and cultural right and as such should be achieved 
progressively, including through changes to legislation.  However, in occupation law, the 
Fourth Geneva Convention calls for only “essential” changes to the law, and the Hague 
Regulations state that a state should respect local laws “unless absolutely prevented.”  
Which of these provisions is strongest in relation to changing the education system in an 
occupied territory? 
 He then examines four positive obligations of the right to education under IHRL 
and their potential compatibility with the Occupant’s requirements for education under 
occupation law. These four will be explained briefly. 
1. Make Primary Education Compulsory and Free for All – this provision, contained 
in Article 13 of the ICESCR, is not similarly enshrined in occupation law. While 
the Fourth Geneva Convention stipulates that Occupants must provide education 
for children orphaned or separated from their parents, its only other obligation is 
to “facilitate the proper working of institutions devoted to the care and education 
of children.”  Legislating for free and compulsory education for all children in a 
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context in which that did not exist therefore seems to go beyond what is required 
of the Occupant.409 In this sense, there appears to be a conflict between the laws. 
2. Ensure the Physical Operation of Institutions Devoted to Primary Education – the 
requirement to ensure that educational institutions are properly functioning in 
occupation law, especially as elaborated in the Commentary to the Fourth Geneva 
Convention stating that Occupants must ensure this even when local or national 
authorities’ resources are inadequate, seems compatible with the broad obligations 
under the right to education regarding what it means for an educational institution 
to be working properly.410  Human rights law however does provide stronger, 
specific obligations than occupation law in terms of what is required to ensure 
that educational institutions are properly functioning. State practice generally 
shows that while Occupants have provided for educational institutions, they have 
done so more “based on whim, generosity, and self-interest of the Occupying 
Power.”411 
3. Remove Discriminatory Laws that Limit Children’s Access to Primary Education 
– this is a key, immediately required provision of the ICESCR enshrined in 
Article 2(2),412 and has a corollary in occupation law. The Fourth Geneva 
Convention in Article 27 prevents the Occupant from making detrimental 
distinctions against those under their control based on factors such as “race, 
religion, or political opinion.”413 While this has been respected in state practice, 
Horowitz raised some further questions. For example, while the Commentary to 
the Fourth Geneva Convention indicates that an Occupant should abrogate any 
discriminatory laws it finds that “might place difficulties in the way of the 
application of the Convention,”414 he questioned what powers the Occupant 
would have in a situation in which a discriminatory law existed preventing girls 
from attending school.  While changing the law would seem to be compatible 
with the non-discriminatory spirit of the Fourth Geneva Convention, it could be 
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impermissible on the basis of the principle that occupation law requires the 
Occupant to preserve institutions’ working the way they worked prior to 
occupation.415 
4. Remove Hateful Materials from Education – the ICESCR requires States Parties 
to provide an education that promotes “understanding, tolerance and friendship 
among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups,”416 implying that 
hateful materials should be removed from school curricula.  State practice 
indicates that Occupants have done so, and commentator Von Glahn advocated 
this approach as far as it is required by military necessity or satisfies the 
Occupant’s requirement to ensure public order.417  However, removing hateful 
materials might not always be in the interest of public order or required by 
military necessity. For example, if the hateful materials are not directed toward 
the Occupant, but toward some third group, it seems that removing them would 
cross a line in occupation law.418 This represents a conflict with IHRL, which 
would have the State Party remove any such materials that promote hatred. 
Additionally, some provisions of occupation law can be fit into the spirit of human rights 
obligations related to education.  These include: 
1. Occupant Should Act to Benefit the Welfare of the Local Population – Because 
human rights law is primarily concerned with protecting citizens from state 
abuses, this approach – condoned by occupation law – is consonant with 
international human rights law in general. 
2. Occupant Should Support Educational Institutions in Cooperation with National 
and Local Authorities – working with local and national authorities is a key 
provision of the laws of occupation on education, and respects the many 
provisions within human rights law on the right to education which specify that 
children, or children’s parents acting on their behalf, should have a choice in their 
educational options. This choice is tantamount to their having a say in their 
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education, and so the occupation law provision fits well into the spirit of these 
human rights law provisions. 
3. Occupant Should Respect Local Norms Including Religious and Cultural Needs - 
both IHRL and occupation law contain provisions related to providing for the 
needs of the local population in a manner that is specific to their religious, 
cultural, and ethnic backgrounds.  This demonstrates a respect in both sets of law 
for the dignity of individuals and for their family life.  In occupation law, an 
Occupant is required to find teachers, if it must assign them, who closely match 
the student in terms of his or her religion, ethnicity, national and cultural 
background.   
The increasing fragmentation of international law, which has been much discussed, 
requires that competing principles be harmonized into a single set of principles. The 
Court in ICJ decision simply mentioned that the state is responsible for both sets of 
obligations, IHL and IHRL. It relied on doctrine of lex specialis heavily to determine 
through which lens the laws should be seen (as a matter of which comes first).  However, 
many scholars have found this approach – largely imported from domestic legal systems 
which have much clearer formal hierarchies than the international legal system – to be 
problematic and at times, unclear.419  Other interpretations have been posited and 
international legal bodies such as the ILC have noted that which approach is taken should 
be determined based upon context.420   
 Horowitz pointed out two main underlying assumptions that in his opinion should 
be taken into consideration when deciding on the relationship between occupation law 
norms related to education and IHRL norms. One is the assumptions underlying 
occupation – namely, that occupation is short and temporary and the Occupant does not 
have the “prerogative” to change laws, which in contrast with a State’s wide authority to 
decide what education it provides its population, should be respected as a general 
principle over IHRL. So in this case, he finds the lex specialis approach, which would 
favor occupation law in this case, relevant.421  The second is that since occupation law 
was written, international standards on the right to education are far more comprehensive 
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and up to date than anything in occupation law.  It is for this reason that Horowitz 
advocates flipping the lex specialis relationship, allowing IHRL to be in the lead, and he 
does so by invoking the principle of law lex posterior derogat legi priori, meaning that 
when two provisions deal with the same content, the more recent law takes precedence.422 
He cautioned against using this principle however to suggest that all of IHRL should 
supersede IHL because IHRL is more recent, since this position has and would have 
virtually no support in court decisions or literature and goes against the notion that both 
bodies of law co-exist during conflict.423 
 One final point is that without the lex specialis framework to reign in the human 
rights standards, Occupants might use human rights obligations to manipulate laws in 
their favor.424  Some of the several occupation law restrictions that might reign in a 
human rights approach to amending legislation are the necessity of cooperating with local 
and national authorities to ensure the proper working of educational facilities.425  Another 
is that interference in education is only permitted in cases of necessity, i.e. if not 
interfering would result in a violation of the right to education.426 
 Allowing more up-to-date international human rights standards to guide the 
Occupant in its interpretation of IHL is not in conflict with what the drafters and 
interpreters of the Fourth Geneva Convention appeared to have wanted based on 
Horowitz’s reading of the drafting history and commentary.  For example, Greece 
specifically suggested updating a provision on education in Protocol I Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol I) to reflect “present-day requirements,” referring specifically to the 
right to education in the ICESCR.427 And the commentary on Article 77 AP I specifically 
mentions that the article develops the Fourth Geneva Convention as well as other rules of 
international law, naming specifically the ICCPR and the CRC.428 
 In regards to the question of at what point a human rights approach for a specific 
provision should take precedence over an occupation law approach, some have answered 
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that the change could occur when the territory during its daily life represents peace more 
than war.429 However, in the case of education, stronger controls are still needed in order 
to be able to monitor the Occupant’s intentions and actions and in order to more 
accurately gauge the needs and wants of the local population. 
 One other approach that could be possible would be for the Occupant to give 
effect to treaties that were in force by the prior sovereign’s ratification, but that had not 
been implemented.430  This would allow the Occupant to amend laws without coming up 
against the restrictions of occupation law. However, it would only allow for a limited 
range of changes and would go against the spirit of occupation law, which is not to make 
sweeping changes to the existing legislative structure. 
 The author advocates for the use of Horowitz’s approach, in which lex specialis or 
lex posterior is applied in order to selectively determine which body of law is the more 
appropriate lens through which to view an Occupant’s primary obligations. After 
determining which is the more appropriate, IHL or IHRL, the other norms can be filled in 
or injected into the more vague requirements of the other.  While imperfect, this approach 
nevertheless seems to bring practitioners one step closer to an agreed-upon approach for 
assessing education under occupation in relation to IHL and IHRL. 
 
Israel’s Conduct in Relation to IHL and IHRL Obligations 
Now that Israel’s obligations related to education under IHL and IHRL have been 
established, Israel’s violations of International Humanitarian Law and International 
Human Rights Law will be presented, taking into account the complementarity of Israel’s 
obligations based on the lex specialis/lex posterior framework that was discussed 
previously.  The violations of the various legal instruments and articles already discussed 
will be explored according to four general themes related to education, within which IHL 
and IHRL norms complement one another. 
Legal Problems Arising from Israel’s Position 
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Israel’s position that the Syrian Golan Heights is part of the sovereign territory of the 
state of Israel, while simultaneously recognizing that this status is not intended to 
prejudice a peace settlement with Syria, in which all or part of the Syrian Golan may be 
returned in exchange for peace, at first glance presents some legal contradictions.  Israel 
appears to be recognizing the continuing state of war between Syria and itself, and even 
politically conceptualizing its control over the Syrian Golan as a temporary state, and yet 
is not willing to take the step of formally admitting that the Syrian Golan is an occupied 
territory.  Doing so would force the state to accept the legal ramifications of its conduct 
(such as its violations of law, including the transfer of parts of its civilian population into 
the Syrian Golan through its civilian settlements there – arguably a war crime according 
to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court) and accept the legal obligations 
that it ignores or evades in relation to its conduct with the native population.   
 However, one scholar offers an explanation that reconciles this apparent 
contradiction in Israel’s position which provides even further support for the contention 
that Israel intended to annex the Syrian Golan.  Simply, annexing a territory does not in 
any way prevent a sovereign from agreeing to transfer its territory to its neighbor.431  This 
was pointed out explicitly by Prime Minister Begin during two of the three readings of 
the Golan Heights Law,432 and statements indicating the same idea were expressed in 
relation to the Basic Law which annexed Jerusalem to Israel.433   
 In addition to these problems, a primary reason why Israel’s position is 
problematic as regards international law is not simply a matter of its practice being in 
violation of the letter of legal norms, or the factual reality of its civil administration of the 
Syrian Golan, nor is it solely a matter of semantics in regards to whether or not the 
territory is called “annexed.”  The problem is something much more fundamental, having 
implications for the international legal system as a whole.  
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Whether the Israeli administration of the Syrian Golan is civil or military is not 
the main problem.  The primary problem is in the application of the same laws of one’s 
own population to an occupied population: Israel’s extension of its own law to the Syrian 
Golan fails to take into account the differing realities, state aims and legal obligations 
regarding the treatment of an occupied population.  This problem is essentially the crux 
of this paper.  The state has legitimate aims in regards to educating its own population.  
Yet these aims are at times fundamentally in conflict with the aims of education as relates 
to an occupied population, especially when a state is attempting to inculcate a sense of 
national identity in the people.  Some of the most obvious manifestations of this problem 
are in terms of educational content and curricula that address national history, but the 
problem goes much deeper, for example into the democratic processes of decision-
making that the Syrian Golan residents are not able to take part in due to their status as 
non-citizens.  And as long as Israel continues to hold that the inhabitants are simply 
rejecting Israel’s benevolence or generosity by not accepting its offer of citizenship, the 
fundamental attitude of Israel as regards the population and the resulting power relations 
will remain distinctly unbalanced. 
Israel in many ways, by attending to its human rights obligations exclusively in 
the Syrian Golan, could theoretically develop educational institutions positively in 
accordance with its obligations under international law.  This often is the narrative put 
forth by the state in relation to its conduct in the Syrian Golan.  For example, the state of 
Israel focuses on its achievements in education in the Syrian Golan, such as the increased 
enrollment of girls in schools, improved attendance and graduation rates among both 
genders, and its development of schools by utilizing increasingly advanced technology.  
However, by ignoring its obligations under international humanitarian law and focusing 
exclusively on the promotion of human rights and its objectives as a state, no matter how 
well it achieves these ends, Israel will still face problems due to the conflicting aims of 
the two bodies of law in relation to the residents.  The aims of a legitimate state sovereign 
over its population and the aims of an occupying power over the enemy inhabitants of the 
territory it occupies differ substantially, as has been discussed previously in this study.  
And as long as the population sees itself as occupied, and Israel ignores this status and 
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the resulting consequences of this viewpoint, the human dignity of the residents will not 
be respected and human rights obligations will therefore be violated in the process.  
Put another way, if what is good for an Israeli citizen must necessarily be good for 
a Syrian citizen, or a citizen of any other state, that would undermine some of the most 
important principles that underlie the international system of states.  These include the 
principles of state sovereignty and of the self-determination of peoples, which are 
bedrocks of the international legal system and protected by the UN Charter, in addition to 
numerous other instruments guaranteeing these rights.  States by definition differ in their 
determinations of what benefits their citizens, and it is their right and privilege to do so, 
since as sovereign nations, no legal body has authority over them. While there is happily 
more overlap between the valuations of states in what constitutes “good”- for example 
resulting in the abundance of multilateral international legal instruments guaranteeing 
agreed-upon rights and interstate cooperation - each state as a sovereign has the right to 
disagree with other states, except in regards to commission of the most heinous of crimes 
(such as violations of jus cogens norms).   
While Israel could begin to comply with its obligations under IHL and IHRL in 
relation to education as suggested by this analysis, it is unlikely that the residents of the 
Syrian Golan would enjoy their rights fully until they are no longer living under 
belligerent occupation.  However, without an end in sight to their prolonged occupation, 
Israel’s increased compliance with its international legal obligations could vastly improve 
the Syrian Golan residents’ enjoyment of the right to education. 
Changes to the Legal Structure and Proper Functioning of Schools 
As discussed previously, Israel’s acquisition of the Syrian Golan by force was in 
contravention of the UN Charter.  Israel’s subsequent military occupation was illegal 
according to IHL, and its application of its laws to the OSG, or annexing the territory, 
constituted a further violation of IHL that was condemned immediately by the United 
Nations Security Council, General Assembly, and was not recognized by nearly all 
nations of the world. And as just discussed, Israel’s prolonged occupation of the territory 
continuously subjects the population to an increased risk that their human rights will be 
violated.   
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As discussed, an occupant has to balance its obligations to maintain the status quo in 
the territory it occupies, and to take positive steps to ensure that the population is 
enjoying its human rights obligations. The tension between these two competing 
principles is apparent when it comes to the issue of Israel extending its educational 
curricula to the residents of the Syrian Golan and administering its schools.  
In a review of the history, immediately after its capture of the Syrian Golan in 1967, 
Israel’s military administration allowed the Syrian Golan residents to continue attending 
educational institutions following the Syrian curriculum and educational structure.  
However, the curriculum was soon replaced by an Israeli curriculum.  Israel claims that 
because of war with Syria, it had to use its own textbooks for education of the Syrian 
Golan residents since it had no access to Syrian curricula. Local authorities within the 
Syrian Golan, due to their stance of resisting Israeli authority, refused to cooperate with 
Israeli military authorities. Consequently, it is difficult to determine whether the Israeli 
authorities conducted themselves appropriately by replacing the curriculum. In regards to 
whether Israel’s changes to educational institutions without the consent of the local 
population amounted to a violation of IHL, this area of occupation law is gray.  
 As mentioned previously, Art. 50 of the Fourth Geneva Convention requiring an 
occupant to maintain educational institutions does not state what an occupant should do if 
local and national authorities refuse to cooperate in maintaining the proper working of 
educational institutions.  Israel chose to act unilaterally by implementing its education 
system, but without the cooperation of local authorities, and given a lack of teachers, 
textbooks, and legal authorities, it is difficult to say whether the Israeli authorities could 
have acted differently without violating their obligation under Article 50.   Under IHRL, 
in particular Article 13(2) of the ICESCR, States Parties have an obligation to ensure that 
schools are developed and that teaching conditions are continuously improved.  By taking 
an active role in the development of schools, Israel appears to have been complying with 
this provision. Teacher training was a more questionable area, but since the right to 
education is meant to be progressively realized, a more in depth study of Israel’s conduct 
would be necessary in order to determine whether or not this article has been violated. 
Art. 50 further requires that the occupant to ensure that children in the occupied 
territory who are orphaned or separated from their parents are provided with an education 
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if the local authorities are inadequate for doing so. And this obligation also requires an 
occupant, when making these arrangements, to provide education given by instructors of 
the same nationality, language, and religion of the children, if possible. And many other 
obligations in IHL demonstrate a respect for education of children that is consistent with 
their parents’ nationality, religion, language, and moral values.  The Israeli authorities, by 
requiring that students were taught in Arabic in Arab sector schools, by Druze teachers, 
may have believed that this constituted their compliance with the spirit of these IHL 
protections, even though most of the children were probably not orphaned.  In regards to 
nationality, because Israel began to define the Druze as a nation, a creative, rather than a 
strict, interpretation of “nationality” could have allowed them to make the argument that 
they were complying with the emphasis on nationality.  
Due to these ambiguities and considerations, it is not clear whether Israel’s original 
choice to impose its curricula on the residents of the Syrian Golan was in contravention 
of IHL. This is particularly true since in the first few years of occupation, the authorities 
may not have had time (or enough information or cooperation from residents) to 
understand the nuances of their situation vis a vis their identity, religion, and educational 
preferences.  Israel’s obligations related to nationality should have been more clear from 
the beginning, and will be discussed further in a later section. 
Similarly, Israel’s extension of its laws related to compulsory education over the 
Syrian Golan, at face value appears to contradict its obligation under Art. 53 of the Hague 
Regulations to keep local laws in force unless “absolutely prevented.” Yet, without 
access to Syrian lawyers, law books, or the authorities governing the provision of 
education, again, it could be argued that it was necessary for Israel to do so in order to 
ensure that the residents were guaranteed access to education under the law. However, 
the wording “absolutely prevented” suggests a very high standard of compliance, casting 
doubt on whether it was truly necessary for Israel to impose its school system on 
residents and cease respecting Syrian educational laws.  Therefore, it is again difficult to 
say whether Israel committed a violation early on by applying its own laws to the Syrian 
Golan. 
Later on, in particular when more of the local population began to cooperate with 
Israeli authorities, and when Syrian residents began publicly voicing their opinions on the 
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imposition of the Israeli educational system on residents, Israeli authorities have more to 
prove as to why they did not respond to the residents’ wishes.  This will be discussed 
further in relation to educational content. 
Access to Education 
In order to comply with its obligations under the right to education in IHRL, 
education must be available, accessible, acceptable, and adaptable. The first two will be 
discussed in relation to access to education. In the Syrian Golan, Israel took steps to 
ensure that all students of the appropriate ages were provided with some form of 
compulsory education.  However, the education was not always free, since residents had 
to pay for educational costs out of pocket in many cases.  This raises questions about 
whether education was truly “accessible” to all residents.  
Israel claimed its actions benefitted the local population. Indeed, Israel presents 
statistics demonstrating that reading levels, girls’ participation in education, and other 
indicators have risen positively as a result of Israel’s actions related to education in the 
Syrian Golan. These improvements support the notion that Israel complied with its 
requirements for access to education under the IHRL right to education. 
Choice of Schools 
On the whole, at least at primary and secondary levels, Israel appears to have 
provided access to education.  However, whether or not this access was provided on a 
non-discriminatory basis is in question. As will be discussed in more detail, students only 
had access to some schools – for example, a non-Jewish, Arab student could not attend a 
Jewish school even if the education provided there was of a higher quality or in keeping 
with the wishes of the student’s parents.  This could indicate that the access was 
discriminatory on prohibited grounds, and would call into question Israel’s compliance 
with access to education under the ICESCR and other IHRL instruments to which it is 
party. 
Choice of schools is an important component of the right to education that is not 
discriminatory, as outlined in the CADE, Art. 5(1) and numerous other instruments to 
which Israel is party, including the ICCPR and ICESCR. Parents have a right to choose 
the educational institutions for their children, or to create new schools if the available 
choices are not acceptable (subject to limitations such as quality and local law).  
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However, in the Syrian Golan, students did not have these choices even when they or 
their parents objected to the educational institutions’ quality or content. And according to 
the right to education in the ICESCR, non-discrimination must be achieved immediately, 
and is non-derogable. 
School choice is particularly important when it comes to the rights that minorities’ 
have to ensure their religious, linguistic, and moral traditions are respected and 
maintained.  For example, according to the CADE, Art. 2(b) and Art. 5(1), creating 
separate schools for minorities for linguistic or religious reasons does not constitute 
discriminatory treatment by a state party, but only if the institutions are optional and of a 
quality similar to or the same as other schools in the state.  In the case of the residents of 
the Syrian Golan, not only did many of the parents object to the educational institutions, 
they were not allowed other educational options, and met great resistance from Israeli 
authorities when they attempted to create alternative educational arrangements.  Further, 
the way that Hebrew is taught in comparison with Arabic, indicates a strong aversion by 
authorities to exploring the rich heritage of the Arabic language.  This may result in the 
erosion of Arabic language abilities and knowledge among an Arab population, and 
would defeat some of the objectives of creating separate, Arabic-language schools for the 
Arab minority as a means to respect the maintenance of their linguistic traditions.  
In sum, these circumstances suggest that the non-discrimination requirement, and thus 
Israel’s obligations under the CADE and ICESCR mentioned above, were violated. 
Respect for parents’ wishes and the best interests of the child fall under the “adaptability” 
criteria, and in the above case, as well as in terms of content, this criteria appears not to 
have been respected. 
Educational Content/Curricula 
Because teachers were often poorly trained, the threshold for “acceptable” 
education may not have been met.  
Another aspect in which parents’ wishes are important is in terms of the content 
of education, which fall under both the “acceptability” and “adaptability” criteria for 
assessing the core components of the right to education in IHRL.  Respect for parents’ 
wishes related to their moral or religious convictions in particular is guaranteed in Art. 
18(4) of the ICCPR, ICESCR Art. 13(3), and the two CADE articles already discussed.  
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Additionally, IHL – particularly the Geneva Conventions and their optional protocols-  
places a strong emphasis on the respect for children’s nationality, language, and religion. 
 In the Syrian Golan, many residents strongly disagree with the Druze heritage 
curriculum to which they have been subject. While Druze schools teach essentially 
secular tenets, they take great care to portray the Druze religious sect as an ethnic group 
or nation, and to emphasize aspects of the history of members of the religious sect that 
are calculated to serve Israel’s aims of nation-building among its citizens. Coupled with a 
lack of school choice, what many students and parents feel is objectionable content is 
forced upon residents against their religious and moral convictions.  This is in clear 
contravention of Israel’s obligations under the abovementioned articles. 
 Also in regards to content, the state is under an obligation to avoid inciting 
religious hatred, and to provide an education that is consistent with the United Nations’ 
aims of tolerance and friendship among peoples and nations.  This is an essential 
component of the right to education, as outlined in the CRC, ICESCR, and other 
instruments.  To this end, it is questionable how the portions of the Druze heritage 
curriculum that are intended to distance students from their Arab heritage, and emphasize 
elements of history that serve to distance students from Muslim Arabs, are intended to 
promote “friendly relations” among the residents of the Syrian Golan with Arab 
populations and nations.   
However, Israel in this case is balancing a situation in which authorities may fear 
that– if afforded an accurate portrayal of their political and religious history – the 
curriculum might incite religious hatred against the Jewish population in Israel, or incite 
violence directed at the occupant’s forces.  And yet, it is critical for the state to be able to 
balance their permissible interference with educational content of this nature, with their 
obligations to provide an education that is consistent with residents’ convictions (or to 
allow them to create their own educational institutions). While restrictions on “political” 
content are arguably permissible according to IHL, at least if judging by some of the 
foundational rules of IHL, if not by the letter of the law, an overly broad definition of 
what is political can infringe on residents’ rights as described above – in particular, as 
they relate to what Israel considers sensitive information related to identity, such as 
religion and ethnic heritage – can easily surpass what is permitted by IHL.  
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For example, applying an educational system that – if what critics allege is true – 
deliberately attempts to separate Syrian Arab Druze from their ethnic Arab identity, due 
to fears that Arabs will coalesce under the umbrella of Arab nationalism and harm the 
state’s security, is so broad as to constitute a violation.  Re-shaping the identity of an 
occupied population in order to serve nation-building interests in the occupant’s state, 
particularly at the expense of respecting the national origins of the population, goes 
beyond the occupant’s authorities in relation to interfering with educational content. 
Consent and Welfare of Population 
 Above all other things, the principle of distinction is an essential principle of 
humanitarian law. Residents of the Syrian Golan should under no circumstances be used 
to achieve military objectives by Israel, and actions should not be for the “sole benefit” of 
the occupant.  And according to the CRC, the best interests of the child should be 
respected.  These include a child’s right to education that respects his or her family 
heritage, language, and nationality. 
 Israel’s attempts to inculcate Israeli nationalism in the occupied population – in 
pursuit of the state’s aims to achieve sovereignty over the Syrian Golan – appear to come 
for the sole benefit of the occupant, at the expense of the rights of the children subject to 
the education system.  This is a clear violation of the CRC, and of a basic principle of 
occupation law. 
 
Conclusion 
While it may not live up to the expectations of either adherents or critics of the 
power of education to create either good or evil human beings, education does have an 
impact on a child’s development and worldview, one that is even more pronounced in a 
situation of conflict, in which two parties are at war.  And many of the rights and 
protections afforded children under both IHL and IHRL are directed toward preserving 
and upholding the human dignity that all people possess.  The residents of the Syrian 
Golan have been caught in the middle of a conflict that, in the absence of military action, 
has been waged in terms of their identity, and their loyalty.  And the overall conclusion of 
this study points to the fact that by violating residents’ rights under these two bodies of 
law, Israel in some of its actions threatens their dignity. 
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From a human rights and humanitarian perspective, it is critical to ensure that the 
story of a people is told in a way that does not infringe on others’ rights.  But it is also 
critical that a people be allowed to define itself, and to pass on its own story to its 
children. It is critical that children are never taught that their own identity is a threat. 
  
 
